Seventeen Centuries on iwe.pub

1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

1#

The Will to Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts , which is to tempt us to many a hazardous enterprise, the famous Truthfulness ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Virtues of which all philosophers have hitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Will to Truth not laid before us! What strange, perplexing, questionable questions! It is already a long story; yet it seems as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last grow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away? That this Sphinx ↖ Beyond Good and Evil teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? Who is it really that puts questions to us here? What really is this “Will to Truth” in us? In fact we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this Will—until at last we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We inquired about the value of this Will. Granted that we want the truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the Value of Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil presented itself before us—or was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us is the Oedipus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a rendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could it be believed that it at last seems to us as if the problem had never been propounded before, as if we were the first to discern it, get a sight of it, and risk raising it? For there is risk in raising it, perhaps there is no greater risk.

10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

10#

The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, with which the problem of “the real and the apparent world” is dealt with at present throughout Europe, furnishes food for thought and attention; and he who hears only a “ Will to Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts ” in the background, and nothing else, cannot certainly boast of the sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really have happened that such a Will to Truth—a certain extravagant and adventurous pluck, a metaphysician’s ambition of the forlorn hope—has participated therein: that which in the end always prefers a handful of “certainty” to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be puritanical fanatics of conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure nothing, rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ States Of Being , and the sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding the courageous bearing such a virtue may display. It seems, however, to be otherwise with stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life. In that they side against appearance, and speak superciliously of “ Perspective ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ,” in that they rank the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility of the ocular evidence that “the earth stands still,” and thus, apparently, allowing with complacency their securest possession to escape (for what does one at present believe in more firmly than in one’s body?)—who knows if they are not really trying to win back something which was formerly an even securer possession, something of the old domain of the faith of former times, perhaps the “immortal soul,” perhaps “the old God,” in short, ideas by which they could live better, that is to say, more vigorously and more joyously, than by “modern ideas”? There is distrust of these modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a disbelief in all that has been constructed yesterday and today; there is perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn, which can no longer endure the bric-a-brac of ideas of the most varied origin, such as so-called Positivism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools at present throws on the market; a disgust of the more refined taste at the village-fair motleyness and patchiness of all these reality-philosophasters, in whom there is nothing either new or true, except this motleyness. Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those skeptical anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; their instinct, which repels them from modern reality, is unrefuted … what do their retrograde bypaths concern us! The main thing about them is not that they wish to go “back,” but that they wish to get away therefrom. A little more strength, swing, courage, and artistic power, and they would be off—and not back!

100

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

100#

We all feign to ourselves that we are simpler than we are, we thus relax ourselves away from our fellows.

101

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

101#

A discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the animalization of God.

102

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

102#

Discovering reciprocal love should really disenchant the lover with regard to the beloved. “What! She is modest enough to love even you? Or stupid enough? Or—or—”

103

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

103#

The Danger in Happiness.—“Everything now turns out best for me, I now love every fate:—who would like to be my fate?”

104

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

104#

Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents the Christians of today—burning us.

105

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

105#

The pia fraus is still more repugnant to the taste (the “piety”) of the free spirit (the “pious man of knowledge”) than the impia fraus. Hence the profound lack of judgment, in comparison with the Church, characteristic of the type “free spirit”—as its non-freedom.

106

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

106#

By means of music the very passions enjoy themselves.

107

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

107#

A sign of strong character, when once the resolution has been taken, to shut the ear even to the best counterarguments. Occasionally, therefore, a will to stupidity.

108

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

108#

There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.

109

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

109#

The criminal is often enough not equal to his deed: he extenuates and maligns it.

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Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

11#

It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert attention from the actual influence which Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers exercised on German philosophy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with it in his hand he said: “This is the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics.” Let us only understand this “could be”! He was proud of having discovered a new faculty in man, the faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he deceived himself in this matter; the development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy depended nevertheless on his pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger generation to discover if possible something—at all events “new faculties”—of which to be still prouder!—But let us reflect for a moment—it is high time to do so. “How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” Kant asks himself—and what is really his answer? “By means of a means (faculty)”—but unfortunately not in five words, but so circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of German profundity and verbal flourishes, that one altogether loses sight of the comical niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer. People were beside themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man—for at that time Germans were still moral, not yet dabbling in the “Politics of hard fact.” Then came the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the young theologians of the Tubingen institution went immediately into the groves—all seeking for “faculties.” And what did they not find—in that innocent, rich, and still youthful period of the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious fairy, piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between “finding” and “inventing”! Above all a faculty for the “transcendental”; Schelling ↖ Beyond Good and Evil christened it, intellectual intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest longings of the naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater wrong to the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly, in hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it seriously, or even treat it with moral indignation. Enough, however—the world grew older, and the dream vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still rub them today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost—old Kant. “By means of a means (faculty)”—he had said, or at least meant to say. But, is that—an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? “By means of a means (faculty),” namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Molière,

110

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

110#

The advocates of a criminal are seldom artists enough to turn the beautiful terribleness of the deed to the advantage of the doer.

111

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

111#

Our vanity is most difficult to wound just when our pride has been wounded.

112

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

112#

To him who feels himself preordained to contemplation and not to belief, all believers are too noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them.

113

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

113#

“You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be embarrassed before him.”

114

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

114#

The immense expectation with regard to sexual love, and the coyness in this expectation, spoils all the perspectives of women at the outset.

115

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

115#

Where there is neither love nor hatred in the game, woman’s play is mediocre.

116

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

116#

The great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage to rebaptize our badness as the best in us.

117

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

117#

The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately only the will of another, or of several other, emotions.

118

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

118#

There is an innocence of admiration: it is possessed by him to whom it has not yet occurred that he himself may be admired some day.

119

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

119#

Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning ourselves—“justifying” ourselves.

12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

12#

As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best-refuted theories that have been advanced, and in Europe there is now perhaps no one in the learned world so unscholarly as to attach serious signification to it, except for convenient everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)—thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich ↖ Beyond Good and Evil : he and the Pole Copernicus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil have hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does not stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last thing that “stood fast” of the earth—the belief in “substance,” in “matter,” in the earth-residuum, and particle-atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, against the “atomistic requirements” which still lead a dangerous afterlife in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated “metaphysical requirements”: one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion has taught best and longest, the Soul-atomism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics . Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of “the soul” thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses—as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as “mortal soul,” and “soul of subjective multiplicity,” and “soul as social structure of the instincts and passions,” want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. In that the new psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust—it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned to invent—and, who knows? perhaps to discover the new.

120

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

120#

Sensuality often forces the growth of love too much, so that its root remains weak, and is easily torn up.

121

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

121#

It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author—and that he did not learn it better.

122

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

122#

To rejoice on account of praise is in many cases merely politeness of heart—and the very opposite of vanity of spirit.

123

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

123#

Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage.

124

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

124#

He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable.

125

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

125#

When we have to change an opinion about anyone, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us.

126

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

126#

A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—Yes, and then to get round them.

127

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

127#

In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it—or worse still! under their dress and finery.

128

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

128#

The more abstract the truth you wish to teach, the more must you allure the senses to it.

129

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

129#

The devil has the most extensive perspectives for God; on that account he keeps so far away from him:—the devil, in effect, as the oldest friend of knowledge.

13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

13#

Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of Self-preservation ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts ; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results thereof. In short, here, as everywhere else, let us beware of superfluous Teleological principles ↖ Beyond Good and Evil !—one of which is the instinct of self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers ’s inconsistency). It is thus, in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy of principles.

130

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

130#

What a person is begins to betray itself when his talent decreases—when he ceases to show what he can do. Talent is also an adornment; an adornment is also a concealment.

131

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

131#

The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact woman is essentially unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may have assumed the peaceable demeanour.

132

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

132#

One is punished best for one’s virtues.

133

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

133#

He who cannot find the way to his ideal, lives more frivolously and shamelessly than the man without an ideal.

134

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

134#

From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good conscience, all evidence of truth.

135

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

135#

Pharisaism is not a deterioration of the good man; a considerable part of it is rather an essential condition of being good.

136

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

136#

The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the other seeks someone whom he can assist: a good conversation thus originates.

137

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

137#

In intercourse with scholars and artists one readily makes mistakes of opposite kinds: in a remarkable scholar one not infrequently finds a mediocre man; and often, even in a mediocre artist, one finds a very remarkable man.

138

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

138#

We do the same when awake as when dreaming: we only invent and imagine him with whom we have intercourse—and forget it immediately.

139

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

139#

In revenge and in love woman is more barbarous than man.

14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

14#

It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that Natural philosophy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement (according to us, if I may say so!) and not a world-explanation; but in so far as it is based on belief in the senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be regarded as more—namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this operates fascinatingly, persuasively, and convincingly upon an age with fundamentally plebeian tastes—in fact, it follows instinctively the canon of truth of eternal popular Sensualism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil . What is clear, what is “explained”? Only that which can be seen and felt—one must pursue every problem thus far. Obversely, however, the charm of the Plato ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers nic mode of thought, which was an aristocratic mode, consisted precisely in resistance to obvious sense-evidence—perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger and more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this by means of pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they threw over the motley whirl of the senses—the mob of the senses, as Plato said. In this overcoming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of Plato, there was an enjoyment different from that which the physicists of today offer us—and likewise the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the physiological workers, with their principle of the “smallest possible effort,” and the greatest possible blunder. “Where there is nothing more to see or to grasp, there is also nothing more for men to do”—that is certainly an imperative different from the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be the right imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridge-builders of the future, who have nothing but rough work to perform.

140

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

140#

Advice As a Riddle.—“If the band is not to break, bite it first—secure to make!”

141

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

141#

The belly is the reason why man does not so readily take himself for a God.

142

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

142#

The chastest utterance I ever heard: “Dans le véritable amour c’est l’âme qui enveloppe le corps.”

143

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

143#

Our vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is most difficult to us.—Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.

144

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

144#

When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste; man, indeed, if I may say so, is “the barren animal.”

145

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

145#

Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the secondary role.

146

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

146#

He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.

147

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

147#

From old Florentine novels—moreover, from life: Buona femmina e mala femmina vuol bastone. —Sacchetti, Nov. ‘86.

148

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

148#

To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and afterwards to believe implicitly in this opinion of their neighbour—who can do this conjuring trick so well as women?

149

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

149#

That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of what was formerly considered good—the atavism of an old ideal.

15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

15#

To study Physiology ↖ Beyond Good and Evil with a clear conscience, one must insist on the fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense of the idealistic philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle. What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum, if the conception Causa sui ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is not the work of our organs—?

150

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

150#

Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the demigod everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes—what? perhaps a “world”?

151

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

151#

It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have your permission to possess it;—eh, my friends?

152

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

152#

“Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always Paradise”: so say the most ancient and the most modern serpents.

153

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

153#

What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil.

154

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

154#

Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are signs of health; everything absolute belongs to pathology.

155

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

155#

The sense of the tragic increases and declines with sensuousness.

156

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

156#

Insanity in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule.

157

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

157#

The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night.

158

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

158#

Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to our strongest impulse—the tyrant in us.

159

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

159#

One must repay good and ill; but why just to the person who did us good or ill?

16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

16#

There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are “immediate certainties”; for instance, “I think,” or as the superstition of Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers puts it, “I will”; as though cognition here got hold of its object purely and simply as “the Thing-in-itself ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics ,” without any falsification taking place either on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it, however, a hundred times, that “ Immediate certainty ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ,” as well as “absolute knowledge” and the “thing in itself,” involve a Contradictio in adjecto ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Paradoxes ; we really ought to free ourselves from the misleading significance of words! The people on their part may think that cognition is knowing all about things, but the philosopher must say to himself: “When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, ‘I think,’ I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ‘ Ego ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology ,’ and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? In short, the assertion ‘I think,’ assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further ‘knowledge,’ it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me.”—In place of the “immediate certainty” in which the people may believe in the special case, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented to him, veritable conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: “Whence did I get the notion of ’thinking’? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an ’ego,’ and even of an ’ego’ as cause, and finally of an ’ego’ as cause of thought?” He who ventures to answer these metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of intuitive perception, like the person who says, “I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and certain”—will encounter a smile and two notes of interrogation in a philosopher nowadays. “Sir,” the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, “it is improbable that you are not mistaken, but why should it be the truth?”

160

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

160#

One no longer loves one’s knowledge sufficiently after one has communicated it.

161

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

161#

Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences: they exploit them.

162

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

162#

“Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our neighbour’s neighbour”:—so thinks every nation.

163

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

163#

Love brings to light the noble and hidden qualities of a lover—his rare and exceptional traits: it is thus liable to be deceptive as to his normal character.

164

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

164#

Jesus said to his Jews: “The law was for servants;—love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!”

165

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

165#

In Sight of Every Party.—A shepherd has always need of a bellwether—or he has himself to be a wether occasionally.

166

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

166#

One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with the accompanying grimace one nevertheless tells the truth.

167

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

167#

To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame—and something precious.

168

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

168#

Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice.

169

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

169#

To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing oneself.

17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

17#

With regard to the Superstitions of logicians ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds—namely, that a thought comes when “it” wishes, and not when “I” wish; so that it is a perversion of the facts of the case to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think.” One thinks; but that this “one” is precisely the famous old “ Ego ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology ,” is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an “immediate certainty.” After all, one has even gone too far with this “one thinks”—even the “one” contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula—“To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently” … It was pretty much on the same lines that the older Atomism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics sought, besides the operating “power,” the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this “earth-residuum,” and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician’s point of view, to get along without the little “one” (to which the worthy old “ego” has refined itself).

170

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

170#

In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in blame.

171

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

171#

Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of knowledge, like tender hands on a Cyclops.

172

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

172#

One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one must never confess to the individual.

173

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

173#

One does not hate as long as one disesteems, but only when one esteems equal or superior.

174

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

174#

Ye Utilitarians—ye, too, love the utile only as a vehicle for your inclinations—ye, too, really find the noise of its wheels insupportable!

175

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

175#

One loves ultimately one’s desires, not the thing desired.

176

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

176#

The vanity of others is only counter to our taste when it is counter to our vanity.

177

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

177#

With regard to what “truthfulness” is, perhaps nobody has ever been sufficiently truthful.

178

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

178#

One does not believe in the follies of clever men: what a forfeiture of the rights of man!

179

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

179#

The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile “reformed.”

18

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18#

It is certainly not the least charm of a Theory ↖ Beyond Good and Evil that it is refutable; it is precisely thereby that it attracts the more subtle minds. It seems that the hundred-times-refuted theory of the “ Free Will ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ The Prince ↖ Will Concepts ” owes its persistence to this charm alone; someone is always appearing who feels himself strong enough to refute it.

180

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180#

There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a cause.

181

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

181#

It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed.

182

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

182#

The familiarity of superiors embitters one, because it may not be returned.

183

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

183#

“I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but because I can no longer believe in you.”

184

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

184#

There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the appearance of wickedness.

185

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185#

“I dislike him.”—Why?—“I am not a match for him.”—Did anyone ever answer so?

186

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186#

The Moral sentiment ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems in Europe at present is perhaps as subtle, belated, diverse, sensitive, and refined, as the “ Science of Morals ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems ” belonging thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and coarse-fingered:—an interesting contrast, which sometimes becomes incarnate and obvious in the very person of a moralist. Indeed, the expression, “Science of Morals” is, in respect to what is designated thereby, far too presumptuous and counter to good taste—which is always a foretaste of more modest expressions. One ought to avow with the utmost fairness what is still necessary here for a long time, what is alone proper for the present: namely, the collection of material, the comprehensive survey and classification of an immense domain of delicate sentiments of worth, and distinctions of worth, which live, grow, propagate, and perish—and perhaps attempts to give a clear idea of the recurring and more common forms of these living crystallizations—as preparation for a theory of types of morality. To be sure, people have not hitherto been so modest. All the philosophers, with a pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, demanded of themselves something very much higher, more pretentious, and ceremonious, when they concerned themselves with morality as a science: they wanted to give a basis to morality—and every philosopher hitherto has believed that he has given it a basis; morality itself, however, has been regarded as something “given.” How far from their awkward pride was the seemingly insignificant problem—left in dust and decay—of a description of forms of morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and senses could hardly be fine enough for it! It was precisely owing to moral philosophers’ knowing the moral facts imperfectly, in an arbitrary epitome, or an accidental abridgement—perhaps as the morality of their environment, their position, their church, their Zeitgeist, their climate and zone—it was precisely because they were badly instructed with regard to nations, eras, and past ages, and were by no means eager to know about these matters, that they did not even come in sight of the real problems of morals—problems which only disclose themselves by a comparison of many kinds of morality. In every “Science of Morals” hitherto, strange as it may sound, the problem of morality itself has been omitted: there has been no suspicion that there was anything problematic there! That which philosophers called “giving a basis to morality,” and endeavoured to realize, has, when seen in a right light, proved merely a learned form of good faith in prevailing morality, a new means of its expression, consequently just a matter-of-fact within the sphere of a definite morality, yea, in its ultimate motive, a sort of denial that it is lawful for this morality to be called in question—and in any case the reverse of the testing, analyzing, doubting, and vivisecting of this very faith. Hear, for instance, with what innocence—almost worthy of honour— Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers represents his own task, and draw your conclusions concerning the scientificness of a “Science” whose latest master still talks in the strain of children and old wives: “The principle,” he says (page 136 of the Grundprobleme der Ethik), “the axiom about the purport of which all moralists are practically agreed: neminem laede, immo omnes quantum potes juva—is really the proposition which all moral teachers strive to establish, … the real basis of ethics which has been sought, like the philosopher’s stone, for centuries.”—The difficulty of establishing the proposition referred to may indeed be great—it is well known that Schopenhauer also was unsuccessful in his efforts; and whoever has thoroughly realized how absurdly false and sentimental this proposition is, in a world whose essence is Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts , may be reminded that Schopenhauer, although a pessimist, actually—played the flute … daily after dinner: one may read about the matter in his biography. A question by the way: a pessimist, a repudiator of God and of the world, who makes a halt at morality—who assents to morality, and plays the flute to laede-neminem morals, what? Is that really—a pessimist?

187

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187#

Apart from the value of such assertions as “there is a Categorical imperative ↖ Beyond Good and Evil in us,” one can always ask: What does such an assertion indicate about him who makes it? There are Systems of morals ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems which are meant to justify their author in the eyes of other people; other systems of morals are meant to tranquilize him, and make him self-satisfied; with other systems he wants to crucify and humble himself, with others he wishes to take revenge, with others to conceal himself, with others to glorify himself and gain superiority and distinction—this system of morals helps its author to forget, that system makes him, or something of him, forgotten, many a moralist would like to exercise power and creative arbitrariness over mankind, many another, perhaps, Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers especially, gives us to understand by his morals that “what is estimable in me, is that I know how to obey—and with you it shall not be otherwise than with me!” In short, systems of morals are only a sign-language of the emotions.

188

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188#

In contrast to laisser-aller, every system of morals is a sort of tyranny against “nature” and also against “reason,” that is, however, no objection, unless one should again decree by some system of morals, that all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness are unlawful. What is essential and invaluable in every system of morals, is that it is a long constraint. In order to understand Stoicism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools , or Port Royal, or Puritanism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , one should remember the constraint under which every language has attained to strength and freedom—the metrical constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm. How much trouble have the poets and orators of every nation given themselves!—not excepting some of the prose writers of today, in whose ear dwells an inexorable conscientiousness—“for the sake of a folly,” as utilitarian bunglers say, and thereby deem themselves wise—“from submission to arbitrary laws,” as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy themselves “free,” even free-spirited. The singular fact remains, however, that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as in conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law, and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is “nature” and “natural”—and not laisser-aller! Every artist knows how different from the state of letting himself go, is his “most natural” condition, the free arranging, locating, disposing, and constructing in the moments of “inspiration”—and how strictly and delicately he then obeys a thousand laws, which, by their very rigidness and precision, defy all formulation by means of ideas (even the most stable idea has, in comparison therewith, something floating, manifold, and ambiguous in it). The essential thing “in heaven and in earth” is, apparently (to repeat it once more), that there should be long Obedience ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics in the same direction, there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life worth living; for instance, virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality—anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish, or divine. The long bondage of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in the communicability of ideas, the discipline which the thinker imposed on himself to think in accordance with the rules of a church or a court, or conformable to Aristotelian premises, the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything that happened according to a Christian scheme ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , and in every occurrence to rediscover and justify the Christian God:—all this violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness, and unreasonableness, has proved itself the disciplinary means whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility; granted also that much irrecoverable strength and spirit had to be stifled, suffocated, and spoilt in the process (for here, as everywhere, “nature” shows herself as she is, in all her extravagant and indifferent magnificence, which is shocking, but nevertheless noble). That for centuries European thinkers only thought in order to prove something—nowadays, on the contrary, we are suspicious of every thinker who “wishes to prove something”—that it was always settled beforehand what was to be the result of their strictest thinking, as it was perhaps in the Asiatic astrology of former times, or as it is still at the present day in the innocent, Christian-moral explanation of immediate personal events “for the glory of God,” or “for the good of the soul”:—this tyranny, this arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has educated the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer sense, is apparently an indispensable means even of spiritual education and discipline. One may look at every system of morals in this light: it is “nature” therein which teaches to hate the laisser-aller, the too great freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons, for immediate duties—it teaches the narrowing of perspectives, and thus, in a certain sense, that stupidity is a condition of life and development. “Thou must obey someone, and for a long time; otherwise thou wilt come to grief, and lose all respect for thyself”—this seems to me to be the moral imperative of nature, which is certainly neither “categorical,” as old Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers wished (consequently the “otherwise”), nor does it address itself to the individual (what does nature care for the individual!), but to nations, races, ages, and ranks; above all, however, to the animal “man” generally, to mankind.

189

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Industrious races find it a great hardship to be idle: it was a master stroke of English instinct to hallow and begloom Sunday to such an extent that the Englishman unconsciously hankers for his week—and workday again:—as a kind of cleverly devised, cleverly intercalated fast, such as is also frequently found in the ancient world (although, as is appropriate in southern nations, not precisely with respect to work). Many kinds of fasts are necessary; and wherever powerful influences and habits prevail, legislators have to see that intercalary days are appointed, on which such impulses are fettered, and learn to hunger anew. Viewed from a higher standpoint, whole generations and epochs, when they show themselves infected with any moral fanaticism, seem like those intercalated periods of restraint and fasting, during which an impulse learns to humble and submit itself—at the same time also to purify and sharpen itself; certain philosophical sects likewise admit of a similar interpretation (for instance, the Stoa ↖ Ancient Cultures ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools , in the midst of Hellenic culture, with the atmosphere rank and overcharged with Aphrodisiacal odours).—Here also is a hint for the explanation of the paradox, why it was precisely in the most Christian period of European history, and in general only under the pressure of Christian sentiments ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , that the sexual impulse sublimated into love ( Amour-passion ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ).

19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

19#

Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the Will ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts as though it were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers has given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. But it again and again seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer also only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing—he seems to have adopted a popular prejudice and exaggerated it. Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unity only in name—and it is precisely in a name that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the mastery over the inadequate precautions of philosophers in all ages. So let us for once be more cautious, let us be “unphilosophical”: let us say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition “away from which we go,” the sensation of the condition “towards which we go,” the sensation of this “from” and “towards” itself, and then besides, an accompanying muscular sensation, which, even without our putting in motion “arms and legs,” commences its action by force of habit, directly we “will” anything. Therefore, just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognized as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the will there is a ruling thought;—and let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the “willing,” as if the will would then remain over! In the third place, the will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an emotion, and in fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed “ Freedom of the Will ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts ” is essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to him who must obey: “I am free, ‘he’ must obey”—this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that “this and nothing else is necessary now,” the inward certainty that obedience will be rendered—and whatever else pertains to the position of the commander. A man who wills commands something within himself which renders obedience, or which he believes renders obedience. But now let us notice what is the strangest thing about the will—this affair so extremely complex, for which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the given circumstances we are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term “I”: a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the act of willing—to such a degree that he who wills believes firmly that willing suffices for action. Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the command—consequently obedience, and therefore action—was to be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a necessity of effect; in a word, he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics which accompanies all success. “Freedom of Will”—that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order—who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame them. In this way the person exercising volition adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful “underwills” or under-souls—indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls—to his feelings of delight as commander. L’effet c’est moi: what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many “souls,” on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing-as-such within the sphere of morals—regarded as the doctrine of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of “life” manifests itself.

190

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190#

There is something in the Morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems of Plato ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers which does not really belong to Plato, but which only appears in his philosophy, one might say, in spite of him: namely, Socratism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools , for which he himself was too noble. “No one desires to injure himself, hence all evil is done unwittingly. The evil man inflicts injury on himself; he would not do so, however, if he knew that evil is evil. The evil man, therefore, is only evil through error; if one free him from error one will necessarily make him—good.”—This mode of reasoning savours of the populace, who perceive only the unpleasant consequences of evildoing, and practically judge that “it is stupid to do wrong”; while they accept “good” as identical with “useful and pleasant,” without further thought. As regards every system of Utilitarianism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems , one may at once assume that it has the same origin, and follow the scent: one will seldom err.—Plato did all he could to interpret something refined and noble into the tenets of his teacher, and above all to interpret himself into them—he, the most daring of all interpreters, who lifted the entire Socrates ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers out of the street, as a popular theme and song, to exhibit him in endless and impossible modifications—namely, in all his own disguises and multiplicities. In jest, and in Homeric language as well, what is the Platonic Socrates, if not—

191

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191#

The old theological problem of “Faith” and “Knowledge,” or more plainly, of Instinct and Reason ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology —the question whether, in respect to the valuation of things, instinct deserves more authority than rationality, which wants to appreciate and act according to motives, according to a “Why,” that is to say, in conformity to purpose and utility—it is always the old moral problem that first appeared in the person of Socrates ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers , and had divided men’s minds long before Christianity. Socrates himself, following, of course, the taste of his talent—that of a surpassing dialectician—took first the side of reason; and, in fact, what did he do all his life but laugh at the awkward incapacity of the noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and could never give satisfactory answers concerning the motives of their actions? In the end, however, though silently and secretly, he laughed also at himself: with his finer conscience and introspection, he found in himself the same difficulty and incapacity. “But why”—he said to himself—“should one on that account separate oneself from the instincts! One must set them right, and the reason also—one must follow the instincts, but at the same time persuade the reason to support them with good arguments.” This was the real falseness of that great and mysterious ironist; he brought his conscience up to the point that he was satisfied with a kind of self-outwitting: in fact, he perceived the irrationality in the moral judgment.— Plato ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers , more innocent in such matters, and without the craftiness of the plebeian, wished to prove to himself, at the expenditure of all his strength—the greatest strength a philosopher had ever expended—that reason and instinct lead spontaneously to one goal, to the good, to “God”; and since Plato, all theologians and philosophers have followed the same path—which means that in matters of morality, instinct (or as Christians call it, “Faith,” or as I call it, “the herd”) has hitherto triumphed. Unless one should make an exception in the case of Descartes ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , the father of rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), who recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only a tool, and Descartes was superficial.

192

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Whoever has followed the history of a single science, finds in its development a clue to the understanding of the oldest and commonest processes of all “knowledge and cognizance”: there, as here, the premature hypotheses, the fictions, the good stupid will to “belief,” and the lack of distrust and patience are first developed—our senses learn late, and never learn completely, to be subtle, reliable, and cautious organs of knowledge. Our eyes find it easier on a given occasion to produce a picture already often produced, than to seize upon the divergence and novelty of an impression: the latter requires more force, more “morality.” It is difficult and painful for the ear to listen to anything new; we hear strange music badly. When we hear another language spoken, we involuntarily attempt to form the sounds into words with which we are more familiar and conversant—it was thus, for example, that the Germans modified the spoken word arcubalista into armbrust (crossbow). Our senses are also hostile and averse to the new; and generally, even in the “simplest” processes of sensation, the emotions dominate—such as fear, love, hatred, and the passive emotion of indolence.—As little as a reader nowadays reads all the single words (not to speak of syllables) of a page—he rather takes about five out of every twenty words at random, and “guesses” the probably appropriate sense to them—just as little do we see a tree correctly and completely in respect to its leaves, branches, colour, and shape; we find it so much easier to fancy the chance of a tree. Even in the midst of the most remarkable experiences, we still do just the same; we fabricate the greater part of the experience, and can hardly be made to contemplate any event, except as “inventors” thereof. All this goes to prove that from our fundamental nature and from remote ages we have been—accustomed to lying. Or, to express it more politely and hypocritically, in short, more pleasantly—one is much more of an artist than one is aware of.—In an animated conversation, I often see the face of the person with whom I am speaking so clearly and sharply defined before me, according to the thought he expresses, or which I believe to be evoked in his mind, that the degree of distinctness far exceeds the strength of my visual faculty—the delicacy of the play of the muscles and of the expression of the eyes must therefore be imagined by me. Probably the person put on quite a different expression, or none at all.

193

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Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit: but also contrariwise. What we experience in dreams, provided we experience it often, pertains at last just as much to the general belongings of our soul as anything “actually” experienced; by virtue thereof we are richer or poorer, we have a requirement more or less, and finally, in broad daylight, and even in the brightest moments of our waking life, we are ruled to some extent by the nature of our dreams. Supposing that someone has often flown in his dreams, and that at last, as soon as he dreams, he is conscious of the power and art of flying as his privilege and his peculiarly enviable happiness; such a person, who believes that on the slightest impulse, he can actualize all sorts of curves and angles, who knows the sensation of a certain divine levity, an “upwards” without effort or constraint, a “downwards” without descending or lowering—without trouble!—how could the man with such dream-experiences and dream-habits fail to find “happiness” differently coloured and defined, even in his waking hours! How could he fail—to long differently for happiness? “Flight,” such as is described by poets, must, when compared with his own “flying,” be far too earthly, muscular, violent, far too “troublesome” for him.

194

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The difference among men does not manifest itself only in the difference of their lists of desirable things—in their regarding different good things as worth striving for, and being disagreed as to the greater or less value, the order of rank, of the commonly recognized desirable things:—it manifests itself much more in what they regard as actually having and possessing a desirable thing. As regards a woman, for instance, the control over her body and her sexual gratification serves as an amply sufficient sign of ownership and possession to the more modest man; another with a more suspicious and ambitious thirst for possession, sees the “questionableness,” the mere apparentness of such ownership, and wishes to have finer tests in order to know especially whether the woman not only gives herself to him, but also gives up for his sake what she has or would like to have—only then does he look upon her as “possessed.” A third, however, has not even here got to the limit of his distrust and his desire for possession: he asks himself whether the woman, when she gives up everything for him, does not perhaps do so for a phantom of him; he wishes first to be thoroughly, indeed, profoundly well known; in order to be loved at all he ventures to let himself be found out. Only then does he feel the beloved one fully in his possession, when she no longer deceives herself about him, when she loves him just as much for the sake of his devilry and concealed insatiability, as for his goodness, patience, and spirituality. One man would like to possess a nation, and he finds all the higher arts of Cagliostro and Catalina suitable for his purpose. Another, with a more refined thirst for possession, says to himself: “One may not deceive where one desires to possess”—he is irritated and impatient at the idea that a mask of him should rule in the hearts of the people: “I must, therefore, make myself known, and first of all learn to know myself!” Among helpful and charitable people, one almost always finds the awkward craftiness which first gets up suitably him who has to be helped, as though, for instance, he should “merit” help, seek just their help, and would show himself deeply grateful, attached, and subservient to them for all help. With these conceits, they take control of the needy as a property, just as in general they are charitable and helpful out of a desire for property. One finds them jealous when they are crossed or forestalled in their charity. Parents involuntarily make something like themselves out of their children—they call that “education”; no mother doubts at the bottom of her heart that the child she has borne is thereby her property, no father hesitates about his right to his own ideas and notions of worth. Indeed, in former times fathers deemed it right to use their discretion concerning the life or death of the newly born (as among the ancient Germans). And like the father, so also do the teacher, the class, the priest, and the prince still see in every new individual an unobjectionable opportunity for a new possession. The consequence is …

195

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The Jews ↖ Ancient Cultures ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —a people “born for slavery,” as Tacitus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and the whole ancient world say of them; “the chosen people among the nations,” as they themselves say and believe—the Jews performed the miracle of the Inversion of valuations ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Paradoxes , by means of which life on earth obtained a new and dangerous charm for a couple of millenniums. Their prophets fused into one the expressions “rich,” “godless,” “wicked,” “violent,” “sensual,” and for the first time coined the word “world” as a term of reproach. In this inversion of valuations (in which is also included the use of the word “poor” as synonymous with “saint” and “friend”) the significance of the Jewish people is to be found; it is with them that the Slave-insurrection in morals ↖ Beyond Good and Evil commences.

196

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It is to be inferred that there are countless dark bodies near the sun—such as we shall never see. Among ourselves, this is an allegory; and the psychologist of morals reads the whole star-writing merely as an allegorical and symbolic language in which much may be unexpressed.

197

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The Beast of prey ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and the Man of prey ↖ Beyond Good and Evil (for instance, Caesar Borgia ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People ) are fundamentally misunderstood, “nature” is misunderstood, so long as one seeks a “morbidness” in the constitution of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths, or even an innate “hell” in them—as almost all moralists have done hitherto. Does it not seem that there is a hatred of the virgin forest and of the tropics among moralists? And that the “tropical man” must be discredited at all costs, whether as disease and deterioration of mankind, or as his own hell and self-torture? And why? In favour of the “temperate zones”? In favour of the temperate men? The “moral”? The mediocre?—This for the chapter: “Morals as Timidity.”

198

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All the systems of morals which address themselves with a view to their “happiness,” as it is called—what else are they but suggestions for behaviour adapted to the degree of danger from themselves in which the individuals live; recipes for their passions, their good and bad propensities, insofar as such have the Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts and would like to play the master; small and great expediencies and elaborations, permeated with the musty odour of old family medicines and old-wife wisdom; all of them grotesque and absurd in their form—because they address themselves to “all,” because they generalize where generalization is not authorized; all of them speaking unconditionally, and taking themselves unconditionally; all of them flavoured not merely with one grain of salt, but rather endurable only, and sometimes even seductive, when they are over-spiced and begin to smell dangerously, especially of “the other world.” That is all of little value when estimated intellectually, and is far from being “science,” much less “wisdom”; but, repeated once more, and three times repeated, it is expediency, expediency, expediency, mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity—whether it be the indifference and statuesque coldness towards the heated folly of the emotions, which the Stoics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools advised and fostered; or the no-more-laughing and no-more-weeping of Spinoza ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , the destruction of the emotions by their analysis and vivisection, which he recommended so naively; or the lowering of the emotions to an innocent mean at which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals; or even morality as the enjoyment of the emotions in a voluntary attenuation and spiritualization by the symbolism of art, perhaps as music, or as love of God, and of mankind for God’s sake—for in religion the passions are once more enfranchised, provided that … ; or, finally, even the complaisant and wanton surrender to the emotions, as has been taught by Hafis and Goethe ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People , the bold letting-go of the reins, the spiritual and corporeal licentia morum in the exceptional cases of wise old codgers and drunkards, with whom it “no longer has much danger.”—This also for the chapter: “ Morals as Timidity ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems .”

199

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Inasmuch as in all ages, as long as mankind has existed, there have also been human herds (family alliances, communities, tribes, peoples, states, churches), and always a great number who obey in proportion to the small number who command—in view, therefore, of the fact that obedience has been most practiced and fostered among mankind hitherto, one may reasonably suppose that, generally speaking, the need thereof is now innate in everyone, as a kind of Formal conscience ↖ Beyond Good and Evil which gives the command “Thou shalt unconditionally do something, unconditionally refrain from something,” in short, “Thou shalt.” This need tries to satisfy itself and to fill its form with a content, according to its strength, impatience, and eagerness, it at once seizes as an omnivorous appetite with little selection, and accepts whatever is shouted into its ear by all sorts of commanders—parents, teachers, laws, class prejudices, or public opinion. The extraordinary limitation of human development, the hesitation, protractedness, frequent retrogression, and turning thereof, is attributable to the fact that the Herd-instinct ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology of obedience is transmitted best, and at the cost of the art of command. If one imagine this instinct increasing to its greatest extent, commanders and independent individuals will finally be lacking altogether, or they will suffer inwardly from a bad conscience, and will have to impose a deception on themselves in the first place in order to be able to command just as if they also were only obeying. This condition of things actually exists in Europe at present—I call it the moral hypocrisy of the commanding class. They know no other way of protecting themselves from their bad conscience than by playing the role of executors of older and higher orders (of predecessors, of the constitution, of justice, of the law, or of God himself), or they even justify themselves by maxims from the current opinions of the herd, as “first servants of their people,” or “instruments of the public weal.” On the other hand, the Gregarious European man ↖ Beyond Good and Evil nowadays assumes an air as if he were the only kind of man that is allowable, he glorifies his qualities, such as public spirit, kindness, deference, industry, temperance, modesty, indulgence, sympathy, by virtue of which he is gentle, endurable, and useful to the herd, as the peculiarly human virtues. In cases, however, where it is believed that the leader and bellwether cannot be dispensed with, attempt after attempt is made nowadays to replace commanders by the summing together of clever gregarious men: all representative constitutions, for example, are of this origin. In spite of all, what a blessing, what a deliverance from a weight becoming unendurable, is the appearance of an absolute ruler for these gregarious Europeans—of this fact the effect of the appearance of Napoleon ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People was the last great proof: the history of the influence of Napoleon is almost the history of the higher happiness to which the entire century has attained in its worthiest individuals and periods.

2

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2#

“How could anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of their own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the ‘ Thing-in-itself ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics ’—there must be their source, and nowhere else!”—This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which Metaphysicians ↖ Beyond Good and Evil of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this “belief” of theirs, they exert themselves for their “knowledge,” for something that is in the end solemnly christened “the Truth.” The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in antithesis of values. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, “de omnibus dubitandum.” For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below—“frog perspectives,” as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the Will to delusion ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts , to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous “Perhapses”! For that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of the dangerous “Perhaps” in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear.

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That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective members of the fauna of a Continent—is betrayed in the end by the circumstance: how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers always fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of possible philosophies. Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once more in the same orbit, however independent of each other they may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, something within them leads them, something impels them in definite order the one after the other—to wit, the innate methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is, in fact, far less a discovery than a re-recognizing, a remembering, a return and a homecoming to a far-off, ancient common-household of the soul, out of which those ideas formerly grew: philosophizing is so far a kind of Atavism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil of the highest order. The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where there is affinity of language, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean owing to the unconscious domination and guidance of similar grammatical functions—it cannot but be that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and succession of philosophical systems, just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where the conception of the subject is least developed) look otherwise “into the world,” and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of physiological valuations and racial conditions.—So much by way of rejecting Locke ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers ’s superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas.

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The man of an age of dissolution which mixes the races with one another, who has the inheritance of a diversified descent in his body—that is to say, contrary, and often not only contrary, instincts and standards of value, which struggle with one another and are seldom at peace—such a man of late culture and broken lights, will, on an average, be a weak man. His fundamental desire is that the war which is in him should come to an end; happiness appears to him in the character of a soothing medicine and mode of thought (for instance, Epicurean or Christian); it is above all things the happiness of repose, of undisturbedness, of repletion, of final unity—it is the “Sabbath of Sabbaths,” to use the expression of the holy rhetorician, St. Augustine, who was himself such a man.—Should, however, the contrariety and conflict in such natures operate as an additional incentive and stimulus to life—and if, on the other hand, in addition to their powerful and irreconcilable instincts, they have also inherited and indoctrinated into them a proper mastery and subtlety for carrying on the conflict with themselves (that is to say, the faculty of self-control and self-deception), there then arise those marvelously incomprehensible and inexplicable beings, those enigmatical men, predestined for conquering and circumventing others, the finest examples of which are Alcibiades ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and Caesar ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People (with whom I should like to associate the first of Europeans according to my taste, the Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second), and among artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People . They appear precisely in the same periods when that weaker type, with its longing for repose, comes to the front; the two types are complementary to each other, and spring from the same causes.

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As long as the utility which determines moral estimates is only Gregarious utility ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , as long as the preservation of the community is only kept in view, and the immoral is sought precisely and exclusively in what seems dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can be no “ Morality of love to one’s neighbour ↖ Beyond Good and Evil .” Granted even that there is already a little constant exercise of consideration, sympathy, fairness, gentleness, and mutual assistance, granted that even in this condition of society all those instincts are already active which are latterly distinguished by honourable names as “virtues,” and eventually almost coincide with the conception “morality”: in that period they do not as yet belong to the domain of moral valuations—they are still ultra-moral. A sympathetic action, for instance, is neither called good nor bad, moral nor immoral, in the best period of the Romans; and should it be praised, a sort of resentful disdain is compatible with this praise, even at the best, directly the sympathetic action is compared with one which contributes to the welfare of the whole, to the res publica. After all, “love to our neighbour” is always a secondary matter, partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our fear of our neighbour. After the fabric of society seems on the whole established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of our neighbour which again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. Certain strong and dangerous instincts, such as the love of enterprise, foolhardiness, revengefulness, astuteness, rapacity, and love of power, which up till then had not only to be honoured from the point of view of general utility—under other names, of course, than those here given—but had to be fostered and cultivated (because they were perpetually required in the common danger against the common enemies), are now felt in their dangerousness to be doubly strong—when the outlets for them are lacking—and are gradually branded as immoral and given over to calumny. The contrary instincts and inclinations now attain to moral honour, the Gregarious instinct ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology gradually draws its conclusions. How much or how little dangerousness to the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an emotion, a disposition, or an endowment—that is now the moral perspective, here again fear is the mother of morals. It is by the loftiest and strongest instincts, when they break out passionately and carry the individual far above and beyond the average, and the low level of the gregarious conscience, that the self-reliance of the community is destroyed; its belief in itself, its backbone, as it were, breaks; consequently these very instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent reason, are felt to be dangers; everything that elevates the individual above The herd ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics , and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called evil; the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the mediocrity of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity, even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens distrust, “the lamb,” and still more “the sheep,” wins respect. There is a point of diseased mellowness and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself takes the part of him who injures it, the part of the criminal, and does so, in fact, seriously and honestly. To punish, appears to it to be somehow unfair—it is certain that the idea of “punishment” and “the obligation to punish” are then painful and alarming to people. “Is it not sufficient if the criminal be rendered harmless? Why should we still punish? Punishment itself is terrible!”—with these questions gregarious morality, the morality of fear, draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do away with danger, the cause of fear, one would have done away with this morality at the same time, it would no longer be necessary, it would not consider itself any longer necessary!—Whoever examines the conscience of the present-day European, will always elicit the same imperative from its thousand moral folds and hidden recesses, the imperative of the timidity of the herd: “we wish that some time or other there may be nothing more to fear!” Some time or other—the will and the way thereto is nowadays called “progress” all over Europe.

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Let us at once say again what we have already said a hundred times, for people’s ears nowadays are unwilling to hear such truths—our truths. We know well enough how offensive it sounds when anyone plainly, and without metaphor, counts man among the animals, but it will be accounted to us almost a crime, that it is precisely in respect to men of “modern ideas” that we have constantly applied the terms “herd,” “ Herd-instinct ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology s,” and suchlike expressions. What avail is it? We cannot do otherwise, for it is precisely here that our new insight is. We have found that in all the principal moral judgments, Europe has become unanimous, including likewise the countries where European influence prevails: in Europe people evidently know what Socrates ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers thought he did not know, and what the famous serpent of old once promised to teach—they “know” today what is good and evil. It must then sound hard and be distasteful to the ear, when we always insist that that which here thinks it knows, that which here glorifies itself with praise and blame, and calls itself good, is the instinct of the herding human animal, the instinct which has come and is ever coming more and more to the front, to preponderance and supremacy over other instincts, according to the increasing physiological approximation and resemblance of which it is the symptom. Morality in Europe at present is Herding-animal morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems , and therefore, as we understand the matter, only one kind of human morality, beside which, before which, and after which many other moralities, and above all higher moralities, are or should be possible. Against such a “possibility,” against such a “should be,” however, this morality defends itself with all its strength, it says obstinately and inexorably “I am morality itself and nothing else is morality!” Indeed, with the help of a religion which has humoured and flattered the sublimest desires of the herding-animal, things have reached such a point that we always find a more visible expression of this morality even in political and social arrangements: the democratic movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. That its tempo, however, is much too slow and sleepy for the more impatient ones, for those who are sick and distracted by the herding-instinct, is indicated by the increasingly furious howling, and always less disguised teeth-gnashing of the anarchist dogs, who are now roving through the highways of European culture. Apparently in opposition to the peacefully industrious democrats and Revolution-ideologues, and still more so to the awkward philosophasters and fraternity-visionaries who call themselves Socialists and want a “free society,” those are really at one with them all in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every form of society other than that of the autonomous herd (to the extent even of repudiating the notions “master” and “servant”—ni dieu ni maître, says a socialist formula); at one in their tenacious opposition to every special claim, every special right and privilege (this means ultimately opposition to every right, for when all are equal, no one needs “rights” any longer); at one in their distrust of punitive justice (as though it were a violation of the weak, unfair to the necessary consequences of all former society); but equally at one in their religion of sympathy, in their compassion for all that feels, lives, and suffers (down to the very animals, up even to “God”—the extravagance of “sympathy for God” belongs to a democratic age); altogether at one in the cry and impatience of their sympathy, in their deadly hatred of suffering generally, in their almost feminine incapacity for witnessing it or allowing it; at one in their involuntary beglooming and heart-softening, under the spell of which Europe seems to be threatened with a new Buddhism; at one in their belief in the morality of mutual sympathy, as though it were morality in itself, the climax, the attained climax of mankind, the sole hope of the future, the consolation of the present, the great discharge from all the obligations of the past; altogether at one in their belief in the community as the deliverer, in the herd, and therefore in “themselves.”

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We, who hold a different belief—we, who regard the democratic movement, not only as a degenerating form of political organization, but as equivalent to a degenerating, a waning type of man, as involving his mediocrising and depreciation: where have we to fix our hopes? In New philosophers ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts —there is no other alternative: in minds strong and original enough to initiate opposite estimates of value, to transvalue and invert “eternal valuations”; in forerunners, in men of the future, who in the present shall fix the constraints and fasten the knots which will compel millenniums to take new paths. To teach man the future of humanity as his will, as depending on human will, and to make preparation for vast hazardous enterprises and collective attempts in rearing and educating, in order thereby to put an end to the frightful rule of folly and chance which has hitherto gone by the name of “history” (the folly of the “greatest number” is only its last form)—for that purpose a new type of philosopher and commander will some time or other be needed, at the very idea of which everything that has existed in the way of occult, terrible, and benevolent beings might look pale and dwarfed. The image of such leaders hovers before our eyes:—is it lawful for me to say it aloud, ye Free Spirits ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ? The conditions which one would partly have to create and partly utilize for their genesis; the presumptive methods and tests by virtue of which a soul should grow up to such an elevation and power as to feel a constraint to these tasks; a Transvaluation of values ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts , under the new pressure and hammer of which a conscience should be steeled and a heart transformed into brass, so as to bear the weight of such responsibility; and on the other hand the necessity for such leaders, the dreadful danger that they might be lacking, or miscarry and degenerate:—these are our real anxieties and glooms, ye know it well, ye free spirits! these are the heavy distant thoughts and storms which sweep across the heaven of our life. There are few pains so grievous as to have seen, divined, or experienced how an exceptional man has missed his way and deteriorated; but he who has the rare eye for the universal danger of “man” himself deteriorating, he who like us has recognized the extraordinary fortuitousness which has hitherto played its game in respect to the future of mankind—a game in which neither the hand, nor even a “finger of God” has participated!—he who divines the fate that is hidden under the idiotic unwariness and blind confidence of “modern ideas,” and still more under the whole of Christo-European morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —suffers from an anguish with which no other is to be compared. He sees at a glance all that could still be made out of man through a favourable accumulation and augmentation of human powers and arrangements; he knows with all the knowledge of his conviction how unexhausted man still is for the greatest possibilities, and how often in the past the type man has stood in presence of mysterious decisions and new paths:—he knows still better from his painfulest recollections on what wretched obstacles promising developments of the highest rank have hitherto usually gone to pieces, broken down, sunk, and become contemptible. The universal degeneracy of mankind to the level of the “man of the future”—as idealized by the socialistic fools and shallow-pates—this degeneracy and dwarfing of man to an absolutely gregarious animal (or as they call it, to a man of “free society”), this brutalizing of man into a pygmy with equal rights and claims, is undoubtedly possible! He who has thought out this possibility to its ultimate conclusion knows another loathing unknown to the rest of mankind—and perhaps also a new mission!

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At the risk that moralizing may also reveal itself here as that which it has always been—namely, resolutely montrer ses plaies, according to Balzac—I would venture to protest against an improper and injurious alteration of rank, which quite unnoticed, and as if with the best con Science ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , threatens nowadays to establish itself in the relations of science and Philosophy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil . I mean to say that one must have the right out of one’s own experience—experience, as it seems to me, always implies unfortunate experience?—to treat of such an important question of rank, so as not to speak of colour like the blind, or against science like women and artists (“Ah! this dreadful science!” sigh their instinct and their shame, “it always finds things out!”). The declaration of independence of the scientific man, his emancipation from philosophy, is one of the subtler aftereffects of democratic organization and disorganization: the self-glorification and self-conceitedness of the learned man is now everywhere in full bloom, and in its best springtime—which does not mean to imply that in this case self-praise smells sweet. Here also the instinct of the populace cries, “Freedom from all masters!” and after science has, with the happiest results, resisted theology, whose “handmaid” it had been too long, it now proposes in its wantonness and indiscretion to lay down laws for philosophy, and in its turn to play the “master”—what am I saying! to play the philosopher on its own account. My memory—the memory of a scientific man, if you please!—teems with the naivetes of insolence which I have heard about philosophy and philosophers from young naturalists and old physicians (not to mention the most cultured and most conceited of all learned men, the philologists and schoolmasters, who are both the one and the other by profession). On one occasion it was the specialist and the Jack Horner who instinctively stood on the defensive against all synthetic tasks and capabilities; at another time it was the industrious worker who had got a scent of otium and refined luxuriousness in the internal economy of the philosopher, and felt himself aggrieved and belittled thereby. On another occasion it was the colourblindness of the utilitarian, who sees nothing in philosophy but a series of refuted systems, and an extravagant expenditure which “does nobody any good.” At another time the fear of disguised mysticism and of the boundary-adjustment of knowledge became conspicuous, at another time the disregard of individual philosophers, which had involuntarily extended to disregard of philosophy generally. In fine, I found most frequently, behind the proud disdain of philosophy in young scholars, the evil aftereffect of some particular philosopher, to whom on the whole obedience had been foresworn, without, however, the spell of his scornful estimates of other philosophers having been got rid of—the result being a general ill-will to all philosophy. (Such seems to me, for instance, the aftereffect of Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers on the most modern Germany: by his unintelligent rage against Hegel ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , he has succeeded in severing the whole of the last generation of Germans from its connection with German culture, which culture, all things considered, has been an elevation and a divining refinement of the historical sense, but precisely at this point Schopenhauer himself was poor, irreceptive, and un-German to the extent of ingeniousness.) On the whole, speaking generally, it may just have been the humanness, all-too-humanness of the modern philosophers themselves, in short, their contemptibleness, which has injured most radically the reverence for philosophy and opened the doors to the instinct of the populace. Let it but be acknowledged to what an extent our modern world diverges from the whole style of the world of Heraclitus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , Plato ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers , Empedocles, and whatever else all the royal and magnificent anchorites of the spirit were called, and with what justice an honest man of science may feel himself of a better family and origin, in view of such representatives of philosophy, who, owing to the fashion of the present day, are just as much aloft as they are down below—in Germany, for instance, the two lions of Berlin, the anarchist Eugen Duhring and the amalgamist Eduard von Hartmann. It is especially the sight of those hotch-potch philosophers, who call themselves “realists,” or “positivists,” which is calculated to implant a dangerous distrust in the soul of a young and ambitious scholar: those philosophers, at the best, are themselves but scholars and specialists, that is very evident! All of them are persons who have been vanquished and brought back again under the dominion of science, who at one time or another claimed more from themselves, without having a right to the “more” and its responsibility—and who now, creditably, rancorously, and vindictively, represent in word and deed, disbelief in the master-task and supremacy of philosophy. After all, how could it be otherwise? Science flourishes nowadays and has the good conscience clearly visible on its countenance, while that to which the entire modern philosophy has gradually sunk, the remnant of philosophy of the present day, excites distrust and displeasure, if not scorn and pity. Philosophy reduced to a “theory of knowledge,” no more in fact than a diffident science of epochs and doctrine of forbearance: a philosophy that never even gets beyond the threshold, and rigorously denies itself the right to enter—that is philosophy in its last throes, an end, an agony, something that awakens pity. How could such a philosophy—rule!

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The dangers that beset the evolution of the philosopher are, in fact, so manifold nowadays, that one might doubt whether this fruit could still come to maturity. The extent and towering structure of the sciences have increased enormously, and therewith also the probability that the philosopher will grow tired even as a learner, or will attach himself somewhere and “specialize” so that he will no longer attain to his elevation, that is to say, to his superspection, his circumspection, and his despection. Or he gets aloft too late, when the best of his maturity and strength is past, or when he is impaired, coarsened, and deteriorated, so that his view, his general estimate of things, is no longer of much importance. It is perhaps just the refinement of his intellectual conscience that makes him hesitate and linger on the way, he dreads the temptation to become a dilettante, a millepede, a milleantenna; he knows too well that as a discerner, one who has lost his self-respect no longer commands, no longer leads, unless he should aspire to become a great playactor, a philosophical Cagliostro and spiritual rat-catcher—in short, a misleader. This is in the last instance a question of taste, if it has not really been a question of conscience. To double once more the philosopher’s difficulties, there is also the fact that he demands from himself a verdict, a Yea or Nay, not concerning science, but concerning life and the worth of life—he learns unwillingly to believe that it is his right and even his duty to obtain this verdict, and he has to seek his way to the right and the belief only through the most extensive (perhaps disturbing and destroying) experiences, often hesitating, doubting, and dumbfounded. In fact, the philosopher has long been mistaken and confused by the multitude, either with the scientific man and ideal scholar, or with the religiously elevated, desensualized, desecularized visionary and God-intoxicated man; and even yet when one hears anybody praised, because he lives “wisely,” or “as a philosopher,” it hardly means anything more than “prudently and apart.” Wisdom: that seems to the populace to be a kind of flight, a means and artifice for withdrawing successfully from a bad game; but the genuine philosopher—does it not seem so to us, my friends?—lives “unphilosophically” and “unwisely,” above all, imprudently, and feels the obligation and burden of a hundred attempts and temptations of life—he risks himself constantly, he plays this bad game.

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In relation to the genius, that is to say, a being who either engenders or produces—both words understood in their fullest sense—the man of learning, the scientific average man, has always something of the old maid about him; for, like her, he is not conversant with the two principal functions of man. To both, of course, to the scholar and to the old maid, one concedes respectability, as if by way of indemnification—in these cases one emphasizes the respectability—and yet, in the compulsion of this concession, one has the same admixture of vexation. Let us examine more closely: what is the scientific man? Firstly, a commonplace type of man, with commonplace virtues: that is to say, a non-ruling, non-authoritative, and non-self-sufficient type of man; he possesses industry, patient adaptableness to rank and file, equability and moderation in capacity and requirement; he has the instinct for people like himself, and for that which they require—for instance: the portion of independence and green meadow without which there is no rest from labour, the claim to honour and consideration (which first and foremost presupposes recognition and recognisability), the sunshine of a good name, the perpetual ratification of his value and usefulness, with which the inward distrust which lies at the bottom of the heart of all dependent men and gregarious animals, has again and again to be overcome. The learned man, as is appropriate, has also maladies and faults of an ignoble kind: he is full of petty envy, and has a lynx-eye for the weak points in those natures to whose elevations he cannot attain. He is confiding, yet only as one who lets himself go, but does not flow; and precisely before the man of the great current he stands all the colder and more reserved—his eye is then like a smooth and irresponsive lake, which is no longer moved by rapture or sympathy. The worst and most dangerous thing of which a scholar is capable results from the instinct of mediocrity of his type, from the Jesuitism of mediocrity, which labours instinctively for the destruction of the exceptional man, and endeavours to break—or still better, to relax—every bent bow. To relax, of course, with consideration, and naturally with an indulgent hand—to relax with confiding sympathy that is the real art of Jesuitism, which has always understood how to introduce itself as the religion of sympathy.

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However gratefully one may welcome the objective spirit—and who has not been sick to death of all subjectivity and its confounded ipsissimosity!—in the end, however, one must learn caution even with regard to one’s gratitude, and put a stop to the exaggeration with which the unselfing and depersonalizing of the spirit has recently been celebrated, as if it were the goal in itself, as if it were salvation and glorification—as is especially accustomed to happen in the pessimist school, which has also in its turn good reasons for paying the highest honours to “disinterested knowledge.” The objective man, who no longer curses and scolds like the pessimist, the ideal man of learning in whom the scientific instinct blossoms forth fully after a thousand complete and partial failures, is assuredly one of the most costly instruments that exist, but his place is in the hand of one who is more powerful. He is only an instrument, we may say, he is a mirror—he is no “purpose in himself.” The objective man is in truth a mirror accustomed to prostration before everything that wants to be known, with such desires only as knowing or “reflecting” implies—he waits until something comes, and then expands himself sensitively, so that even the light footsteps and gliding-past of spiritual beings may not be lost on his surface and film. Whatever “personality” he still possesses seems to him accidental, arbitrary, or still oftener, disturbing, so much has he come to regard himself as the passage and reflection of outside forms and events. He calls up the recollection of “himself” with an effort, and not infrequently wrongly, he readily confounds himself with other persons, he makes mistakes with regard to his own needs, and here only is he unrefined and negligent. Perhaps he is troubled about the health, or the pettiness and confined atmosphere of wife and friend, or the lack of companions and society—indeed, he sets himself to reflect on his suffering, but in vain! His thoughts already rove away to the more general case, and tomorrow he knows as little as he knew yesterday how to help himself. He does not now take himself seriously and devote time to himself: he is serene, not from lack of trouble, but from lack of capacity for grasping and dealing with his trouble. The habitual complaisance with respect to all objects and experiences, the radiant and impartial hospitality with which he receives everything that comes his way, his habit of inconsiderate good-nature, of dangerous indifference as to Yea and Nay: alas! there are enough of cases in which he has to atone for these virtues of his!—and as man generally, he becomes far too easily the caput mortuum of such virtues. Should one wish love or hatred from him—I mean love and hatred as God, woman, and animal understand them—he will do what he can, and furnish what he can. But one must not be surprised if it should not be much—if he should show himself just at this point to be false, fragile, questionable, and deteriorated. His love is constrained, his hatred is artificial, and rather un tour de force, a slight ostentation and exaggeration. He is only genuine so far as he can be objective; only in his serene totality is he still “nature” and “natural.” His mirroring and eternally self-polishing soul no longer knows how to affirm, no longer how to deny; he does not command; neither does he destroy. “je ne méprise presque rien”—he says, with Leibniz: let us not overlook nor undervalue the presque! Neither is he a model man; he does not go in advance of anyone, nor after, either; he places himself generally too far off to have any reason for espousing the cause of either good or evil. If he has been so long confounded with the philosopher, with the Caesarian trainer and dictator of civilization, he has had far too much honour, and what is more essential in him has been overlooked—he is an instrument, something of a slave, though certainly the sublimest sort of slave, but nothing in himself—presque rien! The objective man is an instrument, a costly, easily injured, easily tarnished measuring instrument and mirroring apparatus, which is to be taken care of and respected; but he is no goal, not outgoing nor upgoing, no complementary man in whom the rest of existence justifies itself, no termination—and still less a commencement, an engendering, or primary cause, nothing hardy, powerful, self-centred, that wants to be master; but rather only a soft, inflated, delicate, movable potter’s-form, that must wait for some kind of content and frame to “shape” itself thereto—for the most part a man without frame and content, a “selfless” man. Consequently, also, nothing for women, in parenthesi.

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When a philosopher nowadays makes known that he is not a skeptic—I hope that has been gathered from the foregoing description of the objective spirit?—people all hear it impatiently; they regard him on that account with some apprehension, they would like to ask so many, many questions … indeed among timid hearers, of whom there are now so many, he is henceforth said to be dangerous. With his repudiation of Skepticism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools , it seems to them as if they heard some evil-threatening sound in the distance, as if a new kind of explosive were being tried somewhere, a dynamite of the spirit, perhaps a newly discovered Russian nihiline, a Pessimism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ States Of Being bonae voluntatis, that not only denies, means denial, but—dreadful thought! practises denial. Against this kind of “good Will ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts ”—a will to the veritable, actual negation of life—there is, as is generally acknowledged nowadays, no better soporific and sedative than skepticism, the mild, pleasing, lulling poppy of skepticism; and Hamlet himself is now prescribed by the doctors of the day as an antidote to the “spirit,” and its underground noises. “Are not our ears already full of bad sounds?” say the skeptics, as lovers of repose, and almost as a kind of safety police; “this subterranean Nay is terrible! Be still, ye pessimistic moles!” The skeptic, in effect, that delicate creature, is far too easily frightened; his conscience is schooled so as to start at every Nay, and even at that sharp, decided Yea, and feels something like a bite thereby. Yea! and Nay!—they seem to him opposed to morality; he loves, on the contrary, to make a festival to his virtue by a noble aloofness, while perhaps he says with Montaigne ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers : “What do I know?” Or with Socrates ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers : “I know that I know nothing.” Or: “Here I do not trust myself, no door is open to me.” Or: “Even if the door were open, why should I enter immediately?” Or: “What is the use of any hasty hypotheses? It might quite well be in good taste to make no hypotheses at all. Are you absolutely obliged to straighten at once what is crooked? to stuff every hole with some kind of oakum? Is there not time enough for that? Has not the time leisure? Oh, ye demons, can ye not at all wait? The uncertain also has its charms, the Sphinx, too, is a Circe, and Circe, too, was a philosopher.”—Thus does a skeptic console himself; and in truth he needs some consolation. For skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a certain many-sided physiological temperament, which in ordinary language is called nervous debility and sickliness; it arises whenever races or classes which have been long separated, decisively and suddenly blend with one another. In the new generation, which has inherited as it were different standards and valuations in its blood, everything is disquiet, derangement, doubt, and tentativeness; the best powers operate restrictively, the very virtues prevent each other growing and becoming strong, equilibrium, ballast, and perpendicular stability are lacking in body and soul. That, however, which is most diseased and degenerated in such nondescripts is the will; they are no longer familiar with independence of decision, or the courageous feeling of pleasure in willing—they are doubtful of the “freedom of the will” even in their dreams. Our present-day Europe, the scene of a senseless, precipitate attempt at a radical blending of classes, and consequently of races, is therefore skeptical in all its heights and depths, sometimes exhibiting the mobile skepticism which springs impatiently and wantonly from branch to branch, sometimes with gloomy aspect, like a cloud overcharged with interrogative signs—and often sick unto death of its will! Paralysis of will ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts , where do we not find this cripple sitting nowadays! And yet how bedecked oftentimes! How seductively ornamented! There are the finest gala dresses and disguises for this disease, and that, for instance, most of what places itself nowadays in the showcases as “objectiveness,” “the scientific spirit,” “l’art pour l’art,” and “pure voluntary knowledge,” is only decked-out skepticism and paralysis of will—I am ready to answer for this diagnosis of the European disease—The disease of the will is diffused unequally over Europe, it is worst and most varied where civilization has longest prevailed, it decreases according as “the barbarian” still—or again—asserts his claims under the loose drapery of Western culture. It is therefore in the France of today, as can be readily disclosed and comprehended, that the will is most infirm, and France, which has always had a masterly aptitude for converting even the portentous crises of its spirit into something charming and seductive, now manifests emphatically its intellectual ascendancy over Europe, by being the school and exhibition of all the charms of skepticism. The power to will and to persist, moreover, in a resolution, is already somewhat stronger in Germany, and again in the North of Germany it is stronger than in Central Germany, it is considerably stronger in England, Spain, and Corsica, associated with phlegm in the former and with hard skulls in the latter—not to mention Italy, which is too young yet to know what it wants, and must first show whether it can exercise will, but it is strongest and most surprising of all in that immense middle empire where Europe as it were flows back to Asia—namely, in Russia. There the power to will has been long stored up and accumulated, there the will—uncertain whether to be negative or affirmative—waits threateningly to be discharged (to borrow their pet phrase from our physicists). Perhaps not only Indian wars and complications in Asia would be necessary to free Europe from its greatest danger, but also internal subversion, the shattering of the empire into small states, and above all the introduction of parliamentary imbecility, together with the obligation of everyone to read his newspaper at breakfast. I do not say this as one who desires it; in my heart I should rather prefer the contrary—I mean such an increase in the threatening attitude of Russia, that Europe would have to make up its mind to become equally threatening—namely, to acquire one will, by means of a new caste to rule over the Continent, a persistent, dreadful will of its own, that can set its aims thousands of years ahead; so that the long spun-out comedy of its petty-statism, and its dynastic as well as its democratic many-willed-ness, might finally be brought to a close. The time for petty politics is past; the next century will bring the struggle for the dominion of the world—the compulsion to great politics.

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As to how far the new warlike age on which we Europeans have evidently entered may perhaps favour the growth of another and stronger kind of Skepticism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools , I should like to express myself preliminarily merely by a parable, which the lovers of German history will already understand. That unscrupulous enthusiast for big, handsome grenadiers (who, as King of Prussia, brought into being a military and skeptical genius—and therewith, in reality, the new and now triumphantly emerged type of German), the problematic, crazy father of Frederick the Great ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People , had on one point the very knack and lucky grasp of the genius: he knew what was then lacking in Germany, the want of which was a hundred times more alarming and serious than any lack of culture and social form—his ill-will to the young Frederick resulted from the anxiety of a profound instinct. Men were lacking; and he suspected, to his bitterest regret, that his own son was not man enough. There, however, he deceived himself; but who would not have deceived himself in his place? He saw his son lapsed to atheism, to the esprit, to the pleasant frivolity of clever Frenchmen—he saw in the background the great bloodsucker, the spider skepticism; he suspected the incurable wretchedness of a heart no longer hard enough either for evil or good, and of a broken will that no longer commands, is no longer able to command. Meanwhile, however, there grew up in his son that new kind of harder and more dangerous skepticism—who knows to what extent it was encouraged just by his father’s hatred and the icy melancholy of a will condemned to solitude?—the skepticism of daring manliness, which is closely related to the genius for war and conquest, and made its first entrance into Germany in the person of the great Frederick. This skepticism despises and nevertheless grasps; it undermines and takes possession; it does not believe, but it does not thereby lose itself; it gives the spirit a dangerous liberty, but it keeps strict guard over the heart. It is the German form of skepticism, which, as a continued Fredericianism, risen to the highest spirituality, has kept Europe for a considerable time under the dominion of the German Spirit ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and its critical and historical distrust. Owing to the insuperably strong and tough masculine character of the great German philologists and historical critics (who, rightly estimated, were also all of them artists of destruction and dissolution), a new conception of the German spirit gradually established itself—in spite of all Romanticism in music and philosophy—in which the leaning towards masculine skepticism was decidedly prominent whether, for instance, as fearlessness of gaze, as courage and sternness of the dissecting hand, or as resolute will to dangerous voyages of discovery, to spiritualized North Pole expeditions under barren and dangerous skies. There may be good grounds for it when warmblooded and superficial humanitarians cross themselves before this spirit, cet esprit fataliste, ironique, méphistophélique, as Michelet calls it, not without a shudder. But if one would realize how characteristic is this fear of the “man” in the German spirit which awakened Europe out of its “dogmatic slumber,” let us call to mind the former conception which had to be overcome by this new one—and that it is not so very long ago that a masculinized woman could dare, with unbridled presumption, to recommend the Germans to the interest of Europe as gentle, good-hearted, weak-willed, and poetical fools. Finally, let us only understand profoundly enough Napoleon ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People ’s astonishment when he saw Goethe ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People : it reveals what had been regarded for centuries as the “German spirit” “voilà un homme!”—that was as much as to say “But this is a man! And I only expected to see a German!”

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The Causa sui ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics is the best self-contradiction that has yet been conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with this very folly. The desire for “ Freedom of will ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ” in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate Responsibility ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Virtues for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness. If anyone should find out in this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of “free will” and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his “enlightenment” a step further, and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of “free will”: I mean “non-free will,” which is tantamount to a misuse of cause and effect. One should not wrongly materialise “cause” and “effect,” as the natural philosophers do (and whoever like them naturalize in thinking at present), according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until it “effects” its end; one should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure conceptions, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and mutual understanding—not for explanation. In “being-in-itself” there is nothing of “causal-connection,” of “necessity,” or of “psychological non-freedom”; there the effect does not follow the cause, there “law” does not obtain. It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this symbol-world, as “being-in-itself,” with things, we act once more as we have always acted—mythologically. The “non-free will” is mythology; in real life it is only a question of strong and weak wills.—It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in himself, when a thinker, in every “causal-connection” and “psychological necessity,” manifests something of compulsion, indigence, obsequiousness, oppression, and non-freedom; it is suspicious to have such feelings—the person betrays himself. And in general, if I have observed correctly, the “non-freedom of the will” is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite standpoints, but always in a profoundly personal manner: some will not give up their “responsibility,” their belief in themselves, the personal right to their merits, at any price (the vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to get out of the business, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are in the habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort of socialistic sympathy is their favourite disguise. And as a matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak-willed embellishes itself surprisingly when it can pose as “la religion de la souffrance humaine”; that is its “good taste.”

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Supposing, then, that in the picture of the Philosophers of the Future ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts , some trait suggests the question whether they must not perhaps be Skeptics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools in the last-mentioned sense, something in them would only be designated thereby—and not they themselves. With equal right they might call themselves Critics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , and assuredly they will be men of experiments. By the name with which I ventured to baptize them, I have already expressly emphasized their attempting and their love of attempting: is this because, as critics in body and soul, they will love to make use of experiments in a new, and perhaps wider and more dangerous sense? In their passion for knowledge, will they have to go further in daring and painful attempts than the sensitive and pampered taste of a democratic century can approve of?—There is no doubt these coming ones will be least able to dispense with the serious and not unscrupulous qualities which distinguish the critic from the skeptic: I mean the certainty as to standards of worth, the conscious employment of a unity of method, the wary courage, the standing-alone, and the capacity for self-responsibility, indeed, they will avow among themselves a delight in denial and dissection, and a certain considerate cruelty, which knows how to handle the knife surely and deftly, even when the heart bleeds. They will be sterner (and perhaps not always towards themselves only) than humane people may desire, they will not deal with the “truth” in order that it may “please” them, or “elevate” and “inspire” them—they will rather have little faith in “truth” bringing with it such revels for the feelings. They will smile, those rigorous spirits, when anyone says in their presence, “That thought elevates me, why should it not be true?” or, “That work enchants me, why should it not be beautiful?” or, “That artist enlarges me, why should he not be great?” Perhaps they will not only have a smile, but a genuine disgust for all that is thus rapturous, idealistic, feminine, and hermaphroditic, and if anyone could look into their inmost hearts, he would not easily find therein the intention to reconcile “Christian sentiments” with “antique taste,” or even with “modern parliamentarism” (the kind of reconciliation necessarily found even among philosophers in our very uncertain and consequently very conciliatory century). Critical discipline, and every habit that conduces to purity and rigour in intellectual matters, will not only be demanded from themselves by these philosophers of the future, they may even make a display thereof as their special adornment—nevertheless they will not want to be called critics on that account. It will seem to them no small indignity to philosophy to have it decreed, as is so welcome nowadays, that “philosophy itself is Criticism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and critical science—and nothing else whatever!” Though this estimate of philosophy may enjoy the approval of all the Positivists of France and Germany (and possibly it even flattered the heart and taste of Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers : let us call to mind the titles of his principal works), our new philosophers will say, notwithstanding, that critics are instruments of the philosopher, and just on that account, as instruments, they are far from being philosophers themselves! Even the great Chinaman of Königsberg was only a great critic.

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I insist upon it that people finally cease confounding Philosophical workers ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , and in general scientific men, with Philosophers ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Categories —that precisely here one should strictly give “each his own,” and not give those far too much, these far too little. It may be necessary for the education of the real philosopher that he himself should have once stood upon all those steps upon which his servants, the scientific workers of philosophy, remain standing, and must remain standing: he himself must perhaps have been critic, and dogmatist, and historian, and besides, poet, and collector, and traveler, and riddle-reader, and moralist, and seer, and “free spirit,” and almost everything, in order to traverse the whole range of human values and estimations, and that he may be able with a variety of eyes and consciences to look from a height to any distance, from a depth up to any height, from a nook into any expanse. But all these are only preliminary conditions for his task; this task itself demands something else—it requires him to create values. The philosophical workers, after the excellent pattern of Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers and Hegel ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , have to fix and formalize some great existing body of valuations—that is to say, former determinations of value, creations of value, which have become prevalent, and are for a time called “truths”—whether in the domain of the logical, the political (moral), or the artistic. It is for these investigators to make whatever has happened and been esteemed hitherto, conspicuous, conceivable, intelligible, and manageable, to shorten everything long, even “time” itself, and to subjugate the entire past: an immense and wonderful task, in the carrying out of which all refined pride, all tenacious will, can surely find satisfaction. The real philosophers, however, are commanders and lawgivers; they say: “Thus shall it be!” They determine first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby set aside the previous labour of all philosophical workers, and all subjugators of the past—they grasp at the future with a creative hand, and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument, and a hammer. Their “knowing” is creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is— Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts .—Are there at present such philosophers? Have there ever been such philosophers? Must there not be such philosophers some day? …

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It is always more obvious to me that the Philosopher ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , as a man indispensable for the morrow and the day after the morrow, has ever found himself, and has been obliged to find himself, in contradiction to the day in which he lives; his enemy has always been the ideal of his day. Hitherto all those extraordinary furtherers of humanity whom one calls philosophers—who rarely regarded themselves as lovers of wisdom, but rather as disagreeable fools and dangerous interrogators—have found their mission, their hard, involuntary, imperative mission (in the end, however, the greatness of their mission), in being the Bad conscience of their age ↖ Beyond Good and Evil . In putting the vivisector’s knife to the breast of the very virtues of their age, they have betrayed their own secret; it has been for the sake of a new Greatness of man ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , a new untrodden path to his aggrandizement. They have always disclosed how much hypocrisy, indolence, self-indulgence, and self-neglect, how much falsehood was concealed under the most venerated types of contemporary morality, how much virtue was outlived; they have always said, “We must remove hence to where you are least at home.” In the face of a world of “modern ideas,” which would like to confine everyone in a corner, in a “specialty,” a philosopher, if there could be philosophers nowadays, would be compelled to place the greatness of man, the conception of “greatness,” precisely in his comprehensiveness and multifariousness, in his all-roundness, he would even determine worth and rank according to the amount and variety of that which a man could bear and take upon himself, according to the extent to which a man could stretch his responsibility. Nowadays the taste and virtue of the age weaken and attenuate the will, nothing is so adapted to the spirit of the age as weakness of will: consequently, in the ideal of the philosopher, strength of will, sternness, and capacity for prolonged resolution, must specially be included in the conception of “greatness,” with as good a right as the opposite doctrine, with its ideal of a silly, renouncing, humble, selfless humanity, was suited to an opposite age—such as the sixteenth century, which suffered from its accumulated energy of will, and from the wildest torrents and floods of selfishness. In the time of Socrates ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers , among men only of worn-out instincts, old conservative Athenians who let themselves go—“for the sake of happiness,” as they said, for the sake of pleasure, as their conduct indicated—and who had continually on their lips the old pompous words to which they had long forfeited the right by the life they led, irony was perhaps necessary for greatness of soul, the wicked Socratic assurance of the old physician and plebeian, who cut ruthlessly into his own flesh, as into the flesh and heart of the “noble,” with a look that said plainly enough “Do not dissemble before me! here—we are equal!” At present, on the contrary, when throughout Europe the herding-animal alone attains to honours, and dispenses honours, when “equality of right” can too readily be transformed into equality in wrong—I mean to say into general war against everything rare, strange, and privileged, against the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, the creative plenipotence and lordliness—at present it belongs to the conception of “greatness” to be noble, to wish to be apart, to be capable of being different, to stand alone, to have to live by personal initiative, and the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he asserts, “He shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, and of superabundance of will; precisely this shall be called greatness: as diversified as can be entire, as ample as can be full.” And to ask once more the question: Is greatness possible—nowadays?

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It is difficult to learn what a philosopher is, because it cannot be taught: one must “know” it by experience—or one should have the pride not to know it. The fact that at present people all talk of things of which they cannot have any experience, is true more especially and unfortunately as concerns the philosopher and philosophical matters:—the very few know them, are permitted to know them, and all popular ideas about them are false. Thus, for instance, the truly philosophical combination of a bold, exuberant spirituality which runs at presto pace, and a dialectic rigour and necessity which makes no false step, is unknown to most thinkers and scholars from their own experience, and therefore, should anyone speak of it in their presence, it is incredible to them. They conceive of every necessity as troublesome, as a painful compulsory obedience and state of constraint; thinking itself is regarded by them as something slow and hesitating, almost as a trouble, and often enough as “worthy of the sweat of the noble”—but not at all as something easy and divine, closely related to dancing and exuberance! “To think” and to take a matter “seriously,” “arduously”—that is one and the same thing to them; such only has been their “experience.”—Artists have here perhaps a finer intuition; they who know only too well that precisely when they no longer do anything “arbitrarily,” and everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, of subtlety, of power, of creatively fixing, disposing, and shaping, reaches its climax—in short, that necessity and “freedom of will” are then the same thing with them. There is, in fine, a gradation of rank in psychical states, to which the gradation of rank in the problems corresponds; and the highest problems repel ruthlessly everyone who ventures too near them, without being predestined for their solution by the loftiness and power of his spirituality. Of what use is it for nimble, everyday intellects, or clumsy, honest mechanics and empiricists to press, in their plebeian ambition, close to such problems, and as it were into this “holy of holies”—as so often happens nowadays! But coarse feet must never tread upon such carpets: this is provided for in the primary law of things; the doors remain closed to those intruders, though they may dash and break their heads thereon. People have always to be born to a high station, or, more definitely, they have to be bred for it: a person has only a right to philosophy—taking the word in its higher significance—in virtue of his descent; the ancestors, the “blood,” decide here also. Many generations must have prepared the way for the coming of the philosopher; each of his virtues must have been separately acquired, nurtured, transmitted, and embodied; not only the bold, easy, delicate course and current of his thoughts, but above all the readiness for great responsibilities, the majesty of ruling glance and contemning look, the feeling of separation from the multitude with their duties and virtues, the kindly patronage and defense of whatever is misunderstood and calumniated, be it God or devil, the delight and practice of supreme justice, the art of commanding, the amplitude of will, the lingering eye which rarely admires, rarely looks up, rarely loves. …

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Our Virtues?—It is probable that we, too, have still our virtues, although naturally they are not those sincere and massive virtues on account of which we hold our grandfathers in esteem and also at a little distance from us. We Europeans of the day after tomorrow, we firstlings of the twentieth century—with all our dangerous curiosity, our multifariousness and art of disguising, our mellow and seemingly sweetened cruelty in sense and spirit—we shall presumably, if we must have virtues, have those only which have come to agreement with our most secret and heartfelt inclinations, with our most ardent requirements: well, then, let us look for them in our labyrinths!—where, as we know, so many things lose themselves, so many things get quite lost! And is there anything finer than to search for one’s own virtues? Is it not almost to believe in one’s own virtues? But this “believing in one’s own virtues”—is it not practically the same as what was formerly called one’s “good conscience,” that long, respectable pigtail of an idea, which our grandfathers used to hang behind their heads, and often enough also behind their understandings? It seems, therefore, that however little we may imagine ourselves to be old-fashioned and grandfatherly respectable in other respects, in one thing we are nevertheless the worthy grandchildren of our grandfathers, we last Europeans with good consciences: we also still wear their pigtail.—Ah! if you only knew how soon, so very soon—it will be different!

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As in the stellar firmament there are sometimes two suns which determine the path of one planet, and in certain cases suns of different colours shine around a single planet, now with red light, now with green, and then simultaneously illumine and flood it with motley colours: so we modern men, owing to the complicated mechanism of our “firmament,” are determined by different moralities; our actions shine alternately in different colours, and are seldom unequivocal—and there are often cases, also, in which our actions are motley-coloured.

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To love one’s enemies? I think that has been well learnt: it takes place thousands of times at present on a large and small scale; indeed, at times the higher and sublimer thing takes place:—we learn to despise when we love, and precisely when we love best; all of it, however, unconsciously, without noise, without ostentation, with the shame and secrecy of goodness, which forbids the utterance of the pompous word and the formula of virtue. Morality as attitude—is opposed to our taste nowadays. This is also an advance, as it was an advance in our fathers that religion as an attitude finally became opposed to their taste, including the enmity and Voltairean bitterness against religion (and all that formerly belonged to freethinker-pantomime). It is the music in our conscience, the dance in our spirit, to which Puritan litanies, moral sermons, and goody-goodness won’t chime.

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Let us be careful in dealing with those who attach great importance to being credited with moral tact and subtlety in moral discernment! They never forgive us if they have once made a mistake before us (or even with regard to us)—they inevitably become our instinctive calumniators and detractors, even when they still remain our “friends.”—Blessed are the forgetful: for they “get the better” even of their blunders.

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The psychologists of France—and where else are there still psychologists nowadays?—have never yet exhausted their bitter and manifold enjoyment of the bêtise bourgeoise, just as though … in short, they betray something thereby. Flaubert, for instance, the honest citizen of Rouen, neither saw, heard, nor tasted anything else in the end; it was his mode of self-torment and refined cruelty. As this is growing wearisome, I would now recommend for a change something else for a pleasure—namely, the unconscious astuteness with which good, fat, honest mediocrity always behaves towards loftier spirits and the tasks they have to perform, the subtle, barbed, Jesuitical astuteness, which is a thousand times subtler than the taste and understanding of the middle-class in its best moments—subtler even than the understanding of its victims:—a repeated proof that “instinct” is the most intelligent of all kinds of intelligence which have hitherto been discovered. In short, you psychologists, study the philosophy of the “rule” in its struggle with the “exception”: there you have a spectacle fit for Gods and godlike malignity! Or, in plainer words, practise vivisection on “good people,” on the “homo bonae voluntatis,” … on yourselves!

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The practice of judging and condemning morally, is the favourite revenge of the intellectually shallow on those who are less so, it is also a kind of indemnity for their being badly endowed by nature, and finally, it is an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming subtle—malice spiritualises. They are glad in their inmost heart that there is a standard according to which those who are overendowed with intellectual goods and privileges, are equal to them, they contend for the “equality of all before God,” and almost need the belief in God for this purpose. It is among them that the most powerful antagonists of atheism are found. If anyone were to say to them, “A lofty spirituality is beyond all comparison with the honesty and respectability of a merely moral man”—it would make them furious; I shall take care not to say so. I would rather flatter them with my theory that lofty spirituality itself exists only as the ultimate product of moral qualities, that it is a synthesis of all qualities attributed to the “merely moral” man, after they have been acquired singly through long training and practice, perhaps during a whole series of generations; that lofty spirituality is precisely the spiritualising of justice, and the beneficent severity which knows that it is authorized to maintain gradations of rank in the world, even among things—and not only among men.

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Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist from the mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of Interpretation ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology , but “Nature’s conformity to law,” of which you physicists talk so proudly, as though—why, it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad “philology.” It is no matter of fact, no “text,” but rather just a naively humanitarian adjustment and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions to the Democratic instincts ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics of the modern soul! “Everywhere equality before the law—Nature is not different in that respect, nor better than we”: a fine instance of secret motive, in which the vulgar antagonism to everything privileged and autocratic—likewise a second and more refined atheism—is once more disguised. “Ni dieu, ni maître”—that, also, is what you want; and therefore “Cheers for natural law!”—is it not so? But, as has been said, that is interpretation, not text; and somebody might come along, who, with opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same “Nature,” and with regard to the same phenomena, just the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of the claims of power—an interpreter who should so place the unexceptionalness and unconditionalness of all “ Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts ” before your eyes, that almost every word, and the word “tyranny” itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or like a weakening and softening metaphor—as being too human; and who should, nevertheless, end by asserting the same about this world as you do, namely, that it has a “necessary” and “calculable” course, not, however, because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and every power effects its ultimate consequences every moment. Granted that this also is only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the better.

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Now that the praise of the “disinterested person” is so popular one must—probably not without some danger—get an idea of what people actually take an interest in, and what are the things generally which fundamentally and profoundly concern ordinary men—including the cultured, even the learned, and perhaps philosophers also, if appearances do not deceive. The fact thereby becomes obvious that the greater part of what interests and charms higher natures, and more refined and fastidious tastes, seems absolutely “uninteresting” to the average man—if, notwithstanding, he perceive devotion to these interests, he calls it désintéressé, and wonders how it is possible to act “disinterestedly.” There have been philosophers who could give this popular astonishment a seductive and mystical, otherworldly expression (perhaps because they did not know the higher nature by experience?), instead of stating the naked and candidly reasonable truth that “disinterested” action is very interesting and “interested” action, provided that … “And love?”—What! Even an action for love’s sake shall be “unegoistic”? But you fools—! “And the praise of the self-sacrificer?”—But whoever has really offered sacrifice knows that he wanted and obtained something for it—perhaps something from himself for something from himself; that he relinquished here in order to have more there, perhaps in general to be more, or even feel himself “more.” But this is a realm of questions and answers in which a more fastidious spirit does not like to stay: for here truth has to stifle her yawns so much when she is obliged to answer. And after all, truth is a woman; one must not use force with her.

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“It sometimes happens,” said a moralistic pedant and trifle-retailer, “that I honour and respect an unselfish man: not, however, because he is unselfish, but because I think he has a right to be useful to another man at his own expense. In short, the question is always who he is, and who the other is. For instance, in a person created and destined for command, self-denial and modest retirement, instead of being virtues, would be the waste of virtues: so it seems to me. Every system of unegoistic morality which takes itself unconditionally and appeals to everyone, not only sins against good taste, but is also an incentive to sins of omission, an additional seduction under the mask of philanthropy—and precisely a seduction and injury to the higher, rarer, and more privileged types of men. Moral systems must be compelled first of all to bow before the gradations of rank; their presumption must be driven home to their conscience—until they thoroughly understand at last that it is immoral to say that ‘what is right for one is proper for another.’ “—So said my moralistic pedant and bonhomme. Did he perhaps deserve to be laughed at when he thus exhorted systems of morals to practise morality? But one should not be too much in the right if one wishes to have the laughers on one’s own side; a grain of wrong pertains even to good taste.

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Wherever sympathy (fellow-suffering) is preached nowadays—and, if I gather rightly, no other religion is any longer preached—let the psychologist have his ears open through all the vanity, through all the noise which is natural to these preachers (as to all preachers), he will hear a hoarse, groaning, genuine note of self-contempt. It belongs to the overshadowing and uglifying of Europe, which has been on the increase for a century (the first symptoms of which are already specified documentarily in a thoughtful letter of Galiani to Madame d’Epinay)—if it is not really the cause thereof! The man of “modern ideas,” the conceited ape, is excessively dissatisfied with himself—this is perfectly certain. He suffers, and his vanity wants him only “to suffer with his fellows.”

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The hybrid European—a tolerably ugly plebeian, taken all in all—absolutely requires a costume: he needs history as a storeroom of costumes. To be sure, he notices that none of the costumes fit him properly—he changes and changes. Let us look at the nineteenth century with respect to these hasty preferences and changes in its masquerades of style, and also with respect to its moments of desperation on account of “nothing suiting” us. It is in vain to get ourselves up as romantic, or classical, or Christian, or Florentine, or barocco, or “national,” in moribus et artibus: it does not “clothe us”! But the “spirit,” especially the “historical spirit,” profits even by this desperation: once and again a new sample of the past or of the foreign is tested, put on, taken off, packed up, and above all studied—we are the first studious age in puncto of “costumes,” I mean as concerns morals, articles of belief, artistic tastes, and religions; we are prepared as no other age has ever been for a carnival in the grand style, for the most spiritual festival—laughter and arrogance, for the transcendental height of supreme folly and Aristophanic ridicule of the world. Perhaps we are still discovering the domain of our invention just here, the domain where even we can still be original, probably as parodists of the world’s history and as God’s Merry-Andrews—perhaps, though nothing else of the present have a future, our laughter itself may have a future!

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The historical sense (or the capacity for divining quickly the order of rank of the valuations according to which a people, a community, or an individual has lived, the “divining instinct” for the relationships of these valuations, for the relation of the authority of the valuations to the authority of the operating forces)—this historical sense, which we Europeans claim as our specialty, has come to us in the train of the enchanting and mad semi-barbarity into which Europe has been plunged by the democratic mingling of classes and races—it is only the nineteenth century that has recognized this faculty as its sixth sense. Owing to this mingling, the past of every form and mode of life, and of cultures which were formerly closely contiguous and superimposed on one another, flows forth into us “modern souls”; our instincts now run back in all directions, we ourselves are a kind of chaos: in the end, as we have said, the spirit perceives its advantage therein. By means of our semi-barbarity in body and in desire, we have secret access everywhere, such as a noble age never had; we have access above all to the labyrinth of imperfect civilizations, and to every form of semi-barbarity that has at any time existed on earth; and in so far as the most considerable part of human civilization hitherto has just been semi-barbarity, the “historical sense” implies almost the sense and instinct for everything, the taste and tongue for everything: whereby it immediately proves itself to be an ignoble sense. For instance, we enjoy Homer once more: it is perhaps our happiest acquisition that we know how to appreciate Homer, whom men of distinguished culture (as the French of the seventeenth century, like Saint-Evremond, who reproached him for his esprit vaste, and even Voltaire, the last echo of the century) cannot and could not so easily appropriate—whom they scarcely permitted themselves to enjoy. The very decided Yea and Nay of their palate, their promptly ready disgust, their hesitating reluctance with regard to everything strange, their horror of the bad taste even of lively curiosity, and in general the averseness of every distinguished and self-sufficing culture to avow a new desire, a dissatisfaction with its own condition, or an admiration of what is strange: all this determines and disposes them unfavourably even towards the best things of the world which are not their property or could not become their prey—and no faculty is more unintelligible to such men than just this historical sense, with its truckling, plebeian curiosity. The case is not different with Shakespeare, that marvelous Spanish-Moorish-Saxon synthesis of taste, over whom an ancient Athenian of the circle of Aeschylus would have half-killed himself with laughter or irritation: but we—accept precisely this wild motleyness, this medley of the most delicate, the most coarse, and the most artificial, with a secret confidence and cordiality; we enjoy it as a refinement of art reserved expressly for us, and allow ourselves to be as little disturbed by the repulsive fumes and the proximity of the English populace in which Shakespeare’s art and taste lives, as perhaps on the Chiaja of Naples, where, with all our senses awake, we go our way, enchanted and voluntarily, in spite of the drain-odour of the lower quarters of the town. That as men of the “historical sense” we have our virtues, is not to be disputed:—we are unpretentious, unselfish, modest, brave, habituated to self-control and self-renunciation, very grateful, very patient, very complaisant—but with all this we are perhaps not very “tasteful.” Let us finally confess it, that what is most difficult for us men of the “historical sense” to grasp, feel, taste, and love, what finds us fundamentally prejudiced and almost hostile, is precisely the perfection and ultimate maturity in every culture and art, the essentially noble in works and men, their moment of smooth sea and halcyon self-sufficiency, the goldenness and coldness which all things show that have perfected themselves. Perhaps our great virtue of the historical sense is in necessary contrast to good taste, at least to the very bad taste; and we can only evoke in ourselves imperfectly, hesitatingly, and with compulsion the small, short, and happy godsends and glorifications of human life as they shine here and there: those moments and marvelous experiences when a great power has voluntarily come to a halt before the boundless and infinite—when a superabundance of refined delight has been enjoyed by a sudden checking and petrifying, by standing firmly and planting oneself fixedly on still trembling ground. Proportionateness is strange to us, let us confess it to ourselves; our itching is really the itching for the infinite, the immeasurable. Like the rider on his forward panting horse, we let the reins fall before the infinite, we modern men, we semi-barbarians—and are only in our highest bliss when we—are in most danger.

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Whether it be hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, or eudaemonism, all those modes of thinking which measure the worth of things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to accompanying circumstances and secondary considerations, are plausible modes of thought and naivetes, which everyone conscious of creative powers and an artist’s conscience will look down upon with scorn, though not without Sympathy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Gender Relationships ↖ Psychology . Sympathy for you!—to be sure, that is not sympathy as you understand it: it is not sympathy for social “distress,” for “society” with its sick and misfortuned, for the hereditarily vicious and defective who lie on the ground around us; still less is it sympathy for the grumbling, vexed, revolutionary slave-classes who strive after power—they call it “freedom.” Our sympathy is a loftier and further-sighted sympathy:—we see how man dwarfs himself, how you dwarf him! and there are moments when we view your sympathy with an indescribable anguish, when we resist it—when we regard your seriousness as more dangerous than any kind of levity. You want, if possible—and there is not a more foolish “if possible”—to do away with Suffering ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology ↖ States Of Being ; and we?—it really seems that we would rather have it increased and made worse than it has ever been! Well-being, as you understand it—is certainly not a goal; it seems to us an end; a condition which at once renders man ludicrous and contemptible—and makes his destruction desirable! The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—know ye not that it is only this discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto? The tension of soul in misfortune which communicates to it its energy, its shuddering in view of rack and ruin, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting, and exploiting misfortune, and whatever depth, mystery, disguise, spirit, artifice, or greatness has been bestowed upon the soul—has it not been bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In man creature and creator are united: in man there is not only matter, shred, excess, clay, mire, folly, chaos; but there is also the creator, the sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divinity of the spectator, and the seventh day—do ye understand this contrast? And that your sympathy for the “creature in man” applies to that which has to be fashioned, bruised, forged, stretched, roasted, annealed, refined—to that which must necessarily suffer, and is meant to suffer? And our sympathy—do ye not understand what our reverse sympathy applies to, when it resists your sympathy as the worst of all pampering and enervation?—So it is sympathy against sympathy!—But to repeat it once more, there are higher problems than the problems of Pleasure and pain ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and sympathy; and all systems of philosophy which deal only with these are naivetes.

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We Immoralists.—This world with which we are concerned, in which we have to fear and love, this almost invisible, inaudible world of delicate command and delicate obedience, a world of “almost” in every respect, captious, insidious, sharp, and tender—yes, it is well protected from clumsy spectators and familiar curiosity! We are woven into a strong net and garment of duties, and cannot disengage ourselves—precisely here, we are “men of duty,” even we! Occasionally, it is true, we dance in our “chains” and betwixt our “swords”; it is none the less true that more often we gnash our teeth under the circumstances, and are impatient at the secret hardship of our lot. But do what we will, fools and appearances say of us: “These are men without duty,”—we have always fools and appearances against us!

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Honesty ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Virtues , granting that it is the Virtue ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ The Prince ↖ Virtues of which we cannot rid ourselves, we Free Spirits ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts —well, we will labour at it with all our perversity and love, and not tire of “perfecting” ourselves in our virtue, which alone remains: may its glance some day overspread like a gilded, blue, mocking twilight this aging civilization with its dull gloomy seriousness! And if, nevertheless, our honesty should one day grow weary, and sigh, and stretch its limbs, and find us too hard, and would fain have it pleasanter, easier, and gentler, like an agreeable vice, let us remain hard, we latest Stoics, and let us send to its help whatever devilry we have in us:—our disgust at the clumsy and undefined, our “nitimur in vetitum,” our love of adventure, our sharpened and fastidious curiosity, our most subtle, disguised, intellectual Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts and universal conquest, which rambles and roves avidiously around all the realms of the future—let us go with all our “devils” to the help of our “God”! It is probable that people will misunderstand and mistake us on that account: what does it matter! They will say: “Their ‘honesty’—that is their devilry, and nothing else!” What does it matter! And even if they were right—have not all Gods hitherto been such sanctified, re-baptized devils? And after all, what do we know of ourselves? And what the spirit that leads us wants to be called? (It is a question of names.) And how many spirits we harbour? Our honesty, we free spirits—let us be careful lest it become our vanity, our ornament and ostentation, our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtue inclines to stupidity, every stupidity to virtue; “stupid to the point of sanctity,” they say in Russia—let us be careful lest out of pure honesty we eventually become saints and bores! Is not life a hundred times too short for us—to bore ourselves? One would have to believe in eternal life in order to …

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I hope to be forgiven for discovering that all moral philosophy hitherto has been tedious and has belonged to the soporific appliances—and that “ Virtue ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ The Prince ↖ Virtues ,” in my opinion, has been more injured by the tediousness of its advocates than by anything else; at the same time, however, I would not wish to overlook their general usefulness. It is desirable that as few people as possible should reflect upon morals, and consequently it is very desirable that morals should not some day become interesting! But let us not be afraid! Things still remain today as they have always been: I see no one in Europe who has (or discloses) an idea of the fact that philosophizing concerning morals might be conducted in a dangerous, captious, and ensnaring manner—that calamity might be involved therein. Observe, for example, the indefatigable, inevitable English utilitarians ↖ Beyond Good and Evil : how ponderously and respectably they stalk on, stalk along (a Homeric metaphor expresses it better) in the footsteps of Bentham, just as he had already stalked in the footsteps of the respectable Helvetius! (no, he was not a dangerous man, Helvetius, ce sénateur Pococurante, to use an expression of Galiani). No new thought, nothing of the nature of a finer turning or better expression of an old thought, not even a proper history of what has been previously thought on the subject: an impossible literature, taking it all in all, unless one knows how to leaven it with some mischief. In effect, the old English vice called cant, which is moral tartuffism, has insinuated itself also into these moralists (whom one must certainly read with an eye to their motives if one must read them), concealed this time under the new form of the scientific spirit; moreover, there is not absent from them a secret struggle with the pangs of conscience, from which a race of former Puritans must naturally suffer, in all their scientific tinkering with morals. (Is not a moralist the opposite of a Puritan? That is to say, as a thinker who regards morality as questionable, as worthy of interrogation, in short, as a problem? Is moralizing not-immoral?) In the end, they all want English morality to be recognized as authoritative, inasmuch as mankind, or the “general utility,” or “the happiness of the greatest number,”—no! the happiness of England, will be best served thereby. They would like, by all means, to convince themselves that the striving after English happiness, I mean after comfort and fashion (and in the highest instance, a seat in Parliament), is at the same time the true path of virtue; in fact, that in so far as there has been virtue in the world hitherto, it has just consisted in such striving. Not one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herding-animals (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive to the general welfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the “general welfare” is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped, but is only a nostrum—that what is fair to one may not at all be fair to another, that the requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment to higher men, in short, that there is a Distinction of rank ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics between man and man, and consequently between morality and morality. They are an unassuming and fundamentally mediocre species of men, these utilitarian Englishmen, and, as already remarked, in so far as they are tedious, one cannot think highly enough of their utility. One ought even to encourage them, as has been partially attempted in the following rhymes:—

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In these later ages, which may be proud of their humanity, there still remains so much fear, so much superstition of the fear, of the “cruel wild beast,” the mastering of which constitutes the very pride of these humaner ages—that even obvious truths, as if by the agreement of centuries, have long remained unuttered, because they have the appearance of helping the finally slain wild beast back to life again. I perhaps risk something when I allow such a truth to escape; let others capture it again and give it so much milk of pious sentiment to drink, that it will lie down quiet and forgotten, in its old corner.—One ought to learn anew about Cruelty ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology ↖ The Prince , and open one’s eyes; one ought at last to learn impatience, in order that such immodest gross errors—as, for instance, have been fostered by ancient and modern philosophers with regard to Tragedy ↖ Aesthetics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —may no longer wander about virtuously and boldly. Almost everything that we call “ Higher culture ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development ” is based upon the spiritualising and intensifying of cruelty—this is my thesis; the “wild beast” has not been slain at all, it lives, it flourishes, it has only been—transfigured. That which constitutes the painful delight of tragedy is cruelty; that which operates agreeably in so-called tragic sympathy, and at the basis even of everything sublime, up to the highest and most delicate thrills of metaphysics, obtains its sweetness solely from the intermingled ingredient of cruelty. What the Roman enjoys in the arena, the Christian in the ecstasies of the cross, the Spaniard at the sight of the faggot and stake, or of the bullfight, the present-day Japanese who presses his way to the tragedy, the workman of the Parisian suburbs who has a homesickness for bloody revolutions, the Wagnerienne who, with unhinged will, “undergoes” the performance of Tristan and Isolde—what all these enjoy, and strive with mysterious ardour to drink in, is the philtre of the great Circe “cruelty.” Here, to be sure, we must put aside entirely the blundering psychology of former times, which could only teach with regard to cruelty that it originated at the sight of the suffering of others: there is an abundant, superabundant enjoyment even in one’s own suffering, in causing one’s own suffering—and wherever man has allowed himself to be persuaded to Self-denial ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development in the religious sense, or to self-mutilation, as among the Phoenicians and ascetics, or in general, to desensualisation, decarnalisation, and contrition, to Puritanical repentance-spasms, to vivisection of conscience and to Pascal ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers -like sacrifizia dell’ intelleto, he is secretly allured and impelled forwards by his cruelty, by the dangerous thrill of cruelty towards himself.—Finally, let us consider that even the seeker of Knowledge ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology operates as an artist and glorifier of cruelty, in that he compels his spirit to perceive against its own inclination, and often enough against the wishes of his heart:—he forces it to say Nay, where he would like to affirm, love, and adore; indeed, every instance of taking a thing profoundly and fundamentally, is a violation, an intentional injuring of the fundamental will of the spirit, which instinctively aims at appearance and superficiality—even in every desire for knowledge there is a drop of cruelty.

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All Psychology ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology hitherto has run aground on moral prejudices and timidities, it has not dared to launch out into the depths. In so far as it is allowable to recognize in that which has hitherto been written, evidence of that which has hitherto been kept silent, it seems as if nobody had yet harboured the notion of psychology as the Morphology and development-doctrine of the Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts , as I conceive of it. The power of moral prejudices has penetrated deeply into the most intellectual world, the world apparently most indifferent and unprejudiced, and has obviously operated in an injurious, obstructive, blinding, and distorting manner. A proper Physio-psychology ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology has to contend with unconscious antagonism in the heart of the investigator, it has “the heart” against it: even a doctrine of the reciprocal conditionalness of the “good” and the “bad” impulses, causes (as refined immorality) distress and aversion in a still strong and manly conscience—still more so, a doctrine of the derivation of all good impulses from bad ones. If, however, a person should regard even the emotions of hatred, envy, covetousness, and imperiousness as life-conditioning emotions, as factors which must be present, fundamentally and essentially, in the general economy of life (which must, therefore, be further developed if life is to be further developed), he will suffer from such a view of things as from seasickness. And yet this hypothesis is far from being the strangest and most painful in this immense and almost new domain of dangerous knowledge, and there are in fact a hundred good reasons why everyone should keep away from it who can do so! On the other hand, if one has once drifted hither with one’s bark, well! very good! now let us set our teeth firmly! let us open our eyes and keep our hand fast on the helm! We sail away right over morality, we crush out, we destroy perhaps the remains of our own morality by daring to make our voyage thither—but what do we matter. Never yet did a profounder world of insight reveal itself to daring travelers and adventurers, and the psychologist who thus “makes a sacrifice”—it is not the sacrifizio dell’ intelletto, on the contrary!—will at least be entitled to demand in return that psychology shall once more be recognized as the queen of the sciences, for whose service and equipment the other sciences exist. For psychology is once more the path to the fundamental problems.

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Perhaps what I have said here about a “ Fundamental will of the spirit ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ” may not be understood without further details; I may be allowed a word of explanation.—That imperious something which is popularly called “the spirit,” wishes to be master internally and externally, and to feel itself master; it has the will of a multiplicity for a simplicity, a binding, taming, imperious, and essentially ruling will. Its requirements and capacities here, are the same as those assigned by physiologists to everything that lives, grows, and multiplies. The power of the spirit to appropriate foreign elements reveals itself in a strong tendency to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, to overlook or repudiate the absolutely contradictory; just as it arbitrarily re-underlines, makes prominent, and falsifies for itself certain traits and lines in the foreign elements, in every portion of the “outside world.” Its object thereby is the incorporation of new “experiences,” the assortment of new things in the old arrangements—in short, growth; or more properly, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power—is its object. This same will has at its service an apparently opposed impulse of the spirit, a suddenly adopted preference of ignorance, of arbitrary shutting out, a closing of windows, an inner denial of this or that, a prohibition to approach, a sort of defensive attitude against much that is knowable, a contentment with obscurity, with the shutting-in horizon, an acceptance and approval of ignorance: as that which is all necessary according to the degree of its appropriating power, its “digestive power,” to speak figuratively (and in fact “the spirit” resembles a stomach more than anything else). Here also belong an occasional propensity of the spirit to let itself be deceived (perhaps with a waggish suspicion that it is not so-and-so, but is only allowed to pass as such), a delight in uncertainty and ambiguity, an exulting enjoyment of arbitrary, out-of-the-way narrowness and mystery, of the too-near, of the foreground, of the magnified, the diminished, the misshapen, the beautified—an enjoyment of the arbitrariness of all these manifestations of power. Finally, in this connection, there is the not unscrupulous readiness of the spirit to deceive other spirits and dissemble before them—the constant pressing and straining of a creating, shaping, changeable power: the spirit enjoys therein its craftiness and its variety of disguises, it enjoys also its feeling of security therein—it is precisely by its Protean arts that it is best protected and concealed!—counter to this propensity for appearance, for simplification, for a disguise, for a cloak, in short, for an outside—for every outside is a cloak—there operates the sublime tendency of the man of knowledge, which takes, and insists on taking things profoundly, variously, and thoroughly; as a kind of cruelty of the Intellectual conscience ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and taste, which every courageous thinker will acknowledge in himself, provided, as it ought to be, that he has sharpened and hardened his eye sufficiently long for introspection, and is accustomed to severe discipline and even severe words. He will say: “There is something cruel in the tendency of my spirit”: let the virtuous and amiable try to convince him that it is not so! In fact, it would sound nicer, if, instead of our cruelty, perhaps our “extravagant honesty” were talked about, whispered about, and glorified—we free, very free spirits—and some day perhaps such will actually be our—posthumous glory! Meanwhile—for there is plenty of time until then—we should be least inclined to deck ourselves out in such florid and fringed moral verbiage; our whole former work has just made us sick of this taste and its sprightly exuberance. They are beautiful, glistening, jingling, festive words: honesty, love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for knowledge, heroism of the truthful—there is something in them that makes one’s heart swell with pride. But we anchorites and marmots have long ago persuaded ourselves in all the secrecy of an anchorite’s conscience, that this worthy parade of verbiage also belongs to the old false adornment, frippery, and gold-dust of unconscious human vanity, and that even under such flattering colour and repainting, the terrible original text Homo natura ↖ Beyond Good and Evil must again be recognized. In effect, to translate man back again into nature; to master the many vain and visionary interpretations and subordinate meanings which have hitherto been scratched and daubed over the eternal original text, homo natura; to bring it about that man shall henceforth stand before man as he now, hardened by the discipline of science, stands before the other forms of nature, with fearless Oedipus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil -eyes, and stopped Ulysses ↖ Beyond Good and Evil -ears, deaf to the enticements of old metaphysical bird-catchers, who have piped to him far too long: “Thou art more! thou art higher! thou hast a different origin!”—this may be a strange and foolish task, but that it is a task, who can deny! Why did we choose it, this foolish task? Or, to put the question differently: “Why knowledge at all?” Everyone will ask us about this. And thus pressed, we, who have asked ourselves the question a hundred times, have not found and cannot find any better answer. …

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Learning alters us, it does what all nourishment does that does not merely “conserve”—as the physiologist knows. But at the bottom of our souls, quite “down below,” there is certainly something unteachable, a granite of spiritual fate, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined, chosen questions. In each cardinal problem there speaks an unchangeable “I am this”; a thinker cannot learn anew about man and woman, for instance, but can only learn fully—he can only follow to the end what is “fixed” about them in himself. Occasionally we find certain solutions of problems which make strong beliefs for us; perhaps they are henceforth called “convictions.” Later on—one sees in them only footsteps to self-knowledge, guideposts to the problem which we ourselves are—or more correctly to the great stupidity which we embody, our spiritual fate, the unteachable in us, quite “down below.”—In view of this liberal compliment which I have just paid myself, permission will perhaps be more readily allowed me to utter some truths about “woman as she is,” provided that it is known at the outset how literally they are merely—my truths.

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Woman ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Gender Relationships wishes to be independent, and therefore she begins to enlighten men about “woman as she is”—this is one of the worst developments of the general uglifying of Europe. For what must these clumsy attempts of feminine scientificality and self-exposure bring to light! Woman has so much cause for shame; in woman there is so much pedantry, superficiality, schoolmasterliness, petty presumption, unbridledness, and indiscretion concealed—study only woman’s behaviour towards children!—which has really been best restrained and dominated hitherto by the fear of man. Alas, if ever the “eternally tedious in woman”—she has plenty of it!—is allowed to venture forth! if she begins radically and on principle to unlearn her wisdom and art—of charming, of playing, of frightening away sorrow, of alleviating and taking easily; if she forgets her delicate aptitude for agreeable desires! Female voices are already raised, which, by Saint Aristophanes ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ! make one afraid:—with medical explicitness it is stated in a threatening manner what woman first and last requires from man. Is it not in the very worst taste that woman thus sets herself up to be scientific? Enlightenment ↖ Beyond Good and Evil hitherto has fortunately been men’s affair, men’s gift—we remained therewith “among ourselves”; and in the end, in view of all that women write about “woman,” we may well have considerable doubt as to whether woman really desires enlightenment about herself—and can desire it. If woman does not thereby seek a new ornament for herself—I believe ornamentation belongs to the eternally feminine?—why, then, she wishes to make herself feared: perhaps she thereby wishes to get the mastery. But she does not want Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Meditations —what does woman care for truth? From the very first, nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth—her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty. Let us confess it, we men: we honour and love this very art and this very instinct in woman: we who have the hard task, and for our recreation gladly seek the company of beings under whose hands, glances, and delicate follies, our seriousness, our gravity, and profundity appear almost like follies to us. Finally, I ask the question: Did a woman herself ever acknowledge profundity in a woman’s mind, or justice in a woman’s heart? And is it not true that on the whole “woman” has hitherto been most despised by woman herself, and not at all by us?—We men desire that woman should not continue to compromise herself by enlightening us; just as it was man’s care and the consideration for woman, when the church decreed: mulier taceat in ecclesia. It was to the benefit of woman when Napoleon ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People gave the too eloquent Madame de Stael ↖ Beyond Good and Evil to understand: mulier taceat in politicis!—and in my opinion, he is a true friend of woman who calls out to women today: mulier taceat de muliere!

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It betrays corruption of the instincts—apart from the fact that it betrays bad taste—when a woman refers to Madame Roland, or Madame de Stael, or Monsieur George Sand, as though something were proved thereby in favour of “woman as she is.” Among men, these are the three comical women as they are—nothing more!—and just the best involuntary counterarguments against feminine emancipation and autonomy.

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Stupidity in the kitchen; woman as cook; the terrible thoughtlessness with which the feeding of the family and the master of the house is managed! Woman does not understand what food means, and she insists on being cook! If woman had been a thinking creature, she should certainly, as cook for thousands of years, have discovered the most important physiological facts, and should likewise have got possession of the healing art! Through bad female cooks—through the entire lack of reason in the kitchen—the development of mankind has been longest retarded and most interfered with: even today matters are very little better. A word to High School girls.

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There are turns and casts of fancy, there are sentences, little handfuls of words, in which a whole culture, a whole society suddenly crystallises itself. Among these is the incidental remark of Madame de Lambert to her son: “Mon ami, ne vous permettez jamais que des folies, qui vous feront grand plaisir”—the motherliest and wisest remark, by the way, that was ever addressed to a son.

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I have no doubt that every noble woman will oppose what Dante and Goethe believed about woman—the former when he sang, “ella guardava suso, ed io in lei,” and the latter when he interpreted it, “the eternally feminine draws us aloft”; for this is just what she believes of the eternally masculine.

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Seven Apophthegms for Women

How the longest ennui flees,When a man comes to our knees!

Age, alas! and science staid,Furnish even weak virtue aid.

Sombre garb and silence meet:Dress for every dame—discreet.

Whom I thank when in my bliss?God!—and my good tailoress!

Young, a flower-decked cavern home;Old, a dragon thence doth roam.

Noble title, leg that’s fine,Man as well: Oh, were he mine!

Speech in brief and sense in mass—Slippery for the jenny-ass!

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Woman has hitherto been treated by men like birds, which, losing their way, have come down among them from an elevation: as something delicate, fragile, wild, strange, sweet, and animating—but as something also which must be cooped up to prevent it flying away.

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To be mistaken in the fundamental problem of “man and woman,” to deny here the profoundest antagonism and the necessity for an eternally hostile tension, to dream here perhaps of equal rights, equal training, equal claims and obligations: that is a typical sign of shallow-mindedness; and a thinker who has proved himself shallow at this dangerous spot—shallow in instinct!—may generally be regarded as suspicious, nay more, as betrayed, as discovered; he will probably prove too “short” for all fundamental questions of life, future as well as present, and will be unable to descend into any of the depths. On the other hand, a man who has depth of spirit as well as of desires, and has also the depth of benevolence which is capable of severity and harshness, and easily confounded with them, can only think of woman as Orientals do: he must conceive of her as a possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for service and accomplishing her mission therein—he must take his stand in this matter upon the immense rationality of Asia, upon the superiority of the instinct of Asia, as the Greeks did formerly; those best heirs and scholars of Asia—who, as is well known, with their increasing culture and amplitude of power, from Homer to the time of Pericles, became gradually stricter towards woman, in short, more Oriental. How necessary, how logical, even how humanely desirable this was, let us consider for ourselves!

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The weaker sex has in no previous age been treated with so much respect by men as at present—this belongs to the tendency and fundamental taste of democracy, in the same way as disrespectfulness to old age—what wonder is it that abuse should be immediately made of this respect? They want more, they learn to make claims, the tribute of respect is at last felt to be well-nigh galling; rivalry for rights, indeed actual strife itself, would be preferred: in a word, woman is losing modesty. And let us immediately add that she is also losing taste. She is unlearning to fear man: but the woman who “unlearns to fear” sacrifices her most womanly instincts. That woman should venture forward when the fear-inspiring quality in man—or more definitely, the man in man—is no longer either desired or fully developed, is reasonable enough and also intelligible enough; what is more difficult to understand is that precisely thereby—woman deteriorates. This is what is happening nowadays: let us not deceive ourselves about it! Wherever the industrial spirit has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit, woman strives for the economic and legal independence of a clerk: “woman as clerkess” is inscribed on the portal of the modern society which is in course of formation. While she thus appropriates new rights, aspires to be “master,” and inscribes “progress” of woman on her flags and banners, the very opposite realises itself with terrible obviousness: woman retrogrades. Since the French Revolution the influence of woman in Europe has declined in proportion as she has increased her rights and claims; and the “emancipation of woman,” insofar as it is desired and demanded by women themselves (and not only by masculine shallow-pates), thus proves to be a remarkable symptom of the increased weakening and deadening of the most womanly instincts. There is stupidity in this movement, an almost masculine stupidity, of which a well-reared woman—who is always a sensible woman—might be heartily ashamed. To lose the intuition as to the ground upon which she can most surely achieve victory; to neglect exercise in the use of her proper weapons; to let-herself-go before man, perhaps even “to the book,” where formerly she kept herself in control and in refined, artful humility; to neutralize with her virtuous audacity man’s faith in a veiled, fundamentally different ideal in woman, something eternally, necessarily feminine; to emphatically and loquaciously dissuade man from the idea that woman must be preserved, cared for, protected, and indulged, like some delicate, strangely wild, and often pleasant domestic animal; the clumsy and indignant collection of everything of the nature of servitude and bondage which the position of woman in the hitherto existing order of society has entailed and still entails (as though slavery were a counterargument, and not rather a condition of every higher culture, of every elevation of culture):—what does all this betoken, if not a disintegration of womanly instincts, a defeminising? Certainly, there are enough of idiotic friends and corrupters of woman among the learned asses of the masculine sex, who advise woman to defeminize herself in this manner, and to imitate all the stupidities from which “man” in Europe, European “manliness,” suffers—who would like to lower woman to “general culture,” indeed even to newspaper reading and meddling with politics. Here and there they wish even to make women into free spirits and literary workers: as though a woman without piety would not be something perfectly obnoxious or ludicrous to a profound and godless man;—almost everywhere her nerves are being ruined by the most morbid and dangerous kind of music (our latest German music), and she is daily being made more hysterical and more incapable of fulfilling her first and last function, that of bearing robust children. They wish to “cultivate” her in general still more, and intend, as they say, to make the “weaker sex” strong by culture: as if history did not teach in the most emphatic manner that the “cultivating” of mankind and his weakening—that is to say, the weakening, dissipating, and languishing of his force of will—have always kept pace with one another, and that the most powerful and influential women in the world (and lastly, the mother of Napoleon) had just to thank their force of will—and not their schoolmasters—for their power and ascendancy over men. That which inspires respect in woman, and often enough fear also, is her nature, which is more “natural” than that of man, her genuine, carnivora-like, cunning flexibility, her tiger-claws beneath the glove, her naivete in egoism, her untrainableness and innate wildness, the incomprehensibleness, extent, and deviation of her desires and virtues. That which, in spite of fear, excites one’s sympathy for the dangerous and beautiful cat, “woman,” is that she seems more afflicted, more vulnerable, more necessitous of love, and more condemned to disillusionment than any other creature. Fear and sympathy: it is with these feelings that man has hitherto stood in the presence of woman, always with one foot already in tragedy, which rends while it delights.—What? And all that is now to be at an end? And the disenchantment of woman is in progress? The tediousness of woman is slowly evolving? Oh Europe! Europe! We know the horned animal which was always most attractive to thee, from which danger is ever again threatening thee! Thy old fable might once more become “history”—an immense stupidity might once again overmaster thee and carry thee away! And no God concealed beneath it—no! only an “idea,” a “modern idea”!

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O sancta simplicitiatas! In what strange simplification and falsification man lives! One can never cease wondering when once one has got eyes for beholding this marvel! How we have made everything around us clear and free and easy and simple! how we have been able to give our senses a passport to everything superficial, our thoughts a godlike desire for wanton pranks and wrong inferences!—how from the beginning, we have contrived to retain our ignorance in order to enjoy an almost inconceivable freedom, thoughtlessness, imprudence, heartiness, and gaiety—in order to enjoy life! And only on this solidified, granite-like foundation of ignorance could knowledge rear itself hitherto, the Will to knowledge ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Will Concepts on the foundation of a far more powerful will, the Will to ignorance ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , to the uncertain, to the untrue! Not as its opposite, but—as its refinement! It is to be hoped, indeed, that Language ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , here as elsewhere, will not get over its awkwardness, and that it will continue to talk of opposites where there are only degrees and many refinements of gradation; it is equally to be hoped that the incarnated Tartuffery of morals, which now belongs to our unconquerable “flesh and blood,” will turn the words round in the mouths of us discerning ones. Here and there we understand it, and laugh at the way in which precisely the best knowledge seeks most to retain us in this simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably imagined, and suitably falsified world: at the way in which, whether it will or not, it loves error, because, as living itself, it loves life!

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I heard, once again for the first time, Richard Wagner ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ’s overture to the Mastersingers: it is a piece of magnificent, gorgeous, heavy, latter-day art, which has the pride to presuppose two centuries of music as still living, in order that it may be understood:—it is an honour to Germans that such a pride did not miscalculate! What flavours and forces, what seasons and climes do we not find mingled in it! It impresses us at one time as ancient, at another time as foreign, bitter, and too modern, it is as arbitrary as it is pompously traditional, it is not infrequently roguish, still oftener rough and coarse—it has fire and courage, and at the same time the loose, dun-coloured skin of fruits which ripen too late. It flows broad and full: and suddenly there is a moment of inexplicable hesitation, like a gap that opens between cause and effect, an oppression that makes us dream, almost a nightmare; but already it broadens and widens anew, the old stream of delight—the most manifold delight—of old and new happiness; including especially the joy of the artist in himself, which he refuses to conceal, his astonished, happy cognizance of his mastery of the expedients here employed, the new, newly acquired, imperfectly tested expedients of art which he apparently betrays to us. All in all, however, no beauty, no South, nothing of the delicate southern clearness of the sky, nothing of Grace ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , no dance, hardly a will to logic; a certain clumsiness even, which is also emphasized, as though the artist wished to say to us: “It is part of my intention”; a cumbersome drapery, something arbitrarily barbaric and ceremonious, a flirring of learned and venerable conceits and witticisms; something German in the best and worst sense of the word, something in the German style, manifold, formless, and inexhaustible; a certain German potency and super-plenitude of soul, which is not afraid to hide itself under the raffinements of Decadence ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ States Of Being —which, perhaps, feels itself most at ease there; a real, genuine token of the German soul ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , which is at the same time young and aged, too ripe and yet still too rich in futurity. This kind of music expresses best what I think of the Germans: they belong to the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow—they have as yet no today.

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We “good Europeans,” we also have hours when we allow ourselves a warmhearted patriotism, a plunge and relapse into old loves and narrow views—I have just given an example of it—hours of national excitement, of patriotic anguish, and all other sorts of old-fashioned floods of sentiment. Duller spirits may perhaps only get done with what confines its operations in us to hours and plays itself out in hours—in a considerable time: some in half a year, others in half a lifetime, according to the speed and strength with which they digest and “change their material.” Indeed, I could think of sluggish, hesitating races, which even in our rapidly moving Europe, would require half a century ere they could surmount such atavistic attacks of patriotism and soil-attachment, and return once more to reason, that is to say, to “good Europeanism.” And while digressing on this possibility, I happen to become an earwitness of a conversation between two old patriots—they were evidently both hard of hearing and consequently spoke all the louder. “He has as much, and knows as much, philosophy as a peasant or a corps-student,” said the one—“he is still innocent. But what does that matter nowadays! It is the age of the masses: they lie on their belly before everything that is massive. And so also in politicis. A statesman who rears up for them a new Tower of Babel, some monstrosity of empire and power, they call ‘great’—what does it matter that we more prudent and conservative ones do not meanwhile give up the old belief that it is only the great thought that gives greatness to an action or affair. Supposing a statesman were to bring his people into the position of being obliged henceforth to practise ‘high politics,’ for which they were by nature badly endowed and prepared, so that they would have to sacrifice their old and reliable virtues, out of love to a new and doubtful mediocrity;—supposing a statesman were to condemn his people generally to ‘practise politics,’ when they have hitherto had something better to do and think about, and when in the depths of their souls they have been unable to free themselves from a prudent loathing of the restlessness, emptiness, and noisy wranglings of the essentially politics-practising nations;—supposing such a statesman were to stimulate the slumbering passions and avidities of his people, were to make a stigma out of their former diffidence and delight in aloofness, an offence out of their exoticism and hidden permanency, were to depreciate their most radical proclivities, subvert their consciences, make their minds narrow, and their tastes ’national’—what! a statesman who should do all this, which his people would have to do penance for throughout their whole future, if they had a future, such a statesman would be great, would he?”—“Undoubtedly!” replied the other old patriot vehemently, “otherwise he could not have done it! It was mad perhaps to wish such a thing! But perhaps everything great has been just as mad at its commencement!”—“Misuse of words!” cried his interlocutor, contradictorily—“strong! strong! Strong and mad! not great!”—The old men had obviously become heated as they thus shouted their “truths” in each other’s faces, but I, in my happiness and apartness, considered how soon a stronger one may become master of the strong, and also that there is a compensation for the intellectual superficialising of a nation—namely, in the deepening of another.

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Whether we call it “civilization,” or “humanising,” or “progress,” which now distinguishes the European, whether we call it simply, without praise or blame, by the political formula the democratic movement in Europe—behind all the moral and political foregrounds pointed to by such formulas, an immense physiological process goes on, which is ever extending the process of the assimilation of Europeans, their increasing detachment from the conditions under which, climatically and hereditarily, united races originate, their increasing independence of every definite milieu, that for centuries would fain inscribe itself with equal demands on soul and body—that is to say, the slow emergence of an essentially supernational and nomadic species of man, who possesses, physiologically speaking, a maximum of the art and power of adaptation as his typical distinction. This process of the evolving European, which can be retarded in its tempo by great relapses, but will perhaps just gain and grow thereby in vehemence and depth—the still-raging storm and stress of “national sentiment” pertains to it, and also the anarchism which is appearing at present—this process will probably arrive at results on which its naive propagators and panegyrists, the apostles of “modern ideas,” would least care to reckon. The same new conditions under which on an average a levelling and mediocrising of man will take place—a useful, industrious, variously serviceable, and clever gregarious man—are in the highest degree suitable to give rise to exceptional men of the most dangerous and attractive qualities. For, while the capacity for adaptation, which is every day trying changing conditions, and begins a new work with every generation, almost with every decade, makes the powerfulness of the type impossible; while the collective impression of such future Europeans will probably be that of numerous, talkative, weak-willed, and very handy workmen who require a master, a commander, as they require their daily bread; while, therefore, the democratising of Europe will tend to the production of a type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense of the term: the strong man will necessarily in individual and exceptional cases, become stronger and richer than he has perhaps ever been before—owing to the unprejudicedness of his schooling, owing to the immense variety of practice, art, and disguise. I meant to say that the democratising of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the rearing of tyrants—taking the word in all its meanings, even in its most spiritual sense.

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I hear with pleasure that our sun is moving rapidly towards the constellation Hercules: and I hope that the men on this earth will do like the sun. And we foremost, we good Europeans!

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There was a time when it was customary to call Germans “deep” by way of distinction; but now that the most successful type of new Germanism is covetous of quite other honours, and perhaps misses “smartness” in all that has depth, it is almost opportune and patriotic to doubt whether we did not formerly deceive ourselves with that commendation: in short, whether German depth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil is not at bottom something different and worse—and something from which, thank God, we are on the point of successfully ridding ourselves. Let us try, then, to relearn with regard to German depth; the only thing necessary for the purpose is a little vivisection of the German soul ↖ Beyond Good and Evil .—The German soul is above all manifold, varied in its source, aggregated and superimposed, rather than actually built: this is owing to its origin. A German who would embolden himself to assert: “Two souls, alas, dwell in my breast,” would make a bad guess at the truth, or, more correctly, he would come far short of the truth about the number of souls. As a people made up of the most extraordinary mixing and mingling of races, perhaps even with a preponderance of the pre-Aryan element as the “people of the centre” in every sense of the term, the Germans are more intangible, more ample, more contradictory, more unknown, more incalculable, more surprising, and even more terrifying than other peoples are to themselves:—they escape definition, and are thereby alone the despair of the French. It is characteristic of the Germans that the question: “What is German?” never dies out among them. Kotzebue certainly knew his Germans well enough: “We are known,” they cried jubilantly to him—but Sand also thought he knew them. Jean Paul knew what he was doing when he declared himself incensed at Fichte’s lying but patriotic flatteries and exaggerations—but it is probable that Goethe ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People thought differently about Germans from Jean Paul, even though he acknowledged him to be right with regard to Fichte. It is a question what Goethe really thought about the Germans?—But about many things around him he never spoke explicitly, and all his life he knew how to keep an astute silence—probably he had good reason for it. It is certain that it was not the “Wars of Independence” that made him look up more joyfully, any more than it was the French Revolution—the event on account of which he reconstructed his Faust, and indeed the whole problem of “man,” was the appearance of Napoleon ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People . There are words of Goethe in which he condemns with impatient severity, as from a foreign land, that which Germans take a pride in: he once defined the famous German turn of mind as “Indulgence towards its own and others’ weaknesses.” Was he wrong? it is characteristic of Germans that one is seldom entirely wrong about them. The German soul has passages and galleries in it, there are caves, hiding-places, and dungeons therein, its disorder has much of the charm of the mysterious, the German is well acquainted with the bypaths to chaos. And as everything loves its symbol, so the German loves the clouds and all that is obscure, evolving, crepuscular, damp, and shrouded, it seems to him that everything uncertain, undeveloped, self-displacing, and growing is “deep.” The German himself does not exist, he is becoming, he is “developing himself.” “Development” is therefore the essentially German discovery and hit in the great domain of philosophical formulas—a ruling idea, which, together with German beer and German music, is labouring to Germanise all Europe. Foreigners are astonished and attracted by the riddles which the conflicting nature at the basis of the German soul propounds to them (riddles which Hegel systematised and Richard Wagner ↖ Beyond Good and Evil has in the end set to music). “Good-natured and spiteful”—such a juxtaposition, preposterous in the case of every other people, is unfortunately only too often justified in Germany one has only to live for a while among Swabians to know this! The clumsiness of the German scholar and his social distastefulness agree alarmingly well with his physical rope-dancing and nimble boldness, of which all the Gods have learnt to be afraid. If anyone wishes to see the “German soul” demonstrated ad oculos, let him only look at German taste, at German arts and manners what boorish indifference to “taste”! How the noblest and the commonest stand there in juxtaposition! How disorderly and how rich is the whole constitution of this soul! The German drags at his soul, he drags at everything he experiences. He digests his events badly; he never gets “done” with them; and German depth is often only a difficult, hesitating “digestion.” And just as all chronic invalids, all dyspeptics like what is convenient, so the German loves “frankness” and “honesty”; it is so convenient to be frank and honest!—This confidingness, this complaisance, this showing-the-cards of German honesty, is probably the most dangerous and most successful disguise which the German is up to nowadays: it is his proper Mephistophelean art; with this he can “still achieve much”! The German lets himself go, and thereby gazes with faithful, blue, empty German eyes—and other countries immediately confound him with his dressing-gown!—I meant to say that, let “German depth” be what it will—among ourselves alone we perhaps take the liberty to laugh at it—we shall do well to continue henceforth to honour its appearance and good name, and not barter away too cheaply our old reputation as a people of depth for Prussian “smartness,” and Berlin wit and sand. It is wise for a people to pose, and let itself be regarded, as profound, clumsy, good-natured, honest, and foolish: it might even be—profound to do so! Finally, we should do honour to our name—we are not called the “tiusche volk” (deceptive people) for nothing. …

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The “good old” time is past, it sang itself out in Mozart ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —how happy are we that his rococo still speaks to us, that his “good company,” his tender enthusiasm, his childish delight in the Chinese and its flourishes, his courtesy of heart, his longing for the elegant, the amorous, the tripping, the tearful, and his belief in the South, can still appeal to something left in us! Ah, some time or other it will be over with it!—but who can doubt that it will be over still sooner with the intelligence and taste for Beethoven ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People ! For he was only the last echo of a break and transition in style, and not, like Mozart, the last echo of a great European taste which had existed for centuries. Beethoven is the intermediate event between an old mellow soul that is constantly breaking down, and a future over-young soul that is always coming; there is spread over his music the twilight of eternal loss and eternal extravagant hope—the same light in which Europe was bathed when it dreamed with Rousseau, when it danced round the Tree of Liberty of the Revolution, and finally almost fell down in adoration before Napoleon. But how rapidly does this very sentiment now pale, how difficult nowadays is even the apprehension of this sentiment, how strangely does the language of Rousseau, Schiller, Shelley, and Byron sound to our ear, in whom collectively the same fate of Europe was able to speak, which knew how to sing in Beethoven!—Whatever German music came afterwards, belongs to Romanticism ↖ Aesthetics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , that is to say, to a movement which, historically considered, was still shorter, more fleeting, and more superficial than that great interlude, the transition of Europe from Rousseau to Napoleon, and to the rise of democracy. Weber—but what do we care nowadays for Freischutz and Oberon! Or Marschner’s Hans Heiling and Vampyre! Or even Wagner’s Tannhäuser! That is extinct, although not yet forgotten music. This whole music of Romanticism, besides, was not noble enough, was not musical enough, to maintain its position anywhere but in the theatre and before the masses; from the beginning it was second-rate music, which was little thought of by genuine musicians. It was different with Felix Mendelssohn, that halcyon master, who, on account of his lighter, purer, happier soul, quickly acquired admiration, and was equally quickly forgotten: as the beautiful episode of German music. But with regard to Robert Schumann ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , who took things seriously, and has been taken seriously from the first—he was the last that founded a school—do we not now regard it as a satisfaction, a relief, a deliverance, that this very Romanticism of Schumann’s has been surmounted? Schumann, fleeing into the “Saxon Switzerland” of his soul, with a half Werther-like, half Jean-Paul-like nature (assuredly not like Beethoven! assuredly not like Byron!)—his Manfred music is a mistake and a misunderstanding to the extent of injustice; Schumann, with his taste, which was fundamentally a petty taste (that is to say, a dangerous propensity—doubly dangerous among Germans—for quiet lyricism and intoxication of the feelings), going constantly apart, timidly withdrawing and retiring, a noble weakling who revelled in nothing but anonymous joy and sorrow, from the beginning a sort of girl and noli me tangere—this Schumann was already merely a German event in music, and no longer a European event, as Beethoven had been, as in a still greater degree Mozart had been; with Schumann German music was threatened with its greatest danger, that of losing the voice for the soul of Europe and sinking into a merely national affair.

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What a torture are books written in German to a reader who has a third ear! How indignantly he stands beside the slowly turning swamp of sounds without tune and rhythms without dance, which Germans call a “book”! And even the German who reads books! How lazily, how reluctantly, how badly he reads! How many Germans know, and consider it obligatory to know, that there is art in every good sentence—art which must be divined, if the sentence is to be understood! If there is a misunderstanding about its tempo, for instance, the sentence itself is misunderstood! That one must not be doubtful about the rhythm-determining syllables, that one should feel the breaking of the too-rigid symmetry as intentional and as a charm, that one should lend a fine and patient ear to every staccato and every rubato, that one should divine the sense in the sequence of the vowels and diphthongs, and how delicately and richly they can be tinted and retinted in the order of their arrangement—who among book-reading Germans is complaisant enough to recognize such duties and requirements, and to listen to so much art and intention in language? After all, one just “has no ear for it”; and so the most marked contrasts of style are not heard, and the most delicate artistry is as it were squandered on the deaf.—These were my thoughts when I noticed how clumsily and unintuitively two masters in the art of prose-writing have been confounded: one, whose words drop down hesitatingly and coldly, as from the roof of a damp cave—he counts on their dull sound and echo; and another who manipulates his language like a flexible sword, and from his arm down into his toes feels the dangerous bliss of the quivering, oversharp blade, which wishes to bite, hiss, and cut.

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How little the German style has to do with harmony and with the ear, is shown by the fact that precisely our good musicians themselves write badly. The German does not read aloud, he does not read for the ear, but only with his eyes; he has put his ears away in the drawer for the time. In antiquity when a man read—which was seldom enough—he read something to himself, and in a loud voice; they were surprised when anyone read silently, and sought secretly the reason of it. In a loud voice: that is to say, with all the swellings, inflections, and variations of key and changes of tempo, in which the ancient public world took delight. The laws of the written style were then the same as those of the spoken style; and these laws depended partly on the surprising development and refined requirements of the ear and larynx; partly on the strength, endurance, and power of the ancient lungs. In the ancient sense, a period is above all a physiological whole, inasmuch as it is comprised in one breath. Such periods as occur in Demosthenes and Cicero, swelling twice and sinking twice, and all in one breath, were pleasures to the men of antiquity, who knew by their own schooling how to appreciate the virtue therein, the rareness and the difficulty in the deliverance of such a period;—we have really no right to the big period, we modern men, who are short of breath in every sense! Those ancients, indeed, were all of them dilettanti in speaking, consequently connoisseurs, consequently critics—they thus brought their orators to the highest pitch; in the same manner as in the last century, when all Italian ladies and gentlemen knew how to sing, the virtuosoship of song (and with it also the art of melody) reached its elevation. In Germany, however (until quite recently when a kind of platform eloquence began shyly and awkwardly enough to flutter its young wings), there was properly speaking only one kind of public and approximately artistical discourse—that delivered from the pulpit. The preacher was the only one in Germany who knew the weight of a syllable or a word, in what manner a sentence strikes, springs, rushes, flows, and comes to a close; he alone had a conscience in his ears, often enough a bad conscience: for reasons are not lacking why proficiency in oratory should be especially seldom attained by a German, or almost always too late. The masterpiece of German prose is therefore with good reason the masterpiece of its greatest preacher: the Bible has hitherto been the best German book. Compared with Luther’s Bible, almost everything else is merely “literature”—something which has not grown in Germany, and therefore has not taken and does not take root in German hearts, as the Bible has done.

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There are two kinds of geniuses: one which above all engenders and seeks to engender, and another which willingly lets itself be fructified and brings forth. And similarly, among the gifted nations, there are those on whom the woman’s problem of pregnancy has devolved, and the secret task of forming, maturing, and perfecting—the Greeks, for instance, were a nation of this kind, and so are the French; and others which have to fructify and become the cause of new modes of life—like the Jews, the Romans, and, in all modesty be it asked: like the Germans?—nations tortured and enraptured by unknown fevers and irresistibly forced out of themselves, amorous and longing for foreign races (for such as “let themselves be fructified”), and withal imperious, like everything conscious of being full of generative force, and consequently empowered “by the grace of God.” These two kinds of geniuses seek each other like man and woman; but they also misunderstand each other—like man and woman.

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Every nation has its own “Tartuffery,” and calls that its virtue.—One does not know—cannot know, the best that is in one.

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After such a cheerful commencement, a serious word would fain be heard; it appeals to the most serious minds. Take care, ye philosophers and friends of knowledge, and beware of Martyrdom ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ! Of suffering “for the Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Meditations ’s sake”! even in your own defense! It spoils all the innocence and fine neutrality of your conscience; it makes you headstrong against objections and red rags; it stupefies, animalizes, and brutalizes, when in the struggle with danger, slander, suspicion, expulsion, and even worse consequences of enmity, ye have at last to play your last card as protectors of truth upon earth—as though “the Truth” were such an innocent and incompetent creature as to require protectors! and you of all people, ye knights of the sorrowful countenance, Messrs. Loafers and Cobweb-spinners of the spirit! Finally, ye know sufficiently well that it cannot be of any consequence if ye just carry your point; ye know that hitherto no philosopher has carried his point, and that there might be a more laudable truthfulness in every little interrogative mark which you place after your special words and favourite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all the solemn pantomime and trumping games before accusers and law-courts! Rather go out of the way! Flee into concealment! And have your masks and your ruses, that ye may be mistaken for what you are, or somewhat feared! And pray, don’t forget the garden, the garden with golden trelliswork! And have people around you who are as a garden—or as music on the waters at eventide, when already the day becomes a memory. Choose the good Solitude ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development ↖ States Of Being , the free, wanton, lightsome solitude, which also gives you the right still to remain good in any sense whatsoever! How poisonous, how crafty, how bad, does every long war make one, which cannot be waged openly by means of force! How personal does a long fear make one, a long watching of enemies, of possible enemies! These pariahs of society, these long-pursued, badly-persecuted ones—also the compulsory recluses, the Spinoza ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers s or Giordano Bruno ↖ Beyond Good and Evil s—always become in the end, even under the most intellectual masquerade, and perhaps without being themselves aware of it, refined vengeance-seekers and poison-brewers (just lay bare the foundation of Spinoza’s ethics and theology!), not to speak of the stupidity of moral indignation, which is the unfailing sign in a philosopher that the sense of philosophical humour has left him. The martyrdom of the philosopher, his “sacrifice for the sake of truth,” forces into the light whatever of the agitator and actor lurks in him; and if one has hitherto contemplated him only with artistic curiosity, with regard to many a philosopher it is easy to understand the dangerous desire to see him also in his deterioration (deteriorated into a “martyr,” into a stage-and-tribune-bawler). Only, that it is necessary with such a desire to be clear what spectacle one will see in any case—merely a satyric play, merely an epilogue farce, merely the continued proof that the long, real tragedy is at an end, supposing that every philosophy has been a long tragedy in its origin.

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What Europe owes to the Jews?—Many things, good and bad, and above all one thing of the nature both of the best and the worst: the grand style in morality, the fearfulness and majesty of infinite demands, of infinite significations, the whole Romanticism and sublimity of moral questionableness—and consequently just the most attractive, ensnaring, and exquisite element in those iridescences and allurements to life, in the aftersheen of which the sky of our European culture, its evening sky, now glows—perhaps glows out. For this, we artists among the spectators and philosophers, are—grateful to the Jews.

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It must be taken into the bargain, if various clouds and disturbances—in short, slight attacks of stupidity—pass over the spirit of a people that suffers and wants to suffer from national nervous fever and political ambition: for instance, among present-day Germans there is alternately the anti-French folly, the antisemitic folly, the anti-Polish folly, the Christian-romantic folly, the Wagnerian folly, the Teutonic folly, the Prussian folly (just look at those poor historians, the Sybels and Treitschkes, and their closely bandaged heads), and whatever else these little obscurations of the German spirit and conscience may be called. May it be forgiven me that I, too, when on a short daring sojourn on very infected ground, did not remain wholly exempt from the disease, but like everyone else, began to entertain thoughts about matters which did not concern me—the first symptom of political infection. About the Jews, for instance, listen to the following:—I have never yet met a German who was favourably inclined to the Jews; and however decided the repudiation of actual antisemitism may be on the part of all prudent and political men, this prudence and policy is not perhaps directed against the nature of the sentiment itself, but only against its dangerous excess, and especially against the distasteful and infamous expression of this excess of sentiment;—on this point we must not deceive ourselves. That Germany has amply sufficient Jews, that the German stomach, the German blood, has difficulty (and will long have difficulty) in disposing only of this quantity of “Jew”—as the Italian, the Frenchman, and the Englishman have done by means of a stronger digestion:—that is the unmistakable declaration and language of a general instinct, to which one must listen and according to which one must act. “Let no more Jews come in! And shut the doors, especially towards the East (also towards Austria)!”—thus commands the instinct of a people whose nature is still feeble and uncertain, so that it could be easily wiped out, easily extinguished, by a stronger race. The Jews, however, are beyond all doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race at present living in Europe, they know how to succeed even under the worst conditions (in fact better than under favourable ones), by means of virtues of some sort, which one would like nowadays to label as vices—owing above all to a resolute faith which does not need to be ashamed before “modern ideas,” they alter only, when they do alter, in the same way that the Russian Empire makes its conquest—as an empire that has plenty of time and is not of yesterday—namely, according to the principle, “as slowly as possible”! A thinker who has the future of Europe at heart, will, in all his perspectives concerning the future, calculate upon the Jews, as he will calculate upon the Russians, as above all the surest and likeliest factors in the great play and battle of forces. That which is at present called a “nation” in Europe, and is really rather a res facta than nata (indeed, sometimes confusingly similar to a res ficta et picta), is in every case something evolving, young, easily displaced, and not yet a race, much less such a race aere perennus, as the Jews are: such “nations” should most carefully avoid all hotheaded rivalry and hostility! It is certain that the Jews, if they desired—or if they were driven to it, as the anti-Semites seem to wish—could now have the ascendancy, nay, literally the supremacy, over Europe, that they are not working and planning for that end is equally certain. Meanwhile, they rather wish and desire, even somewhat importunely, to be insorbed and absorbed by Europe, they long to be finally settled, authorized, and respected somewhere, and wish to put an end to the nomadic life, to the “wandering Jew”—and one should certainly take account of this impulse and tendency, and make advances to it (it possibly betokens a mitigation of the Jewish instincts) for which purpose it would perhaps be useful and fair to banish the antisemitic bawlers out of the country. One should make advances with all prudence, and with selection, pretty much as the English nobility do. It stands to reason that the more powerful and strongly marked types of new Germanism could enter into relation with the Jews with the least hesitation, for instance, the nobleman officer from the Prussian border: it would be interesting in many ways to see whether the genius for money and patience (and especially some intellect and intellectuality—sadly lacking in the place referred to) could not in addition be annexed and trained to the hereditary art of commanding and obeying—for both of which the country in question has now a classic reputation. But here it is expedient to break off my festal discourse and my sprightly Teutonomania: for I have already reached my serious topic, the “European problem,” as I understand it, the rearing of a new ruling caste for Europe.

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They are not a philosophical race—the English: Bacon ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers represents an attack on the philosophical spirit generally, Hobbes, Hume ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , and Locke, an abasement, and a depreciation of the idea of a “philosopher” for more than a century. It was against Hume that Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers uprose and raised himself; it was Locke of whom Schelling rightly said, “je méprise Locke”; in the struggle against the English mechanical stultification of the world, Hegel ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers and Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers (along with Goethe) were of one accord; the two hostile brother-geniuses in philosophy, who pushed in different directions towards the opposite poles of German thought, and thereby wronged each other as only brothers will do.—What is lacking in England, and has always been lacking, that half-actor and rhetorician knew well enough, the absurd muddlehead, Carlyle, who sought to conceal under passionate grimaces what he knew about himself: namely, what was lacking in Carlyle—real power of intellect, real depth of intellectual perception, in short, philosophy. It is characteristic of such an unphilosophical race to hold on firmly to Christianity—they need its discipline for “moralizing” and humanizing. The Englishman, more gloomy, sensual, headstrong, and brutal than the German—is for that very reason, as the baser of the two, also the most pious: he has all the more need of Christianity. To finer nostrils, this English Christianity itself has still a characteristic English taint of spleen and alcoholic excess, for which, owing to good reasons, it is used as an antidote—the finer poison to neutralize the coarser: a finer form of poisoning is in fact a step in advance with coarse-mannered people, a step towards spiritualization. The English coarseness and rustic demureness is still most satisfactorily disguised by Christian pantomime, and by praying and psalm-singing (or, more correctly, it is thereby explained and differently expressed); and for the herd of drunkards and rakes who formerly learned moral grunting under the influence of Methodism (and more recently as the “Salvation Army”), a penitential fit may really be the relatively highest manifestation of “humanity” to which they can be elevated: so much may reasonably be admitted. That, however, which offends even in the humanest Englishman is his lack of music, to speak figuratively (and also literally): he has neither rhythm nor dance in the movements of his soul and body; indeed, not even the desire for rhythm and dance, for “music.” Listen to him speaking; look at the most beautiful Englishwoman walking—in no country on earth are there more beautiful doves and swans; finally, listen to them singing! But I ask too much …

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There are truths which are best recognized by mediocre minds, because they are best adapted for them, there are truths which only possess charms and seductive power for mediocre spirits:—one is pushed to this probably unpleasant conclusion, now that the influence of respectable but mediocre Englishmen—I may mention Darwin ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , John Stuart Mill ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , and Herbert Spencer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —begins to gain the ascendancy in the middle-class region of European taste. Indeed, who could doubt that it is a useful thing for such minds to have the ascendancy for a time? It would be an error to consider the highly developed and independently soaring minds as specially qualified for determining and collecting many little common facts, and deducing conclusions from them; as exceptions, they are rather from the first in no very favourable position towards those who are “the rules.” After all, they have more to do than merely to perceive:—in effect, they have to be something new, they have to signify something new, they have to represent new values! The gulf between knowledge and capacity is perhaps greater, and also more mysterious, than one thinks: the capable man in the grand style, the creator, will possibly have to be an ignorant person;—while on the other hand, for scientific discoveries like those of Darwin, a certain narrowness, aridity, and industrious carefulness (in short, something English) may not be unfavourable for arriving at them.—Finally, let it not be forgotten that the English, with their profound mediocrity, brought about once before a general depression of European intelligence.

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Even at present France is still the seat of the most intellectual and refined culture of Europe, it is still the high school of taste; but one must know how to find this “France of taste.” He who belongs to it keeps himself well concealed:—they may be a small number in whom it lives and is embodied, besides perhaps being men who do not stand upon the strongest legs, in part fatalists, hypochondriacs, invalids, in part persons overindulged, overrefined, such as have the ambition to conceal themselves.

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I hold that many precautions should be taken against German music. Suppose a person loves the South as I love it—as a great school of recovery for the most spiritual and the most sensuous ills, as a boundless solar profusion and effulgence which o’erspreads a sovereign existence believing in itself—well, such a person will learn to be somewhat on his guard against German music, because, in injuring his taste anew, it will also injure his health anew. Such a Southerner, a Southerner not by origin but by belief, if he should dream of the future of music, must also dream of it being freed from the influence of the North; and must have in his ears the prelude to a deeper, mightier, and perhaps more perverse and mysterious music, a super-German music, which does not fade, pale, and die away, as all German music does, at the sight of the blue, wanton sea and the Mediterranean clearness of sky—a super-European music, which holds its own even in presence of the brown sunsets of the desert, whose soul is akin to the palm tree, and can be at home and can roam with big, beautiful, lonely beasts of prey … I could imagine a music of which the rarest charm would be that it knew nothing more of good and evil; only that here and there perhaps some sailor’s homesickness, some golden shadows and tender weaknesses might sweep lightly over it; an art which, from the far distance, would see the colours of a sinking and almost incomprehensible moral world fleeing towards it, and would be hospitable enough and profound enough to receive such belated fugitives.

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Owing to the morbid estrangement which the nationality-craze has induced and still induces among the nations of Europe, owing also to the shortsighted and hasty-handed politicians, who with the help of this craze, are at present in power, and do not suspect to what extent the disintegrating policy they pursue must necessarily be only an interlude policy—owing to all this and much else that is altogether unmentionable at present, the most unmistakable signs that Europe wishes to be one, are now overlooked, or arbitrarily and falsely misinterpreted. With all the more profound and large-minded men of this century, the real general tendency of the mysterious labour of their souls was to prepare the way for that new synthesis, and tentatively to anticipate the European of the future; only in their simulations, or in their weaker moments, in old age perhaps, did they belong to the “fatherlands”—they only rested from themselves when they became “patriots.” I think of such men as Napoleon ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People , Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, Schopenhauer: it must not be taken amiss if I also count Richard Wagner ↖ Beyond Good and Evil among them, about whom one must not let oneself be deceived by his own misunderstandings (geniuses like him have seldom the right to understand themselves), still less, of course, by the unseemly noise with which he is now resisted and opposed in France: the fact remains, nevertheless, that Richard Wagner and the later French Romanticism ↖ Aesthetics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil of the forties, are most closely and intimately related to one another. They are akin, fundamentally akin, in all the heights and depths of their requirements; it is Europe, the one Europe, whose soul presses urgently and longingly, outwards and upwards, in their multifarious and boisterous art—whither? into a new light? towards a new sun? But who would attempt to express accurately what all these masters of new modes of speech could not express distinctly? It is certain that the same storm and stress tormented them, that they sought in the same manner, these last great seekers! All of them steeped in literature to their eyes and ears—the first artists of universal literary culture—for the most part even themselves writers, poets, intermediaries and blenders of the arts and the senses (Wagner, as musician is reckoned among painters, as poet among musicians, as artist generally among actors); all of them fanatics for expression “at any cost”—I specially mention Delacroix, the nearest related to Wagner; all of them great discoverers in the realm of the sublime, also of the loathsome and dreadful, still greater discoverers in effect, in display, in the art of the show-shop; all of them talented far beyond their genius, out and out virtuosi, with mysterious accesses to all that seduces, allures, constrains, and upsets; born enemies of logic and of the straight line, hankering after the strange, the exotic, the monstrous, the crooked, and the self-contradictory; as men, Tantaluses of the will, plebeian parvenus, who knew themselves to be incapable of a noble tempo or of a lento in life and action—think of Balzac, for instance—unrestrained workers, almost destroying themselves by work; antinomians and rebels in manners, ambitious and insatiable, without equilibrium and enjoyment; all of them finally shattering and sinking down at the Christian cross (and with right and reason, for who of them would have been sufficiently profound and sufficiently original for an antichristian philosophy?);—on the whole, a boldly daring, splendidly overbearing, high-flying, and aloft-up-dragging class of higher men, who had first to teach their century—and it is the century of the masses—the conception “higher man.” … Let the German friends of Richard Wagner advise together as to whether there is anything purely German in the Wagnerian art, or whether its distinction does not consist precisely in coming from super-German sources and impulses: in which connection it may not be underrated how indispensable Paris was to the development of his type, which the strength of his instincts made him long to visit at the most decisive time—and how the whole style of his proceedings, of his self-apostolate, could only perfect itself in sight of the French socialistic original. On a more subtle comparison it will perhaps be found, to the honour of Richard Wagner’s German nature, that he has acted in everything with more strength, daring, severity, and elevation than a nineteenth-century Frenchman could have done—owing to the circumstance that we Germans are as yet nearer to barbarism than the French;—perhaps even the most remarkable creation of Richard Wagner is not only at present, but forever inaccessible, incomprehensible, and inimitable to the whole latter-day Latin race: the figure of Siegfried, that very free man, who is probably far too free, too hard, too cheerful, too healthy, too anti-Catholic for the taste of old and mellow civilized nations. He may even have been a sin against Romanticism, this anti-Latin Siegfried: well, Wagner atoned amply for this sin in his old sad days, when—anticipating a taste which has meanwhile passed into politics—he began, with the religious vehemence peculiar to him, to preach, at least, the way to Rome, if not to walk therein.—That these last words may not be misunderstood, I will call to my aid a few powerful rhymes, which will even betray to less delicate ears what I mean—what I mean counter to the “last Wagner” and his Parsifal music:—

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Every elevation of the type “man,” has hitherto been the work of an Aristocratic society ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics and so it will always be—a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the Pathos of distance ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Power Dynamics , such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments, and out of their equally constant practice of obeying and commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance—that other more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the elevation of the type “man,” the continued “ Self-surmounting of man ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ,” to use a moral formula in a supermoral sense. To be sure, one must not resign oneself to any humanitarian illusions about the history of the origin of an aristocratic society (that is to say, of the preliminary condition for the elevation of the type “man”): the truth is hard. Let us acknowledge unprejudicedly how every higher civilization hitherto has originated! Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more peaceful races (perhaps trading or cattle-rearing communities), or upon old mellow civilizations in which the final vital force was flickering out in brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity. At the commencement, the Noble caste ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics was always the barbarian caste: their superiority did not consist first of all in their physical, but in their psychical power—they were more complete men (which at every point also implies the same as “more complete beasts”).

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Corruption ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics —as the indication that Anarchy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics threatens to break out among the instincts, and that the foundation of the emotions, called “ Life ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ States Of Being ,” is convulsed—is something radically different according to the organization in which it manifests itself. When, for instance, an Aristocracy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics ↖ Power Dynamics like that of France at the beginning of the Revolution, flung away its privileges with sublime disgust and sacrificed itself to an excess of its moral sentiments, it was corruption:—it was really only the closing act of the corruption which had existed for centuries, by virtue of which that aristocracy had abdicated step by step its lordly prerogatives and lowered itself to a function of royalty (in the end even to its decoration and parade-dress). The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the significance and highest justification thereof—that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, for its sake, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence: like those sun-seeking climbing plants in Java—they are called Sipo Matador—which encircle an oak so long and so often with their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness.

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To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from Exploitation ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics , and put one’s will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force and degree of worth, and their corelation within one organization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more generally, and if possible even as the fundamental principle of society, it would immediately disclose what it really is—namely, a Will to the denial of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation;—but why should one forever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped? Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal—it takes place in every healthy Aristocracy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics ↖ Power Dynamics —must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts , it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy—not owing to any Morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems or immorality, but because it lives, and because life is precisely Will to Power. On no point, however, is the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this matter, people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which “the exploiting character” is to be absent—that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Will Concepts .—Granting that as a theory this is a novelty—as a reality it is the fundamental fact of all history: let us be so far honest towards ourselves!

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Every select man strives instinctively for a citadel and a privacy, where he is free from the crowd, the many, the majority—where he may forget “men who are the rule,” as their exception;—exclusive only of the case in which he is pushed straight to such men by a still stronger instinct, as a discerner in the great and exceptional sense. Whoever, in intercourse with men, does not occasionally glisten in all the green and grey colours of distress, owing to disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloominess, and solitariness, is assuredly not a man of elevated tastes; supposing, however, that he does not voluntarily take all this burden and disgust upon himself, that he persistently avoids it, and remains, as I said, quietly and proudly hidden in his citadel, one thing is then certain: he was not made, he was not predestined for Knowledge ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology . For as such, he would one day have to say to himself: “The devil take my good taste! but ’the rule’ is more interesting than the exception—than myself, the exception!” And he would go down, and above all, he would go “inside.” The long and serious study of the average man—and consequently much disguise, self-overcoming, familiarity, and bad intercourse (all intercourse is bad intercourse except with one’s equals):—that constitutes a necessary part of the life-history of every Philosopher ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ; perhaps the most disagreeable, odious, and disappointing part. If he is fortunate, however, as a favourite child of knowledge should be, he will meet with suitable auxiliaries who will shorten and lighten his task; I mean so-called cynics, those who simply recognize the animal, the commonplace and “the rule” in themselves, and at the same time have so much spirituality and ticklishness as to make them talk of themselves and their like before witnesses—sometimes they wallow, even in books, as on their own dunghill. Cynicism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools is the only form in which base souls approach what is called honesty; and the higher man must open his ears to all the coarser or finer cynicism, and congratulate himself when the clown becomes shameless right before him, or the scientific satyr speaks out. There are even cases where enchantment mixes with the disgust—namely, where by a freak of nature, genius is bound to some such indiscreet billy-goat and ape, as in the case of the Abbe Galiani, the profoundest, acutest, and perhaps also filthiest man of his century—he was far profounder than Voltaire ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , and consequently also, a good deal more silent. It happens more frequently, as has been hinted, that a scientific head is placed on an ape’s body, a fine exceptional understanding in a base soul, an occurrence by no means rare, especially among doctors and moral physiologists. And whenever anyone speaks without bitterness, or rather quite innocently, of man as a belly with two requirements, and a head with one; whenever anyone sees, seeks, and wants to see only hunger, sexual instinct, and vanity as the real and only motives of human actions; in short, when anyone speaks “badly”—and not even “ill”—of man, then ought the lover of knowledge to hearken attentively and diligently; he ought, in general, to have an open ear wherever there is talk without indignation. For the indignant man, and he who perpetually tears and lacerates himself with his own teeth (or, in place of himself, the world, God, or society), may indeed, morally speaking, stand higher than the laughing and self-satisfied satyr, but in every other sense he is the more ordinary, more indifferent, and less instructive case. And no one is such a liar as the indignant man.

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In a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, I found certain traits recurring regularly together, and connected with one another, until finally two primary types revealed themselves to me, and a radical distinction was brought to light. There is Master-morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems and Slave-morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems —I would at once add, however, that in all higher and mixed civilizations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation of the two moralities, but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual misunderstanding of them, indeed sometimes their close juxtaposition—even in the same man, within one soul. The distinctions of moral values have either originated in a ruling caste, pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled—or among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts. In the first case, when it is the rulers who determine the conception “good,” it is the exalted, proud disposition which is regarded as the distinguishing feature, and that which determines the order of rank. The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this exalted, proud disposition displays itself: he despises them. Let it at once be noted that in this first kind of morality the antithesis “good” and “bad” means practically the same as “noble” and “despicable”—the antithesis “good” and “evil” is of a different origin. The cowardly, the timid, the insignificant, and those thinking merely of narrow utility are despised; moreover, also, the distrustful, with their constrained glances, the self-abasing, the doglike kind of men who let themselves be abused, the mendicant flatterers, and above all the liars:—it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are untruthful. “We truthful ones”—the Nobility ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics in ancient Greece called themselves. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to men; and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to actions; it is a gross mistake, therefore, when historians of morals start with questions like, “Why have sympathetic actions been praised?” The noble type of man regards himself as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: “What is injurious to me is injurious in itself;” he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things; he is a Creator of values ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts . He honours whatever he recognizes in himself: such morality equals self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics , which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow:—the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the superabundance of power. The noble man honours in himself the powerful one, him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness, and has reverence for all that is severe and hard. “Wotan placed a hard heart in my breast,” says an old Scandinavian Saga: it is thus rightly expressed from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is even proud of not being made for sympathy; the hero of the Saga therefore adds warningly: “He who has not a hard heart when young, will never have one.” The noble and brave who think thus are the furthest removed from the morality which sees precisely in sympathy, or in acting for the good of others, or in désintéressement, the characteristic of the moral; faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a radical enmity and irony towards “selflessness,” belong as definitely to noble morality, as do a careless scorn and precaution in presence of sympathy and the “warm heart.”—It is the powerful who know how to honour, it is their art, their domain for invention. The profound reverence for age and for tradition—all law rests on this double reverence—the belief and prejudice in favour of ancestors and unfavourable to newcomers, is typical in the morality of the powerful; and if, reversely, men of “modern ideas” believe almost instinctively in “progress” and the “future,” and are more and more lacking in respect for old age, the ignoble origin of these “ideas” has complacently betrayed itself thereby. A morality of the ruling class, however, is more especially foreign and irritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle that one has duties only to one’s equals; that one may act towards beings of a lower rank, towards all that is foreign, just as seems good to one, or “as the heart desires,” and in any case “beyond good and evil”: it is here that sympathy and similar sentiments can have a place. The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge—both only within the circle of equals—artfulness in retaliation, raffinement of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance—in fact, in order to be a good friend): all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality, which, as has been pointed out, is not the morality of “modern ideas,” and is therefore at present difficult to realize, and also to unearth and disclose.—It is otherwise with the second type of morality, slave-morality. Supposing that the abused, the oppressed, the suffering, the unemancipated, the weary, and those uncertain of themselves should moralize, what will be the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic suspicion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man, together with his situation. The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful; he has a skepticism and distrust, a refinement of distrust of everything “good” that is there honoured—he would fain persuade himself that the very happiness there is not genuine. On the other hand, those qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence and flooded with light; it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience, diligence, humility, and friendliness attain to honour; for here these are the most useful qualities, and almost the only means of supporting the burden of existence. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis “good” and “evil”:—power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being despised. According to slave-morality, therefore, the “evil” man arouses fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely the “good” man who arouses fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being. The contrast attains its maximum when, in accordance with the logical consequences of slave-morality, a shade of depreciation—it may be slight and well-intentioned—at last attaches itself to the “good” man of this morality; because, according to the servile mode of thought, the good man must in any case be the safe man: he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a little stupid, un bonhomme. Everywhere that slave-morality gains the ascendancy, language shows a tendency to approximate the significations of the words “good” and “stupid.”—A last fundamental difference: the desire for freedom, the instinct for happiness and the refinements of the feeling of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals and morality, as artifice and enthusiasm in reverence and devotion are the regular symptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and estimating.—Hence we can understand without further detail why love as a passion—it is our European specialty—must absolutely be of noble origin; as is well known, its invention is due to the Provençal poet-cavaliers, those brilliant, ingenious men of the gai saber, to whom Europe owes so much, and almost owes itself.

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Vanity is one of the things which are perhaps most difficult for a noble man to understand: he will be tempted to deny it, where another kind of man thinks he sees it self-evidently. The problem for him is to represent to his mind beings who seek to arouse a good opinion of themselves which they themselves do not possess—and consequently also do not “deserve,”—and who yet believe in this good opinion afterwards. This seems to him on the one hand such bad taste and so self-disrespectful, and on the other hand so grotesquely unreasonable, that he would like to consider vanity an exception, and is doubtful about it in most cases when it is spoken of. He will say, for instance: “I may be mistaken about my value, and on the other hand may nevertheless demand that my value should be acknowledged by others precisely as I rate it:—that, however, is not vanity (but self-conceit, or, in most cases, that which is called ‘humility,’ and also ‘modesty’).” Or he will even say: “For many reasons I can delight in the good opinion of others, perhaps because I love and honour them, and rejoice in all their joys, perhaps also because their good opinion endorses and strengthens my belief in my own good opinion, perhaps because the good opinion of others, even in cases where I do not share it, is useful to me, or gives promise of usefulness:—all this, however, is not vanity.” The man of noble character must first bring it home forcibly to his mind, especially with the aid of history, that, from time immemorial, in all social strata in any way dependent, the ordinary man was only that which he passed for:—not being at all accustomed to fix values, he did not assign even to himself any other value than that which his master assigned to him (it is the peculiar right of masters to create values). It may be looked upon as the result of an extraordinary atavism, that the ordinary man, even at present, is still always waiting for an opinion about himself, and then instinctively submitting himself to it; yet by no means only to a “good” opinion, but also to a bad and unjust one (think, for instance, of the greater part of the self-appreciations and self-depreciations which believing women learn from their confessors, and which in general the believing Christian learns from his Church). In fact, conformably to the slow rise of the democratic social order (and its cause, the blending of the blood of masters and slaves), the originally noble and rare impulse of the masters to assign a value to themselves and to “think well” of themselves, will now be more and more encouraged and extended; but it has at all times an older, ampler, and more radically ingrained propensity opposed to it—and in the phenomenon of “vanity” this older propensity overmasters the younger. The vain person rejoices over every good opinion which he hears about himself (quite apart from the point of view of its usefulness, and equally regardless of its truth or falsehood), just as he suffers from every bad opinion: for he subjects himself to both, he feels himself subjected to both, by that oldest instinct of subjection which breaks forth in him.—It is “the slave” in the vain man’s blood, the remains of the slave’s craftiness—and how much of the “slave” is still left in woman, for instance!—which seeks to seduce to good opinions of itself; it is the slave, too, who immediately afterwards falls prostrate himself before these opinions, as though he had not called them forth.—And to repeat it again: vanity is an atavism.

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A species originates, and a type becomes established and strong in the long struggle with essentially constant unfavourable conditions. On the other hand, it is known by the experience of breeders that species which receive superabundant nourishment, and in general a surplus of protection and care, immediately tend in the most marked way to develop variations, and are fertile in prodigies and monstrosities (also in monstrous vices). Now look at an aristocratic commonwealth, say an ancient Greek polis, or Venice, as a voluntary or involuntary contrivance for the purpose of rearing human beings; there are there men beside one another, thrown upon their own resources, who want to make their species prevail, chiefly because they must prevail, or else run the terrible danger of being exterminated. The favour, the superabundance, the protection are there lacking under which variations are fostered; the species needs itself as species, as something which, precisely by virtue of its hardness, its uniformity, and simplicity of structure, can in general prevail and make itself permanent in constant struggle with its neighbours, or with rebellious or rebellion-threatening vassals. The most varied experience teaches it what are the qualities to which it principally owes the fact that it still exists, in spite of all Gods and men, and has hitherto been victorious: these qualities it calls virtues, and these virtues alone it develops to maturity. It does so with severity, indeed it desires severity; every aristocratic morality is intolerant in the education of youth, in the control of women, in the marriage customs, in the relations of old and young, in the penal laws (which have an eye only for the degenerating): it counts intolerance itself among the virtues, under the name of “justice.” A type with few, but very marked features, a species of severe, warlike, wisely silent, reserved, and reticent men (and as such, with the most delicate sensibility for the charm and nuances of society) is thus established, unaffected by the vicissitudes of generations; the constant struggle with uniform unfavourable conditions is, as already remarked, the cause of a type becoming stable and hard. Finally, however, a happy state of things results, the enormous tension is relaxed; there are perhaps no more enemies among the neighbouring peoples, and the means of life, even of the enjoyment of life, are present in superabundance. With one stroke the bond and constraint of the old discipline severs: it is no longer regarded as necessary, as a condition of existence—if it would continue, it can only do so as a form of luxury, as an archaizing taste. Variations, whether they be deviations (into the higher, finer, and rarer), or deteriorations and monstrosities, appear suddenly on the scene in the greatest exuberance and splendour; the individual dares to be individual and detach himself. At this turning-point of history there manifest themselves, side by side, and often mixed and entangled together, a magnificent, manifold, virgin-forest-like upgrowth and up-striving, a kind of tropical tempo in the rivalry of growth, and an extraordinary decay and self-destruction, owing to the savagely opposing and seemingly exploding egoisms, which strive with one another “for sun and light,” and can no longer assign any limit, restraint, or forbearance for themselves by means of the hitherto existing morality. It was this morality itself which piled up the strength so enormously, which bent the bow in so threatening a manner:—it is now “out of date,” it is getting “out of date.” The dangerous and disquieting point has been reached when the greater, more manifold, more comprehensive life is lived beyond the old morality; the “individual” stands out, and is obliged to have recourse to his own law-giving, his own arts and artifices for self-preservation, self-elevation, and self-deliverance. Nothing but new “Whys,” nothing but new “Hows,” no common formulas any longer, misunderstanding and disregard in league with each other, decay, deterioration, and the loftiest desires frightfully entangled, the genius of the race overflowing from all the cornucopias of good and bad, a portentous simultaneousness of Spring and Autumn, full of new charms and mysteries peculiar to the fresh, still inexhausted, still unwearied corruption. Danger is again present, the mother of morality, great danger; this time shifted into the individual, into the neighbour and friend, into the street, into their own child, into their own heart, into all the most personal and secret recesses of their desires and volitions. What will the moral philosophers who appear at this time have to preach? They discover, these sharp onlookers and loafers, that the end is quickly approaching, that everything around them decays and produces decay, that nothing will endure until the day after tomorrow, except one species of man, the incurably mediocre. The mediocre alone have a prospect of continuing and propagating themselves—they will be the men of the future, the sole survivors; “be like them! become mediocre!” is now the only morality which has still a significance, which still obtains a hearing.—But it is difficult to preach this morality of mediocrity! it can never avow what it is and what it desires! it has to talk of moderation and dignity and duty and brotherly love—it will have difficulty in concealing its irony!

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There is an instinct for rank, which more than anything else is already the sign of a high rank; there is a delight in the nuances of reverence which leads one to infer noble origin and habits. The refinement, goodness, and loftiness of a soul are put to a perilous test when something passes by that is of the highest rank, but is not yet protected by the awe of authority from obtrusive touches and incivilities: something that goes its way like a living touchstone, undistinguished, undiscovered, and tentative, perhaps voluntarily veiled and disguised. He whose task and practice it is to investigate souls, will avail himself of many varieties of this very art to determine the ultimate value of a soul, the unalterable, innate order of rank to which it belongs: he will test it by its instinct for reverence. Différence engendre haine: the vulgarity of many a nature spurts up suddenly like dirty water, when any holy vessel, any jewel from closed shrines, any book bearing the marks of great destiny, is brought before it; while on the other hand, there is an involuntary silence, a hesitation of the eye, a cessation of all gestures, by which it is indicated that a soul feels the nearness of what is worthiest of respect. The way in which, on the whole, the reverence for the Bible has hitherto been maintained in Europe, is perhaps the best example of discipline and refinement of manners which Europe owes to Christianity: books of such profoundness and supreme significance require for their protection an external tyranny of authority, in order to acquire the period of thousands of years which is necessary to exhaust and unriddle them. Much has been achieved when the sentiment has been at last instilled into the masses (the shallow-pates and the boobies of every kind) that they are not allowed to touch everything, that there are holy experiences before which they must take off their shoes and keep away the unclean hand—it is almost their highest advance towards humanity. On the contrary, in the so-called cultured classes, the believers in “modern ideas,” nothing is perhaps so repulsive as their lack of shame, the easy insolence of eye and hand with which they touch, taste, and finger everything; and it is possible that even yet there is more relative nobility of taste, and more tact for reverence among the people, among the lower classes of the people, especially among peasants, than among the newspaper-reading demimonde of intellect, the cultured class.

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It cannot be effaced from a man’s soul what his ancestors have preferably and most constantly done: whether they were perhaps diligent economizers attached to a desk and a cashbox, modest and citizen-like in their desires, modest also in their virtues; or whether they were accustomed to commanding from morning till night, fond of rude pleasures and probably of still ruder duties and responsibilities; or whether, finally, at one time or another, they have sacrificed old privileges of birth and possession, in order to live wholly for their faith—for their “God,”—as men of an inexorable and sensitive conscience, which blushes at every compromise. It is quite impossible for a man not to have the qualities and predilections of his parents and ancestors in his constitution, whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary. This is the problem of race. Granted that one knows something of the parents, it is admissible to draw a conclusion about the child: any kind of offensive incontinence, any kind of sordid envy, or of clumsy self-vaunting—the three things which together have constituted the genuine plebeian type in all times—such must pass over to the child, as surely as bad blood; and with the help of the best education and culture one will only succeed in deceiving with regard to such heredity.—And what else does education and culture try to do nowadays! In our very democratic, or rather, very plebeian age, “education” and “culture” must be essentially the art of deceiving—deceiving with regard to origin, with regard to the inherited plebeianism in body and soul. An educator who nowadays preached truthfulness above everything else, and called out constantly to his pupils: “Be true! Be natural! Show yourselves as you are!”—even such a virtuous and sincere ass would learn in a short time to have recourse to the furca of Horace, naturam expellere: with what results? “Plebeianism” usque recurret.

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At the risk of displeasing innocent ears, I submit that egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such as “we,” other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts the fact of his egoism without question, and also without consciousness of harshness, constraint, or arbitrariness therein, but rather as something that may have its basis in the primary law of things:—if he sought a designation for it he would say: “It is justice itself.” He acknowledges under certain circumstances, which made him hesitate at first, that there are other equally privileged ones; as soon as he has settled this question of rank, he moves among those equals and equally privileged ones with the same assurance, as regards modesty and delicate respect, which he enjoys in intercourse with himself—in accordance with an innate heavenly mechanism which all the stars understand. It is an additional instance of his egoism, this artfulness and self-limitation in intercourse with his equals—every star is a similar egoist; he honours himself in them, and in the rights which he concedes to them, he has no doubt that the exchange of honours and rights, as the essence of all intercourse, belongs also to the natural condition of things. The noble soul gives as he takes, prompted by the passionate and sensitive instinct of requital, which is at the root of his nature. The notion of “favour” has, inter pares, neither significance nor good repute; there may be a sublime way of letting gifts as it were light upon one from above, and of drinking them thirstily like dewdrops; but for those arts and displays the noble soul has no aptitude. His egoism hinders him here: in general, he looks “aloft” unwillingly—he looks either forward, horizontally and deliberately, or downwards—he knows that he is on a height.

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“One can only truly esteem him who does not look out for himself.” —Goethe to Rath Schlosser.

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The Chinese have a proverb which mothers even teach their children: “Siao-sin” (“Make thy heart small”). This is the essentially fundamental tendency in latter-day civilizations. I have no doubt that an ancient Greek, also, would first of all remark the self-dwarfing in us Europeans of today—in this respect alone we should immediately be “distasteful” to him.

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What, after all, is ignobleness?—Words are vocal symbols for ideas; ideas, however, are more or less definite mental symbols for frequently returning and concurring sensations, for groups of sensations. It is not sufficient to use the same words in order to understand one another: we must also employ the same words for the same kind of internal experiences, we must in the end have experiences in common. On this account the people of one nation understand one another better than those belonging to different nations, even when they use the same language; or rather, when people have lived long together under similar conditions (of climate, soil, danger, requirement, toil) there originates therefrom an entity that “understands itself”—namely, a nation. In all souls a like number of frequently recurring experiences have gained the upper hand over those occurring more rarely: about these matters people understand one another rapidly and always more rapidly—the history of language is the history of a process of abbreviation; on the basis of this quick comprehension people always unite closer and closer. The greater the danger, the greater is the need of agreeing quickly and readily about what is necessary; not to misunderstand one another in danger—that is what cannot at all be dispensed with in intercourse. Also in all loves and friendships one has the experience that nothing of the kind continues when the discovery has been made that in using the same words, one of the two parties has feelings, thoughts, intuitions, wishes, or fears different from those of the other. (The fear of the “eternal misunderstanding”: that is the good genius which so often keeps persons of different sexes from too hasty attachments, to which sense and heart prompt them—and not some Schopenhauerian “genius of the species”!) Whichever groups of sensations within a soul awaken most readily, begin to speak, and give the word of command—these decide as to the general order of rank of its values, and determine ultimately its list of desirable things. A man’s estimates of value betray something of the structure of his soul, and wherein it sees its conditions of life, its intrinsic needs. Supposing now that necessity has from all time drawn together only such men as could express similar requirements and similar experiences by similar symbols, it results on the whole that the easy communicability of need, which implies ultimately the undergoing only of average and common experiences, must have been the most potent of all the forces which have hitherto operated upon mankind. The more similar, the more ordinary people, have always had and are still having the advantage; the more select, more refined, more unique, and difficultly comprehensible, are liable to stand alone; they succumb to accidents in their isolation, and seldom propagate themselves. One must appeal to immense opposing forces, in order to thwart this natural, all-too-natural progressus in simile, the evolution of man to the similar, the ordinary, the average, the gregarious—to the ignoble—!

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The more a psychologist—a born, an unavoidable psychologist and soul-diviner—turns his attention to the more select cases and individuals, the greater is his danger of being suffocated by sympathy: he needs sternness and cheerfulness more than any other man. For the corruption, the ruination of higher men, of the more unusually constituted souls, is in fact, the rule: it is dreadful to have such a rule always before one’s eyes. The manifold torment of the psychologist who has discovered this ruination, who discovers once, and then discovers almost repeatedly throughout all history, this universal inner “desperateness” of higher men, this eternal “too late!” in every sense—may perhaps one day be the cause of his turning with bitterness against his own lot, and of his making an attempt at self-destruction—of his “going to ruin” himself. One may perceive in almost every psychologist a telltale inclination for delightful intercourse with commonplace and well-ordered men; the fact is thereby disclosed that he always requires healing, that he needs a sort of flight and forgetfulness, away from what his insight and incisiveness—from what his “business”—has laid upon his conscience. The fear of his memory is peculiar to him. He is easily silenced by the judgment of others; he hears with unmoved countenance how people honour, admire, love, and glorify, where he has perceived—or he even conceals his silence by expressly assenting to some plausible opinion. Perhaps the paradox of his situation becomes so dreadful that, precisely where he has learnt great sympathy, together with great contempt, the multitude, the educated, and the visionaries, have on their part learnt great reverence—reverence for “great men” and marvelous animals, for the sake of whom one blesses and honours the fatherland, the earth, the dignity of mankind, and one’s own self, to whom one points the young, and in view of whom one educates them. And who knows but in all great instances hitherto just the same happened: that the multitude worshipped a God, and that the “God” was only a poor sacrificial animal! Success has always been the greatest liar—and the “work” itself is a success; the great statesman, the conqueror, the discoverer, are disguised in their creations until they are unrecognizable; the “work” of the artist, of the philosopher, only invents him who has created it, is reputed to have created it; the “great men,” as they are reverenced, are poor little fictions composed afterwards; in the world of historical values spurious coinage prevails. Those great poets, for example, such as Byron, Musset, Poe, Leopardi, Kleist, Gogol (I do not venture to mention much greater names, but I have them in my mind), as they now appear, and were perhaps obliged to be: men of the moment, enthusiastic, sensuous, and childish, light-minded and impulsive in their trust and distrust; with souls in which usually some flaw has to be concealed; often taking revenge with their works for an internal defilement, often seeking forgetfulness in their soaring from a too true memory, often lost in the mud and almost in love with it, until they become like the Will-o’-the-Wisps around the swamps, and pretend to be stars—the people then call them idealists—often struggling with protracted disgust, with an ever-reappearing phantom of disbelief, which makes them cold, and obliges them to languish for gloria and devour “faith as it is” out of the hands of intoxicated adulators:—what a torment these great artists are and the so-called higher men in general, to him who has once found them out! It is thus conceivable that it is just from woman—who is clairvoyant in the world of suffering, and also unfortunately eager to help and save to an extent far beyond her powers—that they have learnt so readily those outbreaks of boundless devoted sympathy, which the multitude, above all the reverent multitude, do not understand, and overwhelm with prying and self-gratifying interpretations. This sympathizing invariably deceives itself as to its power; woman would like to believe that love can do everything—it is the superstition peculiar to her. Alas, he who knows the heart finds out how poor, helpless, pretentious, and blundering even the best and deepest love is—he finds that it rather destroys than saves!—It is possible that under the holy fable and travesty of the life of Jesus there is hidden one of the most painful cases of the martyrdom of knowledge about love: the martyrdom of the most innocent and most craving heart, that never had enough of any human love, that demanded love, that demanded inexorably and frantically to be loved and nothing else, with terrible outbursts against those who refused him their love; the story of a poor soul insatiated and insatiable in love, that had to invent hell to send thither those who would not love him—and that at last, enlightened about human love, had to invent a God who is entire love, entire capacity for love—who takes pity on human love, because it is so paltry, so ignorant! He who has such sentiments, he who has such knowledge about love—seeks for death!—But why should one deal with such painful matters? Provided, of course, that one is not obliged to do so.

27

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27#

It is difficult to be understood, especially when one thinks and lives Gangasrotogati ↖ Beyond Good and Evil (I do everything to be “difficultly understood” myself!)—and one should be heartily grateful for the good will to some refinement of interpretation. As regards “the good friends,” however, who are always too easygoing, and think that as friends they have a right to ease, one does well at the very first to grant them a playground and romping-place for Misunderstanding ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —one can thus laugh still; or get rid of them altogether, these good friends—and laugh then also!

270

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

270#

The Intellectual haughtiness ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and loathing of every man who has suffered deeply—it almost determines the order of rank how deeply men can suffer—the chilling certainty, with which he is thoroughly imbued and coloured, that by virtue of his Suffering ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology ↖ States Of Being he knows more than the shrewdest and wisest can ever know, that he has been familiar with, and “at home” in, many distant, dreadful worlds of which “you know nothing”!—this silent intellectual haughtiness of the sufferer, this pride of the elect of knowledge, of the “initiated,” of the almost sacrificed, finds all forms of disguise necessary to protect itself from contact with officious and sympathizing hands, and in general from all that is not its equal in suffering. Profound suffering makes noble: it separates.—One of the most refined forms of disguise is Epicurism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , along with a certain ostentatious boldness of taste, which takes suffering lightly, and puts itself on the defensive against all that is sorrowful and profound. They are “gay men” who make use of gaiety, because they are misunderstood on account of it—they wish to be misunderstood. There are “scientific minds” who make use of science, because it gives a gay appearance, and because scientificness leads to the conclusion that a person is superficial—they wish to mislead to a false conclusion. There are free insolent minds which would fain conceal and deny that they are broken, proud, incurable hearts (the cynicism of Hamlet ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —the case of Galiani ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ); and occasionally folly itself is the Mask ↖ Beyond Good and Evil of an unfortunate overassured knowledge.—From which it follows that it is the part of a more refined humanity to have reverence “for the mask,” and not to make use of psychology and curiosity in the wrong place.

271

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

271#

That which separates two men most profoundly is a different sense and grade of purity. What does it matter about all their honesty and reciprocal usefulness, what does it matter about all their mutual goodwill: the fact still remains—they “cannot smell each other!” The highest instinct for purity places him who is affected with it in the most extraordinary and dangerous isolation, as a saint: for it is just holiness—the highest spiritualization of the instinct in question. Any kind of cognizance of an indescribable excess in the joy of the bath, any kind of ardour or thirst which perpetually impels the soul out of night into the morning, and out of gloom, out of “affliction” into clearness, brightness, depth, and refinement:—just as much as such a tendency distinguishes—it is a noble tendency—it also separates.—The pity of the saint is pity for the filth of the human, all-too-human. And there are grades and heights where pity itself is regarded by him as impurity, as filth.

272

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272#

Signs of nobility: never to think of lowering our duties to the rank of duties for everybody; to be unwilling to renounce or to share our responsibilities; to count our prerogatives, and the exercise of them, among our duties.

273

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273#

A man who strives after great things, looks upon everyone whom he encounters on his way either as a means of advance, or a delay and hindrance—or as a temporary resting-place. His peculiar lofty bounty to his fellowmen is only possible when he attains his elevation and dominates. Impatience, and the consciousness of being always condemned to comedy up to that time—for even strife is a comedy, and conceals the end, as every means does—spoil all intercourse for him; this kind of man is acquainted with solitude, and what is most poisonous in it.

274

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274#

The Problem of Those Who Wait.—Happy chances are necessary, and many incalculable elements, in order that a higher man in whom the solution of a problem is dormant, may yet take action, or “break forth,” as one might say—at the right moment. On an average it does not happen; and in all corners of the earth there are waiting ones sitting who hardly know to what extent they are waiting, and still less that they wait in vain. Occasionally, too, the waking call comes too late—the chance which gives “permission” to take action—when their best youth, and strength for action have been used up in sitting still; and how many a one, just as he “sprang up,” has found with horror that his limbs are benumbed and his spirits are now too heavy! “It is too late,” he has said to himself—and has become self-distrustful and henceforth forever useless.—In the domain of genius, may not the “Raphael without hands” (taking the expression in its widest sense) perhaps not be the exception, but the rule?—Perhaps genius is by no means so rare: but rather the five hundred hands which it requires in order to tyrannize over the καιρὸϛ, “the right time”—in order to take chance by the forelock!

275

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

275#

He who does not wish to see the height of a man, looks all the more sharply at what is low in him, and in the foreground—and thereby betrays himself.

276

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

276#

In all kinds of injury and loss the lower and coarser soul is better off than the nobler soul: the dangers of the latter must be greater, the probability that it will come to grief and perish is in fact immense, considering the multiplicity of the conditions of its existence.—In a lizard a finger grows again which has been lost; not so in man.—

277

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

277#

It is too bad! Always the old story! When a man has finished building his house, he finds that he has learnt unawares something which he ought absolutely to have known before he—began to build. The eternal, fatal “Too late!” The melancholia of everything completed—!

278

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278#

—Wanderer, who art thou? I see thee follow thy path without scorn, without love, with unfathomable eyes, wet and sad as a plummet which has returned to the light insatiated out of every depth—what did it seek down there?—with a bosom that never sighs, with lips that conceal their loathing, with a hand which only slowly grasps: who art thou? what hast thou done? Rest thee here: this place has hospitality for everyone—refresh thyself! And whoever thou art, what is it that now pleases thee? What will serve to refresh thee? Only name it, whatever I have I offer thee! “To refresh me? To refresh me? Oh, thou prying one, what sayest thou! But give me, I pray thee—” What? what? Speak out! “Another mask! A second mask!”

279

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

279#

Men of profound sadness betray themselves when they are happy: they have a mode of seizing upon happiness as though they would choke and strangle it, out of jealousy—ah, they know only too well that it will flee from them!

28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

28#

What is most difficult to render from one language into another is the tempo of its style, which has its basis in the character of the race, or to speak more physiologically, in the average tempo of the assimilation of its nutriment. There are honestly meant translations, which, as involuntary vulgarizations, are almost falsifications of the original, merely because its lively and merry tempo (which overleaps and obviates all dangers in word and expression) could not also be rendered. A German is almost incapacitated for presto in his language; consequently also, as may be reasonably inferred, for many of the most delightful and daring nuances of free, free-spirited thought. And just as the buffoon and satyr are foreign to him in body and conscience, so Aristophanes ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and Petronius are untranslatable for him. Everything ponderous, viscous, and pompously clumsy, all long-winded and wearying species of style, are developed in profuse variety among Germans—pardon me for stating the fact that even Goethe’s prose, in its mixture of stiffness and elegance, is no exception, as a reflection of the “good old time” to which it belongs, and as an expression of German taste at a time when there was still a “German taste,” which was a rococo-taste in moribus et artibus. Lessing ↖ Beyond Good and Evil is an exception, owing to his histrionic nature, which understood much, and was versed in many things; he who was not the translator of Bayle to no purpose, who took refuge willingly in the shadow of Diderot and Voltaire, and still more willingly among the Roman comedy-writers—Lessing loved also free-spiritism in the tempo, and flight out of Germany. But how could the German language, even in the prose of Lessing, imitate the tempo of Machiavelli ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People , who in his Principe makes us breathe the dry, fine air of Florence, and cannot help presenting the most serious events in a boisterous allegrissimo, perhaps not without a malicious artistic sense of the contrast he ventures to present—long, heavy, difficult, dangerous thoughts, and a tempo of the gallop, and of the best, wantonest humour? Finally, who would venture on a German translation of Petronius, who, more than any great musician hitherto, was a master of presto in invention, ideas, and words? What matter in the end about the swamps of the sick, evil world, or of the “ancient world,” when like him, one has the feet of a wind, the rush, the breath, the emancipating scorn of a wind, which makes everything healthy, by making everything run! And with regard to Aristophanes—that transfiguring, complementary genius, for whose sake one pardons all Hellenism for having existed, provided one has understood in its full profundity all that there requires pardon and transfiguration; there is nothing that has caused me to meditate more on Plato ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers ’s secrecy and sphinxlike nature, than the happily preserved petit fait that under the pillow of his deathbed there was found no Bible, nor anything Egyptian, Pythagorean, or Platonic—but a book of Aristophanes. How could even Plato have endured life—a Greek life which he repudiated—without an Aristophanes!

280

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

280#

“Bad! Bad! What? Does he not—go back?” Yes! But you misunderstand him when you complain about it. He goes back like everyone who is about to make a great spring.

281

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—“Will people believe it of me? But I insist that they believe it of me: I have always thought very unsatisfactorily of myself and about myself, only in very rare cases, only compulsorily, always without delight in ’the subject,’ ready to digress from ‘myself,’ and always without faith in the result, owing to an unconquerable distrust of the possibility of self-knowledge, which has led me so far as to feel a contradictio in adjecto even in the idea of ‘direct knowledge’ which theorists allow themselves:—this matter of fact is almost the most certain thing I know about myself. There must be a sort of repugnance in me to believe anything definite about myself.—Is there perhaps some enigma therein? Probably; but fortunately nothing for my own teeth.—Perhaps it betrays the species to which I belong?—but not to myself, as is sufficiently agreeable to me.”

282

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—“But what has happened to you?”—“I do not know,” he said, hesitatingly; “perhaps the Harpies have flown over my table.”—It sometimes happens nowadays that a gentle, sober, retiring man becomes suddenly mad, breaks the plates, upsets the table, shrieks, raves, and shocks everybody—and finally withdraws, ashamed, and raging at himself—whither? for what purpose? To famish apart? To suffocate with his memories?—To him who has the desires of a lofty and dainty soul, and only seldom finds his table laid and his food prepared, the danger will always be great—nowadays, however, it is extraordinarily so. Thrown into the midst of a noisy and plebeian age, with which he does not like to eat out of the same dish, he may readily perish of hunger and thirst—or, should he nevertheless finally “fall to,” of sudden nausea.—We have probably all sat at tables to which we did not belong; and precisely the most spiritual of us, who are most difficult to nourish, know the dangerous dyspepsia which originates from a sudden insight and disillusionment about our food and our messmates—the after-dinner nausea.

283

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

283#

If one wishes to praise at all, it is a delicate and at the same time a noble self-control, to praise only where one does not agree—otherwise in fact one would praise oneself, which is contrary to good taste:—a self-control, to be sure, which offers excellent opportunity and provocation to constant misunderstanding. To be able to allow oneself this veritable luxury of taste and morality, one must not live among intellectual imbeciles, but rather among men whose misunderstandings and mistakes amuse by their refinement—or one will have to pay dearly for it!—“He praises me, therefore he acknowledges me to be right”—this asinine method of inference spoils half of the life of us recluses, for it brings the asses into our neighbourhood and friendship.

284

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284#

To live in a vast and proud tranquility; always beyond … To have, or not to have, one’s emotions, one’s For and Against, according to choice; to lower oneself to them for hours; to seat oneself on them as upon horses, and often as upon asses:—for one must know how to make use of their stupidity as well as of their fire. To conserve one’s three hundred foregrounds; also one’s black spectacles: for there are circumstances when nobody must look into our eyes, still less into our “motives.” And to choose for company that roguish and cheerful vice, politeness. And to remain master of one’s four virtues, courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude. For solitude is a virtue with us, as a sublime bent and bias to purity, which divines that in the contact of man and man—“in society”—it must be unavoidably impure. All society makes one somehow, somewhere, or sometime—“commonplace.”

285

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

285#

The greatest events and thoughts—the greatest thoughts, however, are the greatest events—are longest in being comprehended: the generations which are contemporary with them do not experience such events—they live past them. Something happens there as in the realm of stars. The light of the furthest stars is longest in reaching man; and before it has arrived man denies—that there are stars there. “How many centuries does a mind require to be understood?”—that is also a standard, one also makes a gradation of rank and an etiquette therewith, such as is necessary for mind and for star.

286

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

286#

“Here is the prospect free, the mind exalted.” [The words of Dr. Marianus.]—But there is a reverse kind of man, who is also upon a height, and has also a free prospect—but looks downwards.

287

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

287#

What is noble? What does the word “noble” still mean for us nowadays? How does the noble man betray himself, how is he recognized under this heavy overcast sky of the commencing Plebeianism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics , by which everything is rendered opaque and leaden?—It is not his actions which establish his claim—actions are always ambiguous, always inscrutable; neither is it his “works.” One finds nowadays among artists and scholars plenty of those who betray by their works that a profound longing for nobleness impels them; but this very need of nobleness is radically different from the needs of the Noble soul ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Virtues itself, and is in fact the eloquent and dangerous sign of the lack thereof. It is not the works, but the belief which is here decisive and determines the order of Rank ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics —to employ once more an old religious formula with a new and deeper meaning—it is some fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost.—The noble soul has Reverence ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Virtues for itself.—

288

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

288#

There are men who are unavoidably intellectual, let them turn and twist themselves as they will, and hold their hands before their treacherous eyes—as though the hand were not a betrayer; it always comes out at last that they have something which they hide—namely, intellect. One of the subtlest means of deceiving, at least as long as possible, and of successfully representing oneself to be stupider than one really is—which in everyday life is often as desirable as an umbrella—is called enthusiasm, including what belongs to it, for instance, virtue. For as Galiani said, who was obliged to know it: vertu est enthousiasme.

289

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

289#

In the writings of a Recluse ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development one always hears something of the echo of the wilderness, something of the murmuring tones and timid vigilance of solitude; in his strongest words, even in his cry itself, there sounds a new and more dangerous kind of silence, of Concealment ↖ Beyond Good and Evil . He who has sat day and night, from year’s end to year’s end, alone with his soul in familiar discord and discourse, he who has become a Cave ↖ Beyond Good and Evil -bear, or a treasure-seeker, or a treasure-guardian and dragon in his cave—it may be a labyrinth, but can also be a goldmine—his ideas themselves eventually acquire a twilight-colour of their own, and an odour, as much of the depth as of the mould, something uncommunicative and repulsive, which blows chilly upon every passerby. The recluse does not believe that a Philosopher ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —supposing that a philosopher has always in the first place been a recluse—ever expressed his actual and ultimate opinions in books: are not books written precisely to hide what is in us?—indeed, he will doubt whether a philosopher can have “ultimate and actual” opinions at all; whether behind every cave in him there is not, and must necessarily be, a still deeper cave: an ampler, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abyss behind every bottom, beneath every “foundation.” Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy—this is a recluse’s verdict: “There is something arbitrary in the fact that the philosopher came to a stand here, took a retrospect, and looked around; that he here laid his spade aside and did not dig any deeper—there is also something suspicious in it.” Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a lurking-place, every word is also a Mask ↖ Beyond Good and Evil .

29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

29#

It is the business of the very few to be independent; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it, even with the best right, but without being obliged to do so, proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring beyond measure. He enters into a Labyrinth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers which life in itself already brings with it; not the least of which is that no one can see how and where he loses his way, becomes isolated, and is torn piecemeal by some Minotaur ↖ Beyond Good and Evil of conscience. Supposing such a one comes to grief, it is so far from the comprehension of men that they neither feel it, nor sympathize with it. And he cannot any longer go back! He cannot even go back again to the sympathy of men!

290

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

290#

Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood. The latter perhaps wounds his vanity; but the former wounds his heart, his sympathy, which always says: “Ah, why would you also have as hard a time of it as I have?”

291

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

291#

Man, a complex, mendacious, artful, and inscrutable animal, uncanny to the other animals by his artifice and sagacity, rather than by his strength, has invented the good conscience in order finally to enjoy his soul as something simple; and the whole of morality is a long, audacious falsification, by virtue of which generally enjoyment at the sight of the soul becomes possible. From this point of view there is perhaps much more in the conception of “art” than is generally believed.

292

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

292#

A philosopher: that is a man who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as if they came from the outside, from above and below, as a species of events and lightning-flashes peculiar to him; who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings; a portentous man, around whom there is always rumbling and mumbling and gaping and something uncanny going on. A philosopher: alas, a being who often runs away from himself, is often afraid of himself—but whose curiosity always makes him “come to himself” again.

293

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

293#

A man who says: “I like that, I take it for my own, and mean to guard and protect it from everyone”; a man who can conduct a case, carry out a resolution, remain true to an opinion, keep hold of a woman, punish and overthrow insolence; a man who has his indignation and his sword, and to whom the weak, the Suffering ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology ↖ States Of Being , the oppressed, and even the animals willingly submit and naturally belong; in short, a man who is a Master ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics by nature—when such a man has Sympathy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Gender Relationships ↖ Psychology , well! that sympathy has value! But of what account is the sympathy of those who suffer! Or of those even who preach sympathy! There is nowadays, throughout almost the whole of Europe, a sickly irritability and sensitiveness towards pain, and also a repulsive irrestrainableness in complaining, an effeminizing, which, with the aid of religion and philosophical nonsense, seeks to deck itself out as something superior—there is a regular cult of suffering. The unmanliness of that which is called “sympathy” by such groups of visionaries, is always, I believe, the first thing that strikes the eye.—One must resolutely and radically taboo this latest form of bad taste; and finally I wish people to put the good amulet, Gai saber ↖ Beyond Good and Evil (“gay science,” in ordinary language), on heart and neck, as a protection against it.

294

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

294#

The Olympian Vice.—Despite the philosopher who, as a genuine Englishman, tried to bring laughter into bad repute in all thinking minds—“Laughing is a bad infirmity of human nature, which every thinking mind will strive to overcome” (Hobbes)—I would even allow myself to rank philosophers according to the quality of their laughing—up to those who are capable of golden laughter. And supposing that Gods ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Religion also philosophize, which I am strongly inclined to believe, owing to many reasons—I have no doubt that they also know how to laugh thereby in an Overman ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts -like and new fashion—and at the expense of all serious things! Gods are fond of ridicule: it seems that they cannot refrain from laughter even in holy matters.

295

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

295#

The Genius of the heart ↖ Aesthetics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , as that great mysterious one possesses it, the Tempter-god ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and born rat-catcher of consciences, whose voice can descend into the netherworld of every soul, who neither speaks a word nor casts a glance in which there may not be some motive or touch of allurement, to whose perfection it pertains that he knows how to appear—not as he is, but in a guise which acts as an additional constraint on his followers to press ever closer to him, to follow him more cordially and thoroughly;—the genius of the heart, which imposes silence and attention on everything loud and self-conceited, which smoothes rough souls and makes them taste a new longing—to lie placid as a mirror, that the deep heavens may be reflected in them;—the genius of the heart, which teaches the clumsy and too hasty hand to hesitate, and to grasp more delicately; which scents the hidden and forgotten treasure, the drop of goodness and sweet spirituality under thick dark ice, and is a divining-rod for every grain of gold, long buried and imprisoned in mud and sand; the genius of the heart, from contact with which everyone goes away richer; not favoured or surprised, not as though gratified and oppressed by the good things of others; but richer in himself, newer than before, broken up, blown upon, and sounded by a thawing wind; more uncertain, perhaps, more delicate, more fragile, more bruised, but full of hopes which as yet lack names, full of a new will and current, full of a new ill-will and countercurrent … but what am I doing, my friends? Of whom am I talking to you? Have I forgotten myself so far that I have not even told you his name? Unless it be that you have already divined of your own accord who this questionable God and spirit is, that wishes to be praised in such a manner? For, as it happens to everyone who from childhood onward has always been on his legs, and in foreign lands, I have also encountered on my path many strange and dangerous spirits; above all, however, and again and again, the one of whom I have just spoken: in fact, no less a personage than the God Dionysus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , the great equivocator and tempter, to whom, as you know, I once offered in all secrecy and reverence my firstfruits—the last, as it seems to me, who has offered a sacrifice to him, for I have found no one who could understand what I was then doing. In the meantime, however, I have learned much, far too much, about the philosophy of this God, and, as I said, from mouth to mouth—I, the last disciple and initiate of the God Dionysus: and perhaps I might at last begin to give you, my friends, as far as I am allowed, a little taste of this philosophy? In a hushed voice, as is but seemly: for it has to do with much that is secret, new, strange, wonderful, and uncanny. The very fact that Dionysus is a philosopher, and that therefore Gods also philosophize, seems to me a novelty which is not unensnaring, and might perhaps arouse suspicion precisely among philosophers;—among you, my friends, there is less to be said against it, except that it comes too late and not at the right time; for, as it has been disclosed to me, you are loth nowadays to believe in God and gods. It may happen, too, that in the frankness of my story I must go further than is agreeable to the strict usages of your ears? Certainly the God in question went further, very much further, in such dialogues, and was always many paces ahead of me … Indeed, if it were allowed, I should have to give him, according to human usage, fine ceremonious tides of lustre and merit, I should have to extol his courage as investigator and discoverer, his fearless honesty, truthfulness, and love of wisdom. But such a God does not know what to do with all that respectable trumpery and pomp. “Keep that,” he would say, “for thyself and those like thee, and whoever else require it! I—have no reason to cover my nakedness!” One suspects that this kind of divinity and philosopher perhaps lacks shame?—He once said: “Under certain circumstances I love mankind”—and referred thereby to Ariadne ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , who was present; “in my opinion man is an agreeable, brave, inventive animal, that has not his equal upon earth, he makes his way even through all labyrinths. I like man, and often think how I can still further advance him, and make him stronger, more evil, and more profound.”—“Stronger, more evil, and more profound?” I asked in horror. “Yes,” he said again, “stronger, more evil, and more profound; also more beautiful”—and thereby the tempter-god smiled with his halcyon smile, as though he had just paid some charming compliment. One here sees at once that it is not only shame that this divinity lacks;—and in general there are good grounds for supposing that in some things the Gods could all of them come to us men for instruction. We men are—more human.—

296

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

296#

Alas! what are you, after all, my written and painted thoughts! Not long ago you were so variegated, young and malicious, so full of thorns and secret spices, that you made me sneeze and laugh—and now? You have already doffed your novelty, and some of you, I fear, are ready to become truths, so immortal do they look, so pathetically honest, so tedious! And was it ever otherwise? What then do we write and paint, we mandarins with Chinese brush, we immortalisers of things which lend themselves to writing, what are we alone capable of painting? Alas, only that which is just about to fade and begins to lose its odour! Alas, only exhausted and departing storms and belated yellow sentiments! Alas, only birds strayed and fatigued by flight, which now let themselves be captured with the hand—with our hand! We immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer, things only which are exhausted and mellow! And it is only for your afternoon, you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have colours, many colours, perhaps, many variegated softenings, and fifty yellows and browns and greens and reds;—but nobody will divine thereby how ye looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and marvels of my solitude, you, my old, beloved—evil thoughts!

3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

3#

Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of conscious thinking must be counted among the instinctive functions, and it is so even in the case of philosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew, as one learned anew about heredity and “innateness.” As little as the act of birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of heredity, just as little is “being-conscious” opposed to the instinctive in any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement, there are Valuations ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , or to speak more plainly, Physiological demands ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , for the maintenance of a definite mode of life. For example, that the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that illusion is less valuable than “ Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Meditations ”: such valuations, in spite of their regulative importance for us, might notwithstanding be only superficial valuations, special kinds of niaiserie, such as may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves. Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the “measure of things.”

30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

30#

Our deepest insights must—and should—appear as follies, and under certain circumstances as crimes, when they come unauthorizedly to the ears of those who are not disposed and predestined for them. The exoteric and the esoteric, as they were formerly distinguished by Philosopher ↖ Beyond Good and Evil s—among the Indians, as among the Greeks, Persians, and Mussulmans, in short, wherever people believed in Gradations of rank ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics and not in equality and equal rights—are not so much in contradistinction to one another in respect to the exoteric class, standing without, and viewing, estimating, measuring, and judging from the outside, and not from the inside; the more essential distinction is that the class in question views things from below upwards—while the esoteric class views things from above downwards. There are heights of the soul from which Tragedy ↖ Aesthetics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil itself no longer appears to operate tragically; and if all the woe in the world were taken together, who would dare to decide whether the sight of it would necessarily seduce and constrain to sympathy, and thus to a doubling of the woe? … That which serves the higher class of men for nourishment or refreshment, must be almost poison to an entirely different and lower order of human beings. The virtues of the common man would perhaps mean vice and weakness in a philosopher; it might be possible for a highly developed man, supposing him to degenerate and go to ruin, to acquire qualities thereby alone, for the sake of which he would have to be honoured as a saint in the lower world into which he had sunk. There are books which have an inverse value for the soul and the health according as the inferior soul and the lower vitality, or the higher and more powerful, make use of them. In the former case they are dangerous, disturbing, unsettling books, in the latter case they are herald-calls which summon the bravest to their bravery. Books for the general reader are always ill-smelling books, the odour of paltry people clings to them. Where the populace eat and drink, and even where they reverence, it is accustomed to stink. One should not go into churches if one wishes to breathe pure air.

31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

31#

In our youthful years we still venerate and despise without the art of Nuance ↖ Aesthetics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , which is the best gain of life, and we have rightly to do hard penance for having fallen upon men and things with Yea and Nay. Everything is so arranged that the worst of all tastes, the Taste for the unconditional ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , is cruelly befooled and abused, until a man learns to introduce a little art into his sentiments, and prefers to try conclusions with the artificial, as do the real artists of life. The angry and reverent spirit peculiar to youth appears to allow itself no peace, until it has suitably falsified men and things, to be able to vent its passion upon them: youth in itself even, is something falsifying and deceptive. Later on, when the young soul, tortured by continual Disillusion ↖ Beyond Good and Evil s, finally turns suspiciously against itself—still ardent and savage even in its suspicion and remorse of conscience: how it upbraids itself, how impatiently it tears itself, how it revenges itself for its long self-blinding, as though it had been a voluntary blindness! In this transition one punishes oneself by distrust of one’s sentiments; one tortures one’s enthusiasm with doubt, one feels even the good conscience to be a danger, as if it were the self-concealment and lassitude of a more refined uprightness; and above all, one espouses upon principle the cause against “youth.”—A decade later, and one comprehends that all this was also still—youth!

32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

32#

Throughout the longest period of human history—one calls it the prehistoric period—the value or non-value of an action was inferred from its consequences; the action in itself was not taken into consideration, any more than its origin; but pretty much as in China at present, where the distinction or disgrace of a child redounds to its parents, the retro-operating power of success or failure was what induced men to think well or ill of an action. Let us call this period the pre-moral period of mankind; the imperative, “Know thyself!” was then still unknown.—In the last ten thousand years, on the other hand, on certain large portions of the earth, one has gradually got so far, that one no longer lets the consequences of an action, but its origin, decide with regard to its worth: a great achievement as a whole, an important refinement of vision and of criterion, the unconscious effect of the supremacy of Aristocratic values ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and of the belief in “origin,” the mark of a period which may be designated in the narrower sense as the moral one: the first attempt at self-knowledge is thereby made. Instead of the consequences, the origin—what an inversion of perspective! And assuredly an inversion effected only after long struggle and wavering! To be sure, an ominous new superstition, a peculiar narrowness of interpretation, attained supremacy precisely thereby: the origin of an action was interpreted in the most definite sense possible, as origin out of an Intention ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ; people were agreed in the belief that the value of an action lay in the value of its intention. The intention as the sole origin and antecedent history of an action: under the influence of this prejudice moral praise and blame have been bestowed, and men have judged and even philosophized almost up to the present day.—Is it not possible, however, that the necessity may now have arisen of again making up our minds with regard to the reversing and fundamental shifting of values, owing to a new self-consciousness and acuteness in man—is it not possible that we may be standing on the threshold of a period which to begin with, would be distinguished negatively as Ultra-moral ↖ Beyond Good and Evil : nowadays when, at least among us immoralists, the suspicion arises that the decisive value of an action lies precisely in that which is not intentional, and that all its intentionalness, all that is seen, sensible, or “sensed” in it, belongs to its surface or skin—which, like every skin, betrays something, but conceals still more? In short, we believe that the intention is only a sign or symptom, which first requires an explanation—a sign, moreover, which has too many interpretations, and consequently hardly any meaning in itself alone: that morality, in the sense in which it has been understood hitherto, as intention-morality, has been a prejudice, perhaps a prematureness or preliminariness, probably something of the same rank as astrology and alchemy, but in any case something which must be surmounted. The surmounting of morality, in a certain sense even the self-mounting of morality—let that be the name for the long-secret labour which has been reserved for the most refined, the most upright, and also the most wicked consciences of today, as the living touchstones of the soul.

33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

33#

It cannot be helped: the sentiment of surrender, of sacrifice for one’s neighbour, and all Self-renunciation-morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems , must be mercilessly called to account, and brought to judgment; just as the aesthetics of “ Disinterested contemplation ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ,” under which the emasculation of art nowadays seeks insidiously enough to create itself a good conscience. There is far too much witchery and sugar in the sentiments “for others” and “not for myself,” for one not needing to be doubly distrustful here, and for one asking promptly: “Are they not perhaps—deceptions?”—That they please—him who has them, and him who enjoys their fruit, and also the mere spectator—that is still no argument in their favour, but just calls for caution. Let us therefore be cautious!

34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

34#

At whatever standpoint of philosophy one may place oneself nowadays, seen from every position, the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and most certain thing our eyes can light upon: we find proof after proof thereof, which would fain allure us into surmises concerning a deceptive principle in the “nature of things.” He, however, who makes thinking itself, and consequently “the spirit,” responsible for the falseness of the world—an honourable exit, which every conscious or unconscious advocatus dei avails himself of—he who regards this world, including space, time, form, and movement, as falsely deduced, would have at least good reason in the end to become distrustful also of all thinking; has it not hitherto been playing upon us the worst of scurvy tricks? and what guarantee would it give that it would not continue to do what it has always been doing? In all seriousness, the innocence of thinkers has something touching and respect-inspiring in it, which even nowadays permits them to wait upon consciousness with the request that it will give them honest answers: for example, whether it be “real” or not, and why it keeps the outer world so resolutely at a distance, and other questions of the same description. The belief in “immediate certainties” is a Moral naivete ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems which does honour to us philosophers; but—we have now to cease being “merely moral” men! Apart from morality, such belief is a folly which does little honour to us! If in middle-class life an ever-ready distrust is regarded as the sign of a “bad character,” and consequently as an imprudence, here among us, beyond the middle-class world and its Yeas and Nays, what should prevent our being imprudent and saying: the philosopher has at length a right to “bad character,” as the being who has hitherto been most befooled on earth—he is now under obligation to distrustfulness, to the wickedest squinting out of every abyss of suspicion.—Forgive me the joke of this gloomy grimace and turn of expression; for I myself have long ago learned to think and estimate differently with regard to deceiving and being deceived, and I keep at least a couple of pokes in the ribs ready for the blind rage with which philosophers struggle against being deceived. Why not? It is nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than semblance; it is, in fact, the worst proved supposition in the world. So much must be conceded: there could have been no life at all except upon the basis of Perspective estimates and semblances ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and stupidity of many philosophers, one wished to do away altogether with the “seeming world”—well, granted that you could do that—at least nothing of your “truth” would thereby remain! Indeed, what is it that forces us in general to the supposition that there is an essential opposition of “true” and “false”? Is it not enough to suppose degrees of seemingness, and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of semblance—different valeurs, as the painters say? Why might not the world which concerns us—be a fiction? And to anyone who suggested: “But to a fiction belongs an originator?”—might it not be bluntly replied: Why? May not this “belong” also belong to the fiction? Is it not at length permitted to be a little ironical towards the subject, just as towards the predicate and object? Might not the philosopher elevate himself above faith in grammar? All respect to governesses, but is it not time that philosophy should renounce governess-faith?

35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

35#

O Voltaire ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers ! O humanity! O idiocy! There is something ticklish in “the Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Meditations ,” and in the search for the truth; and if man goes about it too humanely—"il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien"—I wager he finds nothing!

36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

36#

Supposing that nothing else is “given” as real but our world of desires and passions, that we cannot sink or rise to any other “reality” but just that of our impulses—for thinking is only a relation of these impulses to one another:—are we not permitted to make the attempt and to ask the question whether this which is “given” does not suffice, by means of our counterparts, for the understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or “material”) world? I do not mean as an illusion, a “semblance,” a “representation” (in the Berkeley ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers an and Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers ian sense), but as possessing the same degree of reality as our emotions themselves—as a more primitive form of the world of emotions, in which everything still lies locked in a mighty unity, which afterwards branches off and develops itself in organic processes (naturally also, refines and debilitates)—as a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions, including self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, secretion, and change of matter, are still synthetically united with one another—as a primary form of life?—In the end, it is not only permitted to make this attempt, it is commanded by the conscience of logical method. Not to assume several kinds of Causality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics , so long as the attempt to get along with a single one has not been pushed to its furthest extent (to absurdity, if I may be allowed to say so): that is a morality of method which one may not repudiate nowadays—it follows “from its definition,” as mathematicians say. The question is ultimately whether we really recognize the will as operating, whether we believe in the causality of the will; if we do so—and fundamentally our belief in this is just our belief in causality itself—we must make the attempt to posit hypothetically the causality of the will as the only causality. “Will” can naturally only operate on “will”—and not on “matter” (not on “nerves,” for instance): in short, the hypothesis must be hazarded, whether will does not operate on will wherever “effects” are recognized—and whether all mechanical action, inasmuch as a power operates therein, is not just the power of will, the effect of will. Granted, finally, that we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one fundamental form of will—namely, the Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts , as my thesis puts it; granted that all organic functions could be traced back to this Will to Power, and that the solution of the problem of generation and nutrition—it is one problem—could also be found therein: one would thus have acquired the right to define all active force unequivocally as Will to Power. The world seen from within, the world defined and designated according to its “intelligible character”—it would simply be “Will to Power,” and nothing else.

37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

37#

“What? Does not that mean in popular language: God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion is disproved, but not the Devil ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ?”—On the contrary! On the contrary, my friends! And who the devil also compels you to speak popularly!

38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

38#

As happened finally in all the Enlightenment ↖ Beyond Good and Evil of modern times with the French Revolution ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Politics (that terrible farce, quite superfluous when judged close at hand, into which, however, the noble and visionary spectators of all Europe have interpreted from a distance their own indignation and enthusiasm so long and passionately, until the text has disappeared under the Interpretation ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ), so a noble posterity might once more misunderstand the whole of the past, and perhaps only thereby make its aspect endurable.—Or rather, has not this already happened? Have not we ourselves been—that “noble posterity”? And, in so far as we now comprehend this, is it not—thereby already past?

39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

39#

Nobody will very readily regard a doctrine as true merely because it makes people happy or virtuous—excepting, perhaps, the amiable “ Idealists ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools ,” who are enthusiastic about the good, true, and beautiful, and let all kinds of motley, coarse, and good-natured desirabilities swim about promiscuously in their pond. Happiness and virtue are no arguments. It is willingly forgotten, however, even on the part of thoughtful minds, that to make unhappy and to make bad are just as little counterarguments. A thing could be true, although it were in the highest degree injurious and dangerous; indeed, the fundamental constitution of existence might be such that one succumbed by a full knowledge of it—so that the strength of a mind might be measured by the amount of “ Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Meditations ” it could endure—or to speak more plainly, by the extent to which it required truth attenuated, veiled, sweetened, damped, and falsified. But there is no doubt that for the discovery of certain portions of truth the wicked and unfortunate are more favourably situated and have a greater likelihood of success; not to speak of the wicked who are happy—a species about whom moralists are silent. Perhaps severity and craft are more favourable conditions for the development of strong, independent spirits and philosophers than the gentle, refined, yielding good-nature, and habit of taking things easily, which are prized, and rightly prized in a learned man. Presupposing always, to begin with, that the term “philosopher” be not confined to the philosopher who writes books, or even introduces his philosophy into books!— Stendhal ↖ Beyond Good and Evil furnishes a last feature of the portrait of the free-spirited philosopher, which for the sake of German taste I will not omit to underline—for it is opposed to German taste. “Pour être bon philosophe,” says this last great psychologist, “il faut être sec, clair, sans illusion. Un banquier, qui a fait fortune, a une partie du caractère requis pour faire des découvertes en philosophie, c’est-à-dire pour voir clair dans ce qui est.”

4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

4#

The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us, that without a recognition of Logical fictions ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology , without a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live—that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. To recognise untruth as a condition of life; that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts .

40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

40#

Everything that is Profound ↖ Beyond Good and Evil loves the Mask ↖ Beyond Good and Evil : the profoundest things have a hatred even of figure and likeness. Should not the contrary only be the right disguise for the Shame ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology of a God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion to go about in? A question worth asking!—it would be strange if some mystic has not already ventured on the same kind of thing. There are proceedings of such a delicate nature that it is well to overwhelm them with coarseness and make them unrecognizable; there are actions of love and of an extravagant magnanimity after which nothing can be wiser than to take a stick and thrash the witness soundly: one thereby obscures his recollection. Many a one is able to obscure and abuse his own memory, in order at least to have vengeance on this sole party in the secret: shame is inventive. They are not the worst things of which one is most ashamed: there is not only deceit behind a mask—there is so much goodness in craft. I could imagine that a man with something costly and fragile to conceal, would roll through life clumsily and rotundly like an old, green, heavily-hooped wine-cask: the refinement of his shame requiring it to be so. A man who has depths in his shame meets his destiny and his delicate decisions upon paths which few ever reach, and with regard to the existence of which his nearest and most intimate friends may be ignorant; his mortal danger conceals itself from their eyes, and equally so his regained security. Such a hidden nature, which instinctively employs speech for silence and concealment, and is inexhaustible in evasion of communication, desires and insists that a mask of himself shall occupy his place in the hearts and heads of his friends; and supposing he does not desire it, his eyes will some day be opened to the fact that there is nevertheless a mask of him there—and that it is well to be so. Every profound spirit needs a mask; nay, more, around every profound spirit there continually grows a mask, owing to the constantly false, that is to say, superficial interpretation of every word he utters, every step he takes, every sign of life he manifests.

41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

41#

One must subject oneself to one’s own tests that one is destined for Independence ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development ↖ Virtues and command, and do so at the right time. One must not avoid one’s tests, although they constitute perhaps the most dangerous game one can play, and are in the end tests made only before ourselves and before no other judge. Not to cleave to any person, be it even the dearest—every person is a prison and also a recess. Not to cleave to a fatherland, be it even the most suffering and necessitous—it is even less difficult to detach one’s heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to cleave to a sympathy, be it even for higher men, into whose peculiar torture and helplessness chance has given us an insight. Not to cleave to a science, though it tempt one with the most valuable discoveries, apparently specially reserved for us. Not to cleave to one’s own Liberation ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development , to the voluptuous distance and remoteness of the bird, which always flies further aloft in order always to see more under it—the danger of the flier. Not to cleave to our own Virtue ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ The Prince ↖ Virtues s, nor become as a whole a victim to any of our specialties, to our “hospitality” for instance, which is the danger of dangers for highly developed and wealthy souls, who deal prodigally, almost indifferently with themselves, and push the virtue of liberality so far that it becomes a vice. One must know how to conserve oneself—the best test of independence.

42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

42#

A new order of Philosophers ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Categories is appearing; I shall venture to baptize them by a name not without danger. As far as I understand them, as far as they allow themselves to be understood—for it is their nature to wish to remain something of a puzzle—these philosophers of the future might rightly, perhaps also wrongly, claim to be designated as “ Tempters ↖ Beyond Good and Evil .” This name itself is after all only an attempt, or, if it be preferred, a temptation.

43

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

43#

Will they be new friends of “ Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Meditations ,” these coming Philosophers ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Categories ? Very probably, for all philosophers hitherto have loved their truths. But assuredly they will not be Dogmatists ↖ Beyond Good and Evil . It must be contrary to their pride, and also contrary to their taste, that their truth should still be truth for everyone—that which has hitherto been the secret wish and ultimate purpose of all dogmatic efforts. “My opinion is my opinion: another person has not easily a right to it”—such a philosopher of the future will say, perhaps. One must renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree with many people. “Good” is no longer good when one’s neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a “common good”! The expression contradicts itself; that which can be common is always of small value. In the end things must be as they are and have always been—the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, and, to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare.

44

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

44#

Need I say expressly after all this that they will be free, very Free Spirits ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts , these Philosophers of the Future ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts —as certainly also they will not be merely free spirits, but something more, higher, greater, and fundamentally different, which does not wish to be misunderstood and mistaken? But while I say this, I feel under obligation almost as much to them as to ourselves (we free spirits who are their heralds and forerunners), to sweep away from ourselves altogether a stupid old prejudice and misunderstanding, which, like a fog, has too long made the conception of “free spirit” obscure. In every country of Europe, and the same in America, there is at present something which makes an abuse of this name: a very narrow, prepossessed, enchained class of spirits, who desire almost the opposite of what our intentions and instincts prompt—not to mention that in respect to the new philosophers who are appearing, they must still more be closed windows and bolted doors. Briefly and regrettably, they belong to the levellers, these wrongly named “free spirits”—as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic taste and its “modern ideas” all of them men without Solitude ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development ↖ States Of Being , without personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom neither courage nor honourable conduct ought to be denied, only, they are not free, and are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate partiality for seeing the cause of almost all human misery and failure in the old forms in which society has hitherto existed—a notion which happily inverts the truth entirely! What they would fain attain with all their strength, is the universal, green-meadow happiness of the herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of life for everyone; their two most frequently chanted songs and doctrines are called “Equality of Rights” and “Sympathy with All Sufferers”—and suffering itself is looked upon by them as something which must be done away with. We opposite ones, however, who have opened our eye and conscience to the question how and where the plant “man” has hitherto grown most vigorously, believe that this has always taken place under the opposite conditions, that for this end the dangerousness of his situation had to be increased enormously, his inventive faculty and dissembling power (his “spirit”) had to develop into subtlety and daring under long oppression and compulsion, and his Will to Life had to be increased to the unconditioned Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts —we believe that severity, violence, slavery, danger in the street and in the heart, secrecy, stoicism, tempter’s art and devilry of every kind—that everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine in man, serves as well for the elevation of the human species as its opposite—we do not even say enough when we only say this much, and in any case we find ourselves here, both with our speech and our silence, at the other extreme of all modern ideology and gregarious desirability, as their antipodes perhaps? What wonder that we “free spirits” are not exactly the most communicative spirits? that we do not wish to betray in every respect what a spirit can free itself from, and where perhaps it will then be driven? And as to the import of the dangerous formula, “ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ,” with which we at least avoid confusion, we are something else than “libres-penseurs,” “liberi pensatori” “freethinkers,” and whatever these honest advocates of “modern ideas” like to call themselves. Having been at home, or at least guests, in many realms of the spirit, having escaped again and again from the gloomy, agreeable nooks in which preferences and prejudices, youth, origin, the accident of men and books, or even the weariness of travel seemed to confine us, full of malice against the seductions of dependency which lie concealed in honours, money, positions, or exaltation of the senses, grateful even for distress and the vicissitudes of illness, because they always free us from some rule, and its “prejudice,” grateful to the God, devil, sheep, and worm in us, inquisitive to a fault, investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and stomachs for the most indigestible, ready for any business that requires sagacity and acute senses, ready for every adventure, owing to an excess of “free will,” with anterior and posterior souls, into the ultimate intentions of which it is difficult to pry, with foregrounds and backgrounds to the end of which no foot may run, hidden ones under the mantles of light, appropriators, although we resemble heirs and spendthrifts, arrangers and collectors from morning till night, misers of our wealth and our full-crammed drawers, economical in learning and forgetting, inventive in scheming, sometimes proud of tables of categories, sometimes pedants, sometimes night-owls of work even in full day, yea, if necessary, even scarecrows—and it is necessary nowadays, that is to say, inasmuch as we are the born, sworn, jealous friends of solitude, of our own profoundest midnight and midday solitude—such kind of men are we, we free spirits! And perhaps ye are also something of the same kind, ye coming ones? ye new philosophers?

45

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

45#

The Human soul ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology and its limits, the range of man’s inner experiences hitherto attained, the heights, depths, and distances of these experiences, the entire history of the soul up to the present time, and its still unexhausted possibilities: this is the preordained hunting-domain for a born Psychologist ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and lover of a “big hunt.” But how often must he say despairingly to himself: “A single individual! alas, only a single individual! and this great forest, this virgin forest!” So he would like to have some hundreds of hunting assistants, and fine trained hounds, that he could send into the history of the human soul, to drive his game together. In vain: again and again he experiences, profoundly and bitterly, how difficult it is to find assistants and dogs for all the things that directly excite his curiosity. The evil of sending scholars into new and dangerous hunting-domains, where courage, sagacity, and subtlety in every sense are required, is that they are no longer serviceable just when the “big hunt,” and also the great danger commences—it is precisely then that they lose their keen eye and nose. In order, for instance, to divine and determine what sort of history the problem of knowledge and conscience has hitherto had in the souls of Homines religiosi ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , a person would perhaps himself have to possess as profound, as bruised, as immense an experience as the intellectual conscience of Pascal ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers ; and then he would still require that widespread heaven of clear, wicked spirituality, which, from above, would be able to oversee, arrange, and effectively formulize this mass of dangerous and painful experiences.—But who could do me this service! And who would have time to wait for such servants!—they evidently appear too rarely, they are so improbable at all times! Eventually one must do everything oneself in order to know something; which means that one has much to do!—But a curiosity like mine is once for all the most agreeable of vices—pardon me! I mean to say that the love of truth has its reward in heaven, and already upon earth.

46

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46#

Faith, such as early Christianity desired, and not infrequently achieved in the midst of a skeptical and southernly free-spirited world, which had centuries of struggle between philosophical schools behind it and in it, counting besides the education in tolerance which the Imperium Romanum gave—this faith is not that sincere, austere slave-faith by which perhaps a Luther or a Cromwell, or some other northern barbarian of the spirit remained attached to his God and Christianity, it is much rather the faith of Pascal ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , which resembles in a terrible manner a continuous suicide of reason—a tough, long-lived, worm-like reason, which is not to be slain at once and with a single blow. The Christian faith ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion from the beginning, is sacrifice: the sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit; it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation. There is cruelty and religious Phoenicianism in this faith, which is adapted to a tender, many-sided, and very fastidious conscience; it takes for granted that the subjection of the spirit is indescribably painful, that all the past and all the habits of such a spirit resist the absurdissimum, in the form of which “faith” comes to it. Modern men, with their obtuseness as regards all Christian nomenclature, have no longer the sense for the terribly superlative conception which was implied to an antique taste by the paradox of the formula, “God on the Cross.” Hitherto there had never and nowhere been such boldness in inversion, nor anything at once so dreadful, questioning, and questionable as this formula: it promised a Transvaluation of all ancient values ↖ Beyond Good and Evil .—It was the Orient, the profound Orient, it was the Oriental slave who thus took revenge on Rome and its noble, light-minded toleration, on the Roman “Catholicism” of non-faith; and it was always not the faith, but the freedom from the faith, the half-stoical and smiling indifference to the seriousness of the faith, which made the slaves indignant at their masters and revolt against them. “ Enlightenment ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ” causes revolt, for the slave desires the unconditioned, he understands nothing but the tyrannous, even in morals, he loves as he hates, without nuance, to the very depths, to the point of pain, to the point of sickness—his many hidden sufferings make him revolt against the noble taste which seems to deny suffering. The skepticism with regard to suffering, fundamentally only an attitude of Aristocratic morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems , was not the least of the causes, also, of the last great slave-insurrection which began with the French Revolution.

47

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Wherever the Religious neurosis ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology has appeared on the earth so far, we find it connected with three dangerous prescriptions as to regimen: solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence—but without its being possible to determine with certainty which is cause and which is effect, or if any relation at all of cause and effect exists there. This latter doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilized peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then with equal suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation: both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy? But nowhere is it more obligatory to put aside explanations: around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and even to philosophers—perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look away, to go away—Yet in the background of the most recent philosophy, that of Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , we find almost as the problem in itself, this terrible note of interrogation of the religious crisis and awakening. How is the negation of will possible? how is the Saint ↖ Beyond Good and Evil possible?—that seems to have been the very question with which Schopenhauer made a start and became a philosopher. And thus it was a genuine Schopenhauerian consequence, that his most convinced adherent (perhaps also his last, as far as Germany is concerned), namely, Richard Wagner ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , should bring his own lifework to an end just here, and should finally put that terrible and eternal type upon the stage as Kundry, type vécu, and as it loved and lived, at the very time that the mad-doctors in almost all European countries had an opportunity to study the type close at hand, wherever the religious neurosis—or as I call it, “the religious mood”—made its latest epidemical outbreak and display as the “Salvation Army.”—If it be a question, however, as to what has been so extremely interesting to men of all sorts in all ages, and even to philosophers, in the whole phenomenon of the saint, it is undoubtedly the appearance of the miraculous therein—namely, the immediate succession of opposites, of states of the soul regarded as morally antithetical: it was believed here to be self-evident that a “bad man” was all at once turned into a “saint,” a good man. The hitherto existing Psychology ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology was wrecked at this point; is it not possible it may have happened principally because psychology had placed itself under the dominion of morals, because it believed in oppositions of moral values, and saw, read, and interpreted these oppositions into the text and facts of the case? What? “Miracle” only an error of interpretation? A lack of philology?

48

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It seems that the Latin races are far more deeply attached to their Catholicism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion than we Northerners are to Christianity ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion generally, and that consequently unbelief in Catholic countries means something quite different from what it does among Protestants—namely, a sort of revolt against the spirit of the race, while with us it is rather a return to the spirit (or non-spirit) of the race.

49

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That which is so astonishing in the religious life of the Ancient Greeks ↖ Ancient Cultures ↖ Beyond Good and Evil is the irrestrainable stream of Gratitude ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Virtues which it pours forth—it is a very superior kind of man who takes such an attitude towards nature and life.—Later on, when the populace got the upper hand in Greece, Fear ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology ↖ States Of Being became rampant also in religion; and Christianity ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion was preparing itself.

5

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5#

That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are—but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent Dialectic ↖ Beyond Good and Evil (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of “inspiration”), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or “suggestion,” which is generally their heart’s desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub “truths,”—and very far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers , equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic byways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his “ Categorical imperative ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ”—makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask—in fact, the “love of his wisdom,” to translate the term fairly and squarely—in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene:—how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray!

50

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The Passion for God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Gender Relationships : there are churlish, honest-hearted, and importunate kinds of it, like that of Luther ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ People —the whole of Protestantism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion lacks the southern delicatezza. There is an Oriental exaltation of the mind in it, like that of an undeservedly favoured or elevated slave, as in the case of St. Augustine, for instance, who lacks in an offensive manner, all nobility in bearing and desires. There is a feminine tenderness and sensuality in it, which modestly and unconsciously longs for a unio mystica et physica, as in the case of Madame de Guyon ↖ Beyond Good and Evil . In many cases it appears, curiously enough, as the disguise of a girl’s or youth’s puberty; here and there even as the hysteria of an old maid, also as her last ambition. The Church has frequently canonized the woman in such a case.

51

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The mightiest men have hitherto always bowed reverently before the Saint ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , as the enigma of Self-subjugation ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development and utter voluntary privation—why did they thus bow? They divined in him—and as it were behind the questionableness of his frail and wretched appearance—the superior force which wished to test itself by such a subjugation; the strength of will, in which they recognized their own strength and love of power, and knew how to honour it: they honoured something in themselves when they honoured the saint. In addition to this, the contemplation of the saint suggested to them a suspicion: such an enormity of self-negation and anti-naturalness will not have been coveted for nothing—they have said, inquiringly. There is perhaps a reason for it, some very great danger, about which the Ascetic ↖ Beyond Good and Evil might wish to be more accurately informed through his secret interlocutors and visitors? In a word, the mighty ones of the world learned to have a new fear before him, they divined a new power, a strange, still unconquered enemy:—it was the “ Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts ” which obliged them to halt before the saint. They had to question him.

52

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In the Jewish Old Testament ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , the book of Divine justice ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , there are men, things, and sayings on such an immense scale, that Greek and Indian literature has nothing to compare with it. One stands with fear and reverence before those stupendous remains of what man was formerly, and one has sad thoughts about old Asia and its little out-pushed peninsula Europe, which would like, by all means, to figure before Asia as the “Progress of Mankind.” To be sure, he who is himself only a slender, tame house-animal, and knows only the wants of a house-animal (like our cultured people of today, including the Christians of “cultured” Christianity), need neither be amazed nor even sad amid those ruins—the taste for the Old Testament is a touchstone with respect to “great” and “small”: perhaps he will find that the New Testament ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion , the book of grace, still appeals more to his heart (there is much of the odour of the genuine, tender, stupid beadsman and petty soul in it). To have bound up this New Testament (a kind of rococo of taste in every respect) along with the Old Testament into one book, as the Bible, as “The Book in Itself,” is perhaps the greatest audacity and “sin against the Spirit” which literary Europe has upon its conscience.

53

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Why [A Theism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion ](atheism.md) nowadays? “The father” in God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion is thoroughly refuted; equally so “the judge,” “the rewarder.” Also his “ Free Will ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ The Prince ↖ Will Concepts ”: he does not hear—and even if he did, he would not know how to help. The worst is that he seems incapable of communicating himself clearly; is he uncertain?—This is what I have made out (by questioning and listening at a variety of conversations) to be the cause of the decline of European theism; it appears to me that though the Religious instinct ↖ Beyond Good and Evil is in vigorous growth—it rejects the theistic satisfaction with profound distrust.

54

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What does all modern philosophy mainly do? Since Descartes ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers —and indeed more in defiance of him than on the basis of his procedure—an attentat has been made on the part of all philosophers on the old conception of the Soul ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Metaphysics , under the guise of a criticism of the subject and predicate conception—that is to say, an attentat on the fundamental presupposition of Christian doctrine. Modern philosophy, as Epistemological skepticism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , is secretly or openly anti-Christian, although (for keener ears, be it said) by no means anti-religious. Formerly, in effect, one believed in “the soul” as one believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: one said, “I” is the condition, “think” is the predicate and is conditioned—to think is an activity for which one must suppose a subject as cause. The attempt was then made, with marvelous tenacity and subtlety, to see if one could not get out of this net—to see if the opposite was not perhaps true: “think” the condition, and “I” the conditioned; “I,” therefore, only a synthesis which has been made by thinking itself. Kant ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers really wished to prove that, starting from the subject, the subject could not be proved—nor the object either: the possibility of an apparent existence of the subject, and therefore of “the soul,” may not always have been strange to him—the thought which once had an immense power on earth as the Vedanta philosophy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil .

55

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There is a great ladder of Religious cruelty ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , with many rounds; but three of these are the most important. Once on a time men sacrificed human beings to their God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion , and perhaps just those they loved the best—to this category belong the firstling sacrifices of all primitive religions, and also the sacrifice of the Emperor Tiberius in the Mithra-Grotto on the Island of Capri, that most terrible of all Roman anachronisms. Then, during the moral epoch of mankind, they sacrificed to their God the strongest instincts they possessed, their “ Nature ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Metaphysics ”; this festal joy shines in the cruel glances of Ascetics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and “anti-natural” fanatics. Finally, what still remained to be sacrificed? Was it not necessary in the end for men to sacrifice everything comforting, holy, healing, all hope, all faith in hidden harmonies, in future blessedness and justice? Was it not necessary to sacrifice God himself, and out of cruelty to themselves to worship stone, stupidity, gravity, fate, Nothingness ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics ↖ States Of Being ? To sacrifice God for nothingness—this paradoxical mystery of the ultimate cruelty has been reserved for the rising generation; we all know something thereof already.

56

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Whoever, like myself, prompted by some enigmatical desire, has long endeavoured to go to the bottom of the question of Pessimism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ States Of Being and free it from the half-Christian, half-German narrowness and stupidity in which it has finally presented itself to this century, namely, in the form of Schopenhauer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers ’s philosophy; whoever, with an Asiatic and super-Asiatic eye, has actually looked inside, and into the most world-renouncing of all possible modes of thought—beyond Good and evil ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems ↖ Paradoxes , and no longer like Buddha ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and Schopenhauer, under the dominion and delusion of Morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems —whoever has done this, has perhaps just thereby, without really desiring it, opened his eyes to behold the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most world-approving, exuberant, and vivacious man, who has not only learnt to compromise and arrange with that which was and is, but wishes to have it again as it was and is, for all eternity, insatiably calling out da capo, not only to himself, but to the whole piece and play; and not only the play, but actually to him who requires the play—and makes it necessary; because he always requires himself anew—and makes himself necessary.—What? And this would not be—circulus vitiosus deus?

57

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The distance, and as it were the space around man, grows with the strength of his Intellectual vision ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and insight: his world becomes profounder; new stars, new enigmas, and notions are ever coming into view. Perhaps everything on which the intellectual eye has exercised its acuteness and profundity has just been an occasion for its exercise, something of a game, something for children and childish minds. Perhaps the most solemn conceptions that have caused the most fighting and suffering, the conceptions “ God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion ” and “ Sin ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion ,” will one day seem to us of no more importance than a child’s plaything or a child’s pain seems to an old man;—and perhaps another plaything and another pain will then be necessary once more for “the old man”—always childish enough, an eternal child!

58

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Has it been observed to what extent outward idleness, or semi-idleness, is necessary to a real religious life (alike for its favourite microscopic labour of Self-examination ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Self Development , and for its soft placidity called “ Prayer ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion ,” the state of perpetual readiness for the “coming of God”), I mean the idleness with a good conscience, the idleness of olden times and of blood, to which the aristocratic sentiment that work is dishonouring—that it vulgarizes body and soul—is not quite unfamiliar? And that consequently the modern, noisy, time-engrossing, conceited, foolishly proud laboriousness educates and prepares for “ Unbelief ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion ” more than anything else? Among these, for instance, who are at present living apart from religion in Germany, I find “freethinkers” of diversified species and origin, but above all a majority of those in whom laboriousness from generation to generation has dissolved the religious instincts; so that they no longer know what purpose religions serve, and only note their existence in the world with a kind of dull astonishment. They feel themselves already fully occupied, these good people, be it by their business or by their pleasures, not to mention the “Fatherland,” and the newspapers, and their “family duties”; it seems that they have no time whatever left for religion; and above all, it is not obvious to them whether it is a question of a new business or a new pleasure—for it is impossible, they say to themselves, that people should go to church merely to spoil their tempers. They are by no means enemies of religious customs; should certain circumstances, State affairs perhaps, require their participation in such customs, they do what is required, as so many things are done—with a patient and unassuming seriousness, and without much curiosity or discomfort;—they live too much apart and outside to feel even the necessity for a for or against in such matters. Among those indifferent persons may be reckoned nowadays the majority of German Protestants of the middle classes, especially in the great laborious centres of trade and commerce; also the majority of laborious scholars, and the entire University personnel (with the exception of the theologians, whose existence and possibility there always gives psychologists new and more subtle puzzles to solve). On the part of pious, or merely churchgoing people, there is seldom any idea of how much goodwill, one might say arbitrary will, is now necessary for a German scholar to take the problem of religion seriously; his whole profession (and as I have said, his whole workmanlike laboriousness, to which he is compelled by his modern conscience) inclines him to a lofty and almost charitable serenity as regards religion, with which is occasionally mingled a slight disdain for the “uncleanliness” of spirit which he takes for granted wherever anyone still professes to belong to the Church. It is only with the help of history (not through his own personal experience, therefore) that the scholar succeeds in bringing himself to a respectful seriousness, and to a certain timid deference in presence of religions; but even when his sentiments have reached the stage of gratitude towards them, he has not personally advanced one step nearer to that which still maintains itself as Church or as piety; perhaps even the contrary. The practical indifference to religious matters in the midst of which he has been born and brought up, usually sublimates itself in his case into circumspection and cleanliness, which shuns contact with religious men and things; and it may be just the depth of his tolerance and humanity which prompts him to avoid the delicate trouble which tolerance itself brings with it.—Every age has its own divine type of naivete, for the discovery of which other ages may envy it: and how much naivete—adorable, childlike, and boundlessly foolish naivete is involved in this belief of the scholar in his superiority, in the good conscience of his tolerance, in the unsuspecting, simple certainty with which his instinct treats the religious man as a lower and less valuable type, beyond, before, and above which he himself has developed—he, the little arrogant dwarf and mob-man, the sedulously alert, head-and-hand drudge of “ideas,” of “modern ideas”!

59

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Whoever has seen deeply into the world has doubtless divined what wisdom there is in the fact that men are superficial. It is their preservative instinct which teaches them to be flighty, lightsome, and false. Here and there one finds a passionate and exaggerated adoration of “pure forms” in philosophers as well as in artists: it is not to be doubted that whoever has need of the cult of the superficial to that extent, has at one time or another made an unlucky dive beneath it. Perhaps there is even an order of rank with respect to those burnt children, the born artists who find the enjoyment of life only in trying to falsify its image (as if taking wearisome revenge on it), one might guess to what degree life has disgusted them, by the extent to which they wish to see its image falsified, attenuated, ultrified, and deified—one might reckon the homines religiosi among the artists, as their highest rank. It is the profound, suspicious fear of an incurable Pessimism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ States Of Being which compels whole centuries to fasten their teeth into a religious interpretation of existence: the fear of the instinct which divines that Truth ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ↖ Meditations might be attained too soon, before man has become strong enough, hard enough, artist enough. … Piety ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Virtues , the “Life in God,” regarded in this light, would appear as the most elaborate and ultimate product of the fear of truth, as artist-adoration and artist-intoxication in presence of the most logical of all falsifications, as the will to the inversion of truth, to untruth at any price. Perhaps there has hitherto been no more effective means of beautifying man than piety, by means of it man can become so artful, so superficial, so iridescent, and so good, that his appearance no longer offends.

6

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6#

It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a Philosopher ↖ Beyond Good and Evil have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: “What Morality ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Moral Systems do they (or does he) aim at?” Accordingly, I do not believe that an “ Impulse to knowledge ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ” is the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here acted as inspiring genii (or as demons and cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate lord over all the other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as such, attempts to philosophize. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise—“better,” if you will; there there may really be such a thing as an “impulse to knowledge,” some kind of small, independent clockwork, which, when well wound up, works away industriously to that end, without the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part therein. The actual “interests” of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction—in the family, perhaps, or in moneymaking, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not characterised by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as to who he is—that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other.

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To love mankind for God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion ’s sake—this has so far been the noblest and remotest sentiment to which mankind has attained. That love to mankind, without any redeeming intention in the background, is only an additional folly and brutishness, that the inclination to this love has first to get its proportion, its delicacy, its gram of salt and sprinkling of ambergris from a higher inclination—whoever first perceived and “experienced” this, however his tongue may have stammered as it attempted to express such a delicate matter, let him for all time be holy and respected, as the man who has so far flown highest and gone astray in the finest fashion!

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The philosopher, as we Free Spirits ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts understand him—as the man of the greatest responsibility, who has the conscience for the general development of mankind—will use Religion ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Categories for his disciplining and educating work, just as he will use the contemporary political and economic conditions. The selecting and disciplining influence—destructive, as well as creative and fashioning—which can be exercised by means of religion is manifold and varied, according to the sort of people placed under its spell and protection. For those who are strong and independent, destined and trained to command, in whom the judgment and skill of a Ruling race ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Power Dynamics is incorporated, religion is an additional means for overcoming resistance in the exercise of authority—as a bond which binds rulers and subjects in common, betraying and surrendering to the former the conscience of the latter, their inmost heart, which would fain escape obedience. And in the case of the unique natures of noble origin, if by virtue of superior spirituality they should incline to a more retired and contemplative life, reserving to themselves only the more refined forms of government (over chosen disciples or members of an order), religion itself may be used as a means for obtaining peace from the noise and trouble of managing grosser affairs, and for securing immunity from the unavoidable filth of all political agitation. The Brahmins ↖ Ancient Cultures ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion , for instance, understood this fact. With the help of a religious organization, they secured to themselves the power of nominating kings for the people, while their sentiments prompted them to keep apart and outside, as men with a higher and super-regal mission. At the same time religion gives inducement and opportunity to some of the subjects to qualify themselves for future ruling and commanding the slowly ascending ranks and classes, in which, through fortunate marriage customs, volitional power and delight in self-control are on the increase. To them religion offers sufficient incentives and temptations to aspire to higher intellectuality, and to experience the sentiments of authoritative self-control, of silence, and of solitude. Asceticism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil and Puritanism are almost indispensable means of educating and ennobling a race which seeks to rise above its hereditary baseness and work itself upwards to future supremacy. And finally, to ordinary men, to the majority of the people, who exist for service and general utility, and are only so far entitled to exist, religion gives invaluable contentedness with their lot and condition, peace of heart, ennoblement of obedience, additional social happiness and sympathy, with something of transfiguration and embellishment, something of justification of all the commonplaceness, all the meanness, all the semi-animal poverty of their souls. Religion, together with the religious significance of life, sheds sunshine over such perpetually harassed men, and makes even their own aspect endurable to them, it operates upon them as the Epicurean philosophy usually operates upon sufferers of a higher order, in a refreshing and refining manner, almost turning suffering to account, and in the end even hallowing and vindicating it. There is perhaps nothing so admirable in Christianity ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion and Buddhism ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion as their art of teaching even the lowest to elevate themselves by piety to a seemingly higher order of things, and thereby to retain their satisfaction with the actual world in which they find it difficult enough to live—this very difficulty being necessary.

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Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

62#

To be sure—to make also the bad counter-reckoning against such religions, and to bring to light their secret dangers—the cost is always excessive and terrible when religions do not operate as an educational and disciplinary medium in the hands of the Philosopher ↖ Beyond Good and Evil , but rule voluntarily and paramountly, when they wish to be the final end, and not a means along with other means. Among men, as among all other animals, there is a surplus of defective, diseased, degenerating, infirm, and necessarily suffering individuals; the successful cases, among men also, are always the exception; and in view of the fact that man is the animal not yet properly adapted to his environment, the rare exception. But worse still. The higher the type a man represents, the greater is the improbability that he will succeed; the accidental, the law of irrationality in the general constitution of mankind, manifests itself most terribly in its destructive effect on the higher orders of men, the conditions of whose lives are delicate, diverse, and difficult to determine. What, then, is the attitude of the two greatest religions above-mentioned to the surplus of failures in life? They endeavour to preserve and keep alive whatever can be preserved; in fact, as the religions for sufferers, they take the part of these upon principle; they are always in favour of those who suffer from life as from a disease, and they would fain treat every other experience of life as false and impossible. However highly we may esteem this indulgent and preservative care (inasmuch as in applying to others, it has applied, and applies also to the highest and usually the most suffering type of man), the hitherto paramount religions—to give a general appreciation of them—are among the principal causes which have kept the type of “man” upon a lower level—they have preserved too much that which should have perished. One has to thank them for invaluable services; and who is sufficiently rich in gratitude not to feel poor at the contemplation of all that the “spiritual men” of Christianity ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion have done for Europe hitherto! But when they had given comfort to the sufferers, courage to the oppressed and despairing, a staff and support to the helpless, and when they had allured from society into convents and spiritual penitentiaries the brokenhearted and distracted: what else had they to do in order to work systematically in that fashion, and with a good conscience, for the preservation of all the sick and suffering, which means, in deed and in truth, to work for the deterioration of the European race ↖ Ancient Cultures ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ? To reverse all estimates of value—that is what they had to do! And to shatter the strong, to spoil great hopes, to cast suspicion on the delight in beauty, to break down everything autonomous, manly, conquering, and imperious—all instincts which are natural to the highest and most successful type of “man”—into uncertainty, distress of conscience, and self-destruction; forsooth, to invert all love of the earthly and of supremacy over the earth, into hatred of the earth and earthly things—that is the task The Church ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion imposed on itself, and was obliged to impose, until, according to its standard of value, “unworldliness,” “unsensuousness,” and “higher man” fused into one sentiment. If one could observe the strangely painful, equally coarse and refined comedy of European Christianity with the derisive and impartial eye of an Epicurean god, I should think one would never cease marvelling and laughing; does it not actually seem that some single will has ruled over Europe for eighteen centuries in order to make a sublime abortion of man? He, however, who, with opposite requirements (no longer Epicurean) and with some divine hammer in his hand, could approach this almost voluntary degeneration and stunting of mankind, as exemplified in the European Christian (Pascal, for instance), would he not have to cry aloud with rage, pity, and horror: “Oh, you bunglers, presumptuous pitiful bunglers, what have you done! Was that a work for your hands? How you have hacked and botched my finest stone! What have you presumed to do!”—I should say that Christianity has hitherto been the most portentous of presumptions. Men, not great enough, nor hard enough, to be entitled as artists to take part in fashioning man; men, not sufficiently strong and farsighted to allow, with sublime self-constraint, the obvious law of the thousandfold failures and perishings to prevail; men, not sufficiently noble to see the radically different grades of rank and intervals of rank that separate man from man:—such men, with their “equality before God,” have hitherto swayed the destiny of Europe; until at last a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced, a gregarious animal, something obliging, sickly, mediocre, the European of the present day.

63

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

63#

He who is a thorough teacher takes things seriously—and even himself—only in relation to his pupils.

64

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

64#

“Knowledge for its own sake”—that is the last snare laid by morality: we are thereby completely entangled in morals once more.

65

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

65#

The charm of knowledge would be small, were it not so much shame has to be overcome on the way to it.

65a

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

65a#

We are most dishonourable towards our God: he is not permitted to sin.

66

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

66#

The tendency of a person to allow himself to be degraded, robbed, deceived, and exploited might be the diffidence of a God among men.

67

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

67#

Love to one only is a barbarity, for it is exercised at the expense of all others. Love to God also!

68

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

68#

“I did that,” says my memory. “I could not have done that,” says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually—the memory yields.

69

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

69#

One has regarded life carelessly, if one has failed to see the hand that—kills with leniency.

7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

7#

How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more stinging than the joke Epicurus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers took the liberty of making on Plato ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Philosophers and the Platonists ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools ; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its original sense, and on the face of it, the word signifies “Flatterers of Dionysius”—consequently, tyrants’ accessories and lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as to say, “They are all actors, there is nothing genuine about them” (for Dionysiokolax was a popular name for an actor). And the latter is really the malignant reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he was annoyed by the grandiose manner, the mise-en-scène style of which Plato and his scholars were masters—of which Epicurus was not a master! He, the old schoolteacher of Samos, who sat concealed in his little garden at Athens, and wrote three hundred books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of Plato, who knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the garden-god Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out?

70

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

70#

If a man has character, he has also his typical experience, which always recurs.

71

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

71#

The Sage as Astronomer.—So long as thou feelest the stars as an “above thee,” thou lackest the eye of the discerning one.

72

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

72#

It is not the strength, but the duration of great sentiments that makes great men.

73

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

73#

He who attains his ideal, precisely thereby surpasses it.

73a

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

73a#

Many a peacock hides his tail from every eye—and calls it his pride.

74

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

74#

A man of genius is unbearable, unless he possess at least two things besides: gratitude and purity.

75

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

75#

The degree and nature of a man’s sensuality extends to the highest altitudes of his spirit.

76

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

76#

Under peaceful conditions the militant man attacks himself.

77

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

77#

With his principles a man seeks either to dominate, or justify, or honour, or reproach, or conceal his habits: two men with the same principles probably seek fundamentally different ends therewith.

78

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

78#

He who despises himself, nevertheless esteems himself thereby, as a despiser.

79

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

79#

A soul which knows that it is loved, but does not itself love, betrays its sediment: its dregs come up.

8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

8#

There is a point in every Philosophy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil at which the “ Conviction ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Epistemology ” of the Philosopher ↖ Beyond Good and Evil appears on the scene; or, to put it in the words of an ancient mystery:

Adventavit asinus,Pulcher et fortissimus.

80

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

80#

A thing that is explained ceases to concern us—What did the God mean who gave the advice, “Know thyself!” Did it perhaps imply “Cease to be concerned about thyself! become objective!”—And Socrates?—And the “scientific man”?

81

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

81#

It is terrible to die of thirst at sea. Is it necessary that you should so salt your truth that it will no longer—quench thirst?

82

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

82#

“Sympathy for all”—would be harshness and tyranny for thee, my good neighbour.

83

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

83#

Instinct.—When the house is on fire one forgets even the dinner.—Yes, but one recovers it from among the ashes.

84

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

84#

Woman learns how to hate in proportion as she—forgets how to charm.

85

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

85#

The same emotions are in man and woman, but in different tempo, on that account man and woman never cease to misunderstand each other.

86

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

86#

In the background of all their personal vanity, women themselves have still their impersonal scorn—for “woman.”

87

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

87#

Fettered Heart, Free Spirit.—When one firmly fetters one’s heart and keeps it prisoner, one can allow one’s spirit many liberties: I said this once before. But people do not believe it when I say so, unless they know it already.

88

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

88#

One begins to distrust very clever persons when they become embarrassed.

89

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

89#

Dreadful experiences raise the question whether he who experiences them is not something dreadful also.

9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

9#

You desire to live “according to Nature ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Meditations ↖ Metaphysics ”? Oh, you noble Stoics ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophical Schools , what fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like Nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves indifference as a power—how could you live in accordance with such indifference? To live—is not that just endeavouring to be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And granted that your imperative, “living according to Nature,” means actually the same as “living according to life”—how could you do differently? Why should you make a principle out of what you yourselves are, and must be? In reality, however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature “according to the Stoa,” and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature falsely, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise—and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that because you are able to tyrannize over yourselves—Stoicism is Self-tyranny ↖ Beyond Good and Evil —Nature will also allow herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic a part of Nature? … But this is an old and everlasting story: what happened in old times with the Stoics still happens today, as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Nietzschean Concepts ↖ Will Concepts , the will to “creation of the world,” the will to the causa prima.

90

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

90#

Heavy, melancholy men turn lighter, and come temporarily to their surface, precisely by that which makes others heavy—by hatred and love.

91

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

91#

So cold, so icy, that one burns one’s finger at the touch of him! Every hand that lays hold of him shrinks back!—And for that very reason many think him red-hot.

92

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

92#

Who has not, at one time or another—sacrificed himself for the sake of his good name?

93

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

93#

In affability there is no hatred of men, but precisely on that account a great deal too much contempt of men.

94

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

94#

The maturity of man—that means, to have reacquired the seriousness that one had as a child at play.

95

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

95#

To be ashamed of one’s immorality is a step on the ladder at the end of which one is ashamed also of one’s morality.

96

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

96#

One should part from life as Ulysses parted from Nausicaa—blessing it rather than in love with it.

97

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

97#

What? A great man? I always see merely the playactor of his own ideal.

98

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

98#

When one trains one’s conscience, it kisses one while it bites.

99

Amour-passion#

Summary#

Nietzsche employs the French term amour-passion to describe passionate romantic love as a cultural-historical phenomenon rather than a natural given. He argues paradoxically that it was precisely during the most Christian period of European history, under the pressure of Christian sentiments, that the sexual impulse became sublimated into this form of love. This sublimation represents for Nietzsche an instance of how periods of moral fanaticism and restraint can purify and sharpen certain impulses rather than simply suppress them.

Anarchy

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Anarchy#

Summary#

Anarchy represents the threat of instinctual disorder, a condition where the hierarchy of drives within an individual or society breaks down. It is associated with corruption, signaling that the foundational emotions called “life” are being convulsed. In this view, anarchy is not merely political chaos but a deeper dissolution of the ordering principles that sustain healthy functioning.

Mentioned In#

258 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Ancient Cultures

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Ancient Cultures#

Summary#

The ancient cultures examined in these texts serve as exemplars of distinct approaches to power, virtue, and governance. Machiavelli presents the Romans as masters of prudent statecraft who methodically maintained dominion through colonial settlements, calculated alliances, and the decisive destruction of rebellious cities like Carthage and Numantia. Nietzsche treats the Greeks as representatives of a noble religious attitude marked by gratitude toward existence, while he credits the Jews with performing a revolutionary inversion of aristocratic values that gave birth to slave morality. The Stoics and Brahmins appear as philosophical-priestly castes who developed sophisticated techniques for spiritual discipline and political influence, each representing a different strategy for managing the relationship between power and restraint.

Ancient Greeks

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Ancient Greeks#

Summary#

The ancient Greeks are distinguished by their religious attitude of overflowing gratitude towards nature and life, marking them as a superior type of humanity. This noble stance contrasts with later developments when the populace gained influence, bringing fear into religion and paving the way for Christianity.

Mentioned In#

49 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Mentioned In#

198 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Mentioned In#

55 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Atavism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Atavism#

Summary#

Nietzsche uses atavism to describe how philosophical ideas are not autonomous inventions but ancestral inheritances. Philosophizing is characterized as “atavism of the highest order,” a remembering and homecoming to an ancient common-household of the soul from which ideas originally grew. This explains the family resemblance among Indian, Greek, and German philosophies, which share grammatical structures that unconsciously guide similar patterns of thought.

Mentioned In#

20 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Atheism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Atheism#

Summary#

Modern atheism arises from the refutation of God’s traditional attributes: “the father,” “the judge,” and “the rewarder.” God appears incapable of hearing, helping, or communicating himself clearly. Yet while European theism declines, the religious instinct itself remains vigorous—it simply rejects theistic satisfaction with profound distrust.

Mentioned In#

53 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Mentioned In#

252 ↖ VIII. Peoples and Countries

Mentioned In#

36 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Beyond Good and Evil

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Beyond Good and Evil#

Summary#

“Beyond Good and Evil” represents a philosophical stance that transcends traditional moral valuations of truth and falsehood. It is the position of recognizing untruth as a condition of life, acknowledging that logical fictions and false opinions are indispensable for human existence. This formula distinguishes genuine free spirits from mere “freethinkers” who advocate modern democratic ideals, marking instead those who understand that severity, danger, and the Will to Power serve human elevation as much as their opposites.

Beyond Good and Evil

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Beyond Good and Evil#

Parts#

I. Prejudices of Philosophers

II. The Free Spirit

III. The Religious Mood

IV. Apophthegms and Interludes

V. The Natural History of Morals

VI. We Scholars

VII. Our Virtues

VIII. Peoples and Countries

IX. What Is Noble?

Concepts#

Alcibiades

Amour-passion

Anarchy ↖ Politics

Ancient Greeks ↖ Ancient Cultures

Ariadne

Aristocracy ↖ Politics ↖ Power Dynamics

Aristocratic morality ↖ Moral Systems

Aristocratic society ↖ Power Dynamics

Aristocratic values

Aristophanes

Aristotle ↖ Philosophers

Ascetic

Asceticism

Book I

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book I#

Book II

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book II#

Book III

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book III#

Book IV

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book IV#

Book IX

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book IX#

Book V

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book V#

Book VI

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book VI#

Book VII

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book VII#

Book VIII

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book VIII#

Book X

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book X#

Book XI

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book XI#

Book XII

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Book XII#

Boscovich

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Boscovich#

Summary#

Nietzsche praises the Polish physicist Boscovich alongside Copernicus as one of the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular evidence. While Copernicus persuaded humanity that the earth does not stand fast, Boscovich taught us to abjure belief in the last thing that “stood fast”—substance, matter, the particle-atom. His refutation of materialistic atomism represents the greatest triumph over the senses yet achieved on earth.

Mentioned In#

12 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Brahmins

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Brahmins#

Caesar Borgia

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Caesar Borgia#

Summary#

Caesar Borgia serves as Nietzsche’s prime example of the “man of prey” - a figure of natural vitality and health whom conventional moralists wrongly condemn as morbid or corrupt. Nietzsche argues that such “tropical men” represent the healthiest specimens of humanity, misunderstood by those who favor mediocrity and the “temperate zones” of moral timidity.

Mentioned In#

197 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Categorical imperative

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Categorical imperative#

Summary#

Nietzsche subjects Kant’s categorical imperative to sustained critique in Beyond Good and Evil. He characterizes Kant’s dialectical method as a form of Tartuffery, using clever arguments to lead readers toward a predetermined moral conclusion that reflects Kant’s personal desires rather than genuine philosophical discovery. Nietzsche further suggests that assertions like “there is a categorical imperative in us” reveal more about the asserter’s psychology than about moral truth, indicating Kant’s demand that others obey as he himself knows how to obey.

Categories#

Philosophers ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Philosophical Schools

Politics

Power Dynamics

Religion ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Catholicism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Catholicism#

Summary#

Nietzsche views Catholicism as deeply intertwined with the spirit of the Latin races, such that unbelief among Catholics represents a revolt against their racial character. He contrasts this with Northern peoples, for whom Christianity is foreign and abandoning it means returning to their native spirit. Even French skeptics with Celtic blood retain a Catholic quality in their thinking, exhibiting a “Roman logic” and religious sensibility that appears alien to German souls.

Causa sui

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Causa sui#

Summary#

Causa sui, meaning “cause of itself,” is described as the best self-contradiction ever conceived, a logical violation and unnaturalness. Nietzsche connects it to human pride and the desire for absolute free will, arguing that to claim ultimate responsibility for one’s actions requires the absurdity of pulling oneself into existence out of nothingness. The concept demonstrates a fundamental impossibility: if our organs created the external world, and our body is part of that world, then our organs would be the work of our organs, a complete reductio ad absurdum.

Causality

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Causality#

Summary#

Nietzsche argues that we should not assume multiple kinds of causality when a single one might suffice. He proposes that our belief in causality is fundamentally rooted in our belief in the causality of the will—that will can only operate on will. This leads to the hypothesis that all mechanical action and active force might ultimately be reducible to the Will to Power as the sole form of causality.

Cave

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Cave#

Summary#

The cave serves as Nietzsche’s metaphor for the hidden depths of the philosopher’s soul, where the recluse sits alone in discourse with himself, becoming like a cave-bear or dragon guarding treasure. Behind every cave lies a still deeper cave, an abyss beneath every foundation, suggesting that all philosophy is merely “foreground philosophy” and every expressed opinion conceals deeper, unexpressed truths.

Mentioned In#

289 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Cesare Borgia

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Cesare Borgia#

Summary#

Machiavelli presents Cesare Borgia as the exemplary new prince throughout The Prince. Borgia acquired his state through his father Pope Alexander VI’s fortune, yet demonstrated extraordinary ability in consolidating power: he crushed opposing factions, built loyal forces, instituted effective governance in the Romagna, and used calculated cruelty to restore order before distancing himself from its excesses. Though ultimately undone by illness at his father’s death, Machiavelli argues that Borgia’s methods deserve imitation by any prince who rises through others’ fortune. Borgia’s calculated shift from auxiliary to mercenary to his own forces illustrates the principle that a prince must master his own arms to secure lasting power.

Change

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Change#

Summary#

Change is presented as the fundamental law of nature in which all things participate endlessly. Marcus Aurelius argues that loss is nothing but change, and that universal nature delights in this constant transformation. Rather than resisting change or viewing it as harmful, one should recognize that all things are formed to change and perish so that other things may exist in continuous succession.

Mentioned In#

Christian faith

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Christian faith#

Summary#

Christian faith is characterized as a sacrifice of freedom, pride, and self-confidence of spirit, involving subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation. It demands a painful subjugation of reason, resembling a continuous suicide of the intellect. The formula “God on the Cross” represented an unprecedented boldness in inversion, promising a transvaluation of all ancient values, originating from the profound Orient as revenge against Rome’s noble, light-minded toleration.

Mentioned In#

46 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Christian scheme

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Christian scheme#

Summary#

The Christian scheme refers to the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything that happens according to a Christian framework, rediscovering and justifying the Christian God in every occurrence. This disciplinary constraint, though violent and arbitrary, proved itself a means whereby the European spirit attained its strength, curiosity, and subtle mobility. The long bondage of thought to Christian interpretation, like other forms of intellectual tyranny, served paradoxically as a tool of spiritual education and development.

Christian sentiments

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Christian sentiments#

Summary#

Christian sentiments are presented as a form of moral pressure that functioned like an intercalary period of restraint and fasting in European history. Under this pressure, impulses learned to humble and submit themselves while simultaneously being purified and sharpened. It was precisely during the most Christian period of European history, under the constraint of these sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated into romantic love.

Mentioned In#

189 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Christianity

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Christianity#

Summary#

Christianity is presented as the great teacher of “soul-atomism”—the belief in an indestructible, eternal, indivisible soul—which the author considers a superstition that must be overcome. The religion arose when fear became rampant among the populace, displacing the gratitude-based spirituality of the ancient Greeks. As a religion for sufferers, Christianity has systematically preserved the weak and sick while working to shatter the strong and autonomous, inverting all values to produce a diminished, mediocre European humanity.

Christo-European morality

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Christo-European morality#

Mentioned In#

210 ↖ VI. We Scholars

Mentioned In#

240 ↖ VIII. Peoples and Countries

Dedication

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Dedication#

To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici:

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.

Democratic instincts

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Democratic instincts#

Summary#

Nietzsche uses “democratic instincts” to criticize the modern tendency to project egalitarian values onto nature itself. When physicists speak of “Nature’s conformity to law” and “equality before the law,” they are not describing objective reality but rather disguising their antagonism to everything privileged and autocratic. This represents a form of “refined atheism” that replaces God with the democratic motto “Ni dieu, ni maître” while claiming scientific neutrality.

Democratic movement

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Democratic movement#

Mentioned In#

Epicureanism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Epicureanism#

Summary#

Epicureanism is presented as a philosophy of the weak, a “soothing medicine” sought by those who wish to end the internal war of conflicting instincts within themselves. It represents a longing for repose, undisturbedness, and final unity—the happiness of those who cannot master their contradictory nature but instead seek escape from inner conflict.

Mentioned In#

200 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Epicurism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Epicurism#

Summary#

Nietzsche presents Epicurism as one of the refined disguises adopted by those who have suffered profoundly. Rather than a genuine philosophical stance, it serves as a mask of ostentatious gaiety and lightness toward suffering, allowing the deeply wounded to deflect sympathizing hands and protect themselves from those who cannot understand their experience. The Epicurist posture of taking suffering lightly is thus a deliberate strategy of the noble sufferer who wishes to be misunderstood.

Epicurus

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Epicurus#

Summary#

Epicurus appears in these texts as both exemplar and critic. Marcus Aurelius praises him for maintaining philosophical discourse during illness, refusing to let bodily suffering disturb his mind or give physicians undue importance. Nietzsche, however, portrays Epicurus as a malicious critic who mocked Plato and the Platonists as mere actors, perhaps out of envy from his hidden garden in Athens where he wrote prolifically in obscurity.

Mentioned In#

Meditations#

IX.42 ↖ Book IX

Beyond Good and Evil#

7 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Epistemological skepticism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Epistemological skepticism#

Summary#

Nietzsche characterizes modern philosophy since Descartes as epistemological skepticism, describing it as an attack on the old conception of the soul disguised as criticism of subject-predicate relations. This skepticism is secretly or openly anti-Christian, though not necessarily anti-religious, as it undermines the fundamental presupposition of Christian doctrine by questioning whether the “I” is truly the condition of thinking or merely a synthesis made by thinking itself.

Mentioned In#

54 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Epistemology

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Epistemology#

Summary#

The epistemological concerns across these texts reveal a tension between the pursuit of truth and the recognition of its limits or dangers. Marcus Aurelius holds truth as a virtue produced by the soul’s highest faculty, something to be perceived through inner illumination when the mind maintains its proper form. Nietzsche radically challenges this classical confidence, questioning whether truth is inherently more valuable than illusion and arguing that all knowledge is necessarily perspectival and involves a form of cruelty toward oneself. He suggests that the “will to truth” may itself originate from the will to deception, and that the strength of a mind might be measured by how much truth it can endure rather than by how much certainty it possesses.

Ernest Renan

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Ernest Renan#

Summary#

Nietzsche cites Renan as exemplifying the Celtic-Catholic religious temperament inaccessible to Northern Europeans. He describes Renan as possessing a refined, voluptuous soul that is thrown off balance by the slightest touch of religious thrill. Though Nietzsche initially responded to Renan’s pious assertions with rage, calling them “religious silliness par excellence,” he came to appreciate them precisely as antipodal to his own thought.

Mentioned In#

48 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Erroneousness of the world

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Erroneousness of the world#

Summary#

Nietzsche argues that the erroneousness of the world we perceive is the surest thing philosophy can establish. Rather than attributing this falseness to a deceptive principle or to thinking itself, he suggests we should accept that life depends upon perspective estimates and semblances. The very opposition between “true” and “false” may be nothing more than a moral prejudice, and the world that concerns us might itself be a fiction.

Eternal recurrence

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Eternal recurrence#

Summary#

Eternal recurrence emerges as the opposite ideal to pessimism and world-renunciation. It represents the most world-approving attitude: the desire to have everything that was and is repeat for all eternity, insatiably calling out “da capo” to the whole of existence. This ideal belongs to the most exuberant and vivacious person who not only accepts reality but actively wills its eternal return.

Mentioned In#

56 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Mentioned In#

259 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Faith and Knowledge

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Faith and Knowledge#

Summary#

Nietzsche reframes the old theological problem of “Faith” and “Knowledge” as fundamentally a question of instinct versus reason—whether instinct deserves more authority than rationality in the valuation of things. Since Socrates, who sided with reason yet secretly recognized its limits, and through Plato who tried to harmonize both toward “the good,” philosophers and theologians have followed a path where instinct (or “Faith,” or “the herd”) has ultimately triumphed over pure reason.

Fear

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Fear#

Summary#

Fear is presented as the corrupting force that entered Greek religious life when the populace gained dominance, replacing the noble attitude of gratitude that characterized the superior religious sensibility of the ancient Greeks. It represents the psychological foundation upon which Christianity was built, marking a decline from the affirmative religious stance toward nature and life.

Mentioned In#

49 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Mentioned In#

Mentioned In#

38 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Fundamental will of the spirit

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Fundamental will of the spirit#

Mentioned In#

27 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Gender Relationships

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Gender Relationships#

Woman ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Love for mankind ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Passion for God ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Sympathy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Psychology

Genius of the heart

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Genius of the heart#

Mentioned In#

25 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Mentioned In#

49 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Mentioned In#

270 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Mentioned In#

204 ↖ VI. We Scholars

Mentioned In#

202 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Higher culture

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Higher culture#

Summary#

For Nietzsche, higher culture is fundamentally rooted in cruelty that has been spiritualized and refined rather than eliminated. The “wild beast” of human nature has not been slain by civilization but merely transfigured, with cruelty persisting in sublimated forms across tragedy, religious ecstasy, asceticism, and even the pursuit of knowledge. What humanity proudly calls its cultural achievements represents not the conquest of cruelty but its internalization and elevation into refined pleasures.

Hobbes

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Hobbes#

Summary#

Hobbes appears as the “genuine Englishman” who condemned laughter as “a bad infirmity of human nature, which every thinking mind will strive to overcome.” Nietzsche positions Hobbes as a foil to his own philosophy, which instead ranks philosophers by the quality of their laughter and suggests that even gods cannot refrain from laughing at serious matters.

Mentioned In#

294 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Mentioned In#

45 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Hume

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Hume#

Summary#

Nietzsche places Hume among the English philosophers who represent “an abasement and depreciation of the idea of a ‘philosopher.’” Along with Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, Hume is seen as contributing to the mechanical stultification of the world and the weakening of the philosophical spirit. Notably, it was against Hume that Kant “uprose and raised himself,” suggesting that Hume’s skepticism served as a catalyst for German idealist philosophy.

Mentioned In#

252 ↖ VIII. Peoples and Countries

I. How Many Kinds of Principalities There Are, and by What Means They Are Acquired

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I. How Many Kinds of Principalities There Are, and by What Means They Are Acquired#

All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of Spain.

I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I. Prejudices of Philosophers#

I.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.1#

From my grandfather Verus I learned good morals and the government of my temper.

I.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.10#

From Alexander the grammarian, to refrain from faultfinding, and not in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or solecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce the very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of answer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion.

I.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.11#

From Fronto I learned to observe what envy, and duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are called Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection.

I.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.12#

From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity to say to anyone, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor continually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.

I.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.13#

From Catulus, not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, even if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him to his usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children truly.

I.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.14#

From my brother Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus; and from him I received the idea of a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed; I learned from him also consistency and undeviating steadiness in my regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give to others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am loved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of his opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends had no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was quite plain.

I.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.15#

From Maximus I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness; and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity, and to do what was set before me without complaining. I observed that everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in all that he did he never had any bad intention; and he never showed amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious. He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he presented the appearance of a man who could not be diverted from right rather than of a man who had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way.

I.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.16#

In my father I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable resolution in the things which he had determined after due deliberation; and no vainglory in those things which men call honours; and a love of labour and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to those who had anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating firmness in giving to every man according to his deserts; and a knowledge derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action and for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all passion for boys; and he considered himself no more than any other citizen; and he released his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all matters of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped his investigation through being satisfied with appearances which first present themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his friends, and not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without display; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery; and to be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for the administration of the empire, and to be a good manager of the expenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for such conduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering the populace; but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, and never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things which conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without excusing himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a homebred flippant slave or a pedant; but everyone acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and other men’s affairs. Besides this, he honoured those who were true philosophers, and he did not reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself agreeable without any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of his body’s health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so that, through his own attention, he very seldom stood in need of the physician’s art or of medicine or external applications. He was most ready to give way without envy to those who possessed any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything else; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy reputation according to his deserts; and he always acted conformably to the institutions of his country, without showing any affectation of doing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved to stay in the same places, and to employ himself about the same things; and after his paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and vigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not but very few and very rare, and these only about public matters; and he showed prudence and economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction of public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not to the reputation which is got by a man’s acts. He did not take the bath at unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious about what he ate, nor about the texture and colour of his clothes, nor about the beauty of his slaves. His dress came from Lorium, his villa on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally. We know how he behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was all his behaviour. There was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the sweating point; but he examined all things severally, as if he had abundance of time, and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and consistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded of Socrates, that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy without excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus.

I.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.17#

To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a disposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do something of this kind; but, through their favour, there never was such a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with my grandfather’s concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my youth, and that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season, but even deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and a father who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues, and suchlike show; but that it is in such a man’s power to bring himself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a brother, who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance over myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by his respect and affection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body; that I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I had seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to place those who brought me up in the station of honour, which they seemed to desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some time after, because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions about living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and through not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long in such a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was cured; and, though I was often out of humour with Rusticus, I never did anything of which I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my mother’s fate to die young, she spent the last years of her life with me; that, whenever I wished to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I was never told that I had not the means of doing it; and that to myself the same necessity never happened, to receive anything from another; that I have such a wife, so obedient, and so affectionate, and so simple; that I had abundance of good masters for my children; and that remedies have been shown to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting and giddiness … ; and that, when I had an inclination to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers of histories, or in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself about the investigation of appearances in the heavens; for all these things require the help of the gods and fortune.

I.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.2#

From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a manly character.

I.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.3#

From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.

I.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.4#

From my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools, and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things a man should spend liberally.

I.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.5#

From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators’ fights; from him too I learned endurance of labour, and to want little, and to work with my own hands, and not to meddle with other people’s affairs, and not to be ready to listen to slander.

I.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.6#

From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and not to breed quails for fighting, nor to give myself up passionately to such things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become intimate with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my youth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline.

I.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.7#

From Rusticus I received the impression that my character required improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who practises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to make a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they have shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not to be satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily to give my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him for being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated to me out of his own collection.

I.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.8#

From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see clearly in a living example that the same man can be both most resolute and yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had before my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his skill in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his merits; and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are esteemed favours, without being either humbled by them or letting them pass unnoticed.

I.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

I.9#

From Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after the interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those who form opinions without consideration: he had the power of readily accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly venerated by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty both of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate; and he could express approbation without noisy display, and he possessed much knowledge without ostentation.

Idealists

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Idealists#

Summary#

Idealists are those enthusiastic about the good, true, and beautiful, who let all kinds of “motley, coarse, and good-natured desirabilities swim about promiscuously in their pond.” Nietzsche criticizes them for conflating happiness and virtue with truth, readily accepting doctrines simply because they make people happy or virtuous rather than because they correspond to reality.

Mentioned In#

39 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

II. Concerning Hereditary Principalities

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II. Concerning Hereditary Principalities#

I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

II. The Free Spirit

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II. The Free Spirit#

II.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.1#

Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not only of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in the same intelligence and the same portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away.

II.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.10#

Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts—such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—says, like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through desire are more blameable than those which are committed through anger. For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed with pleasure is more blameable than that which is committed with pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something by desire.

II.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.11#

Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in man’s power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be altogether in a man’s power not to fall into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man’s life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having the knowledge, but not the power to guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.

II.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.12#

How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies themselves, but in time the remembrance of them; what is the nature of all sensible things, and particularly those which attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapoury fame; how worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they are—all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give reputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their parts all the things which present themselves to the imagination in it, he will then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of nature; and if anyone is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man comes near to the deity, and by what part of him, and when this part of man is so disposed.

II.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.13#

Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says, and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbours, without perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him, and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit veneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be dear to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move our pity by reason of men’s ignorance of good and bad; this defect being not less than that which deprives us of the power of distinguishing things that are white and black.

II.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.14#

Though thou shouldst be going to live three thousand years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the same. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes is not the same; and so that which is lost appears to be a mere moment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a man has not, how can anyone take this from him? These two things then thou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of like forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years or two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the only thing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is the only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he has it not.

II.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.15#

Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.

II.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.16#

The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end; and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and polity.

II.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.17#

Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judgement. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man’s doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature.

II.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.2#

Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the ruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is not allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is blood and bones and a network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath also, what kind of a thing it is, air, and not always the same, but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The third then is the ruling part: consider thus: Thou art an old man; no longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer either be dissatisfied with thy present lot, or shrink from the future.

II.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.3#

All that is from the gods is full of Providence. That which is from fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and involution with the things which are ordered by Providence. From thence all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that is good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things compounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee, let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart thankful to the gods.

II.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.4#

Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art a part, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never return.

II.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.5#

Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing more from him who observes these things.

II.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.6#

Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no longer have the opportunity of honouring thyself. Every man’s life is sufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences not itself but places thy felicity in the souls of others.

II.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.7#

Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give thyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled around. But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other way. For those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by their activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every movement, and, in a word, all their thoughts.

II.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.8#

Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

II.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

II.9#

This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole, and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind of a part it is of what kind of a whole; and that there is no one who hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are according to the nature of which thou art a part.

III. Concerning Mixed Principalities

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III. Concerning Mixed Principalities#

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.

III. The Religious Mood

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III. The Religious Mood#

III.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.1#

We ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away and a smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken into the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite uncertain whether the understanding will still continue sufficient for the comprehension of things, and retain the power of contemplation which strives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human. For if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and imagination and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will not fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and considering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever else of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason, all this is already extinguished. We must make haste then, not only because we are daily nearer to death, but also because the conception of things and the understanding of them cease first.

III.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.10#

Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and besides bear in mind that every man lives only this present time, which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is either past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man lives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too the longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a succession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.

III.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.11#

To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:—Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an impression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect to it, such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should say: this comes from God; and this is according to the apportionment and spinning of the thread of destiny, and suchlike coincidence and chance; and this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one who knows not however what is according to his nature. But I know; for this reason I behave towards him according to the natural law of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At the same time however in things indifferent I attempt to ascertain the value of each.

III.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.12#

If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is able to prevent this.

III.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.13#

As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary.

III.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.14#

No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own memoirs, nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the selections from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age. Hasten then to the end which thou hast before thee, and throwing away idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy power.

III.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.15#

They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing, sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this is not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision.

III.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.16#

Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the impressions of forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals; to be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and to have the intelligence that guides to the things which appear suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods, and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they have shut the doors. If then everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to his lot.

III.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.2#

We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker’s art, are beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion’s eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and many other things—though they are far from being beautiful, if a man should examine them severally—still, because they are consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help to adorn them, and they please the mind; so that if a man should have a feeling and deeper insight with respect to the things which are produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which follow by way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner disposed so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which painters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old woman and an old man he will be able to see a certain maturity and comeliness; and the attractive loveliness of young persons he will be able to look on with chaste eyes; and many such things will present themselves, not pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar with nature and her works.

III.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.3#

Hippocrates after curing many diseases himself fell sick and died. The Chaldæi foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them too. Alexander, and Pompeius, and Caius Caesar, after so often completely destroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagration of the universe, was filled with water internally and died smeared all over with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed Socrates. What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is intelligence and deity; the other is earth and corruption.

III.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.4#

Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility. For thou losest the opportunity of doing something else when thou hast such thoughts as these, What is such a person doing, and why, and what is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving, and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from the observation of our own ruling power. We ought then to check in the series of our thoughts everything that is without a purpose and useless, but most of all the overcurious feeling and the malignant; and a man should use himself to think of those things only about which if one should suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? With perfect openness thou mightest, immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy words it should be plain that everything in thee is simple and benevolent, and such as befits a social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts about pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or envy and suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is such and no longer delays being among the number of the best, is like a priest and minister of the gods, using too the deity which is planted within him, which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure, unharmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed deep with justice, accepting with all his soul everything which happens and is assigned to him as his portion; and not often, nor yet without great necessity and for the general interest, imagining what another says, or does, or thinks. For it is only what belongs to himself that he makes the matter for his activity; and he constantly thinks of that which is allotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man is carried along with him and carries him along with it. And he remembers also that every rational animal is his kinsman, and that to care for all men is according to man’s nature; and a man should hold on to the opinion not of all, but of those only who confessedly live according to nature. But as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what kind of men they are both at home and from home, both by night and by day, and what they are, and with what men they live an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise which comes from such men, since they are not even satisfied with themselves.

III.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.5#

Labour not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest, nor without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied ornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words, or busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is in thee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life, and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any man’s testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not external help nor the tranquility which others give. A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others.

III.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.6#

If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own mind’s self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do according to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to thee without thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better than this, turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best. But if nothing appears to be better than the deity which is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou findest everything else smaller and of less value than this, give place to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without distraction be able to give the preference to that good thing which is thy proper possession and thy own; for it is not right that anything of any other kind, such as praise from the many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition with that which is rationally and politically or practically good. All these things, even though they may seem to adapt themselves to the better things in a small degree, obtain the superiority all at once, and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the better, and hold to it.—But that which is useful is the better.—Well then, if it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it; but if it is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy judgement without arrogance: only take care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure method.

III.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.7#

Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel thee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which needs walls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything intelligence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much company; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either pursuing or flying from death; but whether for a longer or a shorter time he shall have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares not at all: for even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he were going to do anything else which can be done with decency and order; taking care of this only all through life, that his thoughts turn not away from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and a member of a civil community.

III.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.8#

In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who leaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound to other things, nor yet detached from other things, nothing worthy of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.

III.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

III.9#

Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it entirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational animal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgement, and friendship towards men, and obedience to the gods.

Immediate certainty

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Immediate certainty#

Summary#

Nietzsche critiques “immediate certainty” as a philosophical illusion, arguing that statements like “I think” involve a series of unproven metaphysical assumptions rather than self-evident truths. He contends that immediate certainty, along with “absolute knowledge” and “thing in itself,” constitutes a contradictio in adjecto. What appears as direct knowledge actually depends on prior concepts, comparisons with past mental states, and assumptions about causation and the existence of an “ego.”

Impermanence

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Impermanence#

Summary#

All things are formed by nature to change, perish, and give way to continuous succession. Marcus Aurelius likens human lives to leaves that spring forth, are cast down by the wind, and are replaced by others in an endless cycle. By contemplating the rapid transformation of all things and the eternity of time, one learns to despise attachment to the perishable and recognize that even the earth itself will change.

Impulse to knowledge

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Impulse to knowledge#

Summary#

Nietzsche questions whether the “impulse to knowledge” is truly the driving force behind philosophy. He argues that other fundamental impulses use knowledge merely as an instrument, with each impulse attempting to establish itself as the ultimate end of existence. While scholars may possess a genuine, small “impulse to knowledge” that works independently like clockwork, philosophers are driven by deeper moral purposes that reveal their true nature.

Independence

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Independence#

Summary#

Independence is a rare privilege reserved for the strong, and pursuing it without genuine inner necessity is dangerous beyond measure. One who seeks independence enters a labyrinth of isolation, multiplying life’s dangers and risking being torn apart by one’s own conscience. True independence requires subjecting oneself to rigorous tests: refusing attachment to persons, fatherlands, sympathies, sciences, or even one’s own virtues. The ultimate test of independence is knowing how to conserve oneself.

Index

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Index#

Indo-Germanic philosophy

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Indo-Germanic philosophy#

Summary#

Nietzsche argues that Indian, Greek, and German philosophies share a “wonderful family resemblance” rooted in common grammatical structures. The unconscious domination of similar linguistic functions prepares thinkers within these traditions for parallel philosophical developments, while barring certain other possibilities of world-interpretation. Philosophers within different language families, such as the Ural-Altaic, likely perceive the world quite differently due to these grammatical and physiological constraints.

Mentioned In#

20 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Instinct and Reason

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Instinct and Reason#

Summary#

The conflict between instinct and reason is framed as the old theological problem of “Faith” versus “Knowledge”—whether instinct deserves more authority than rationality in the valuation of things. Socrates took the side of reason but secretly recognized its limits, arriving at a self-outwitting compromise where instincts should be followed while reason provides supporting arguments. Since Plato, philosophers and theologians have tried to reconcile the two, but in matters of morality, instinct (or “the herd”) has ultimately triumphed.

Intellectual conscience

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Intellectual conscience#

Summary#

Nietzsche describes the intellectual conscience as a kind of cruelty that drives the courageous thinker to take things profoundly, variously, and thoroughly. This sublime tendency operates counter to the spirit’s natural propensity for simplification, disguise, and appearance. Every thinker who has sufficiently hardened his eye for introspection will acknowledge this cruel element within himself, though it might be more palatable to call it “extravagant honesty.”

Mentioned In#

230 ↖ VII. Our Virtues

Mentioned In#

195 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Isolation

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Isolation#

Summary#

Isolation is presented as a danger that befalls those who pursue independence without being compelled to do so. When one enters the labyrinth of self-determination, they multiply life’s dangers and risk becoming isolated, cut off from the comprehension and sympathy of others. This isolation is irreversible: once one has ventured too far into independence, they cannot return to the ordinary human connection they have left behind.

Mentioned In#

29 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

IV. Apophthegms and Interludes

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV. Apophthegms and Interludes#

IV. Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against the Successors of Alexander at His Death

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV. Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against the Successors of Alexander at His Death#

Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.

IV.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.1#

That which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so affected with respect to the events which happen, that it always easily adapts itself to that which is and is presented to it. For it requires no definite material, but it moves towards its purpose, under certain conditions however; and it makes a material for itself out of that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by which a small light would have been extinguished: but when the fire is strong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.

IV.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.10#

The nature of that which is universally useful has been compelled to do this.

IV.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.11#

Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with respect to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect to what is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing its value. Observe then as thou hast begun; and whatever thou doest, do it in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in which a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action.

IV.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.12#

Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in truth.

IV.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.13#

A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one, to do only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may suggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there is anyone at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it appears pleasant or brings reputation.

IV.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.14#

Hast thou reason? I have.—Why then dost not thou use it? For if this does its own work, what else dost thou wish?

IV.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.15#

Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which produced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal principle by transmutation.

IV.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.16#

Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before, another falls after; but it makes no difference.

IV.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.17#

Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the worship of reason.

IV.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.18#

Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.

IV.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.19#

How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his neighbour says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that it may be just and pure; or as Agathon says, look not round at the depraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without deviating from it.

IV.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.2#

Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according to the perfect principles of art.

IV.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.20#

He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal, what then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but what is it to the living? What is praise except indeed so far as it has a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, clinging to something else …

IV.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.21#

Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things and works of art. That which is really beautiful has no need of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not praised? Or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?

IV.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.22#

If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from eternity?—But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these bodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make room for other dead bodies; so the souls which are removed into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there. And this is the answer which a man might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must not only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth receives them by reason of the changes of these bodies into blood, and the transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.

IV.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.23#

What is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division into that which is material and that which is the cause of form, the formal.

IV.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.24#

Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to justice, and on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty of comprehension or understanding.

IV.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.25#

Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature: from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say, Dear city of Zeus?

IV.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.26#

Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil.—But consider if it would not be better to say, Do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is naturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only the tranquility which comes from doing well, but also that which comes from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly on every occasion a man should ask himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take away not only unnecessary acts, but also, unnecessary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts will not follow after.

IV.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.27#

Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own just acts and benevolent disposition.

IV.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.28#

Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does anyone do wrong? It is to himself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well; out of the universe from the beginning everything which happens has been apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice. Be sober in thy relaxation.

IV.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.29#

Either it is a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee, and disorder in the All? And this too when all things are so separated and diffused and sympathetic.

IV.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.3#

Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, seashores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect tranquility; and I affirm that tranquility is nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art thou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at last.—But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned to thee out of the universe.—Recall to thy recollection this alternative; either there is providence or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things; or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of political community, and be quiet at last.—But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon thee.—Consider then further that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and pleasure, and be quiet at last.—But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment thee.—See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of the present, and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness and want of judgement in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space within which it is circumscribed, and be quiet at last. For the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee.

IV.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.30#

A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character, bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyrannical.

IV.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.31#

If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the understanding; he is poor, who has need of another, and has not from himself all things which are useful for life. He is an abscess on the universe who withdraws and separates himself from the reason of our common nature through being displeased with the things which happen, for the same nature produces this, and has produced thee too: he is a piece rent asunder from the state, who tears his own soul from that of reasonable animals, which is one.

IV.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.32#

The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a book: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I abide by reason.—And I do not get the means of living out of my learning, and I abide by my reason.

IV.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.33#

Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be content with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has entrusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man.

IV.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.34#

Consider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all these things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring counsulship, kingly power. Well then, that life of these people no longer exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting themselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance with their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be content with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the attention given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller matters no further than is fit.

IV.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.35#

The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also the names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner antiquated, Camillus, Cæso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after also Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrian and Antoninus. For all things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the matter, what is even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then is that about which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing from a principle and source of the same kind.

IV.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.36#

Willingly give thyself up to Clotho, one of the Fates, allowing her to spin thy thread into whatever things she pleases.

IV.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.37#

Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that which is remembered.

IV.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.38#

Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the Universe loves nothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.

IV.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.39#

Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, not free from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in acting justly.

IV.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.4#

This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy own, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other is that all these things, which thou seest, change immediately and will no longer be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou hast already witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion.

IV.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.40#

Examine men’s ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.

IV.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.41#

What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of another; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. Where is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the power of forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form such opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor body, is burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let the part which forms opinions about these things be quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which can happen equally to the bad man and the good. For that which happens equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives according to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to nature.

IV.42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.42#

Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to one perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all things act with one movement; and how all things are the cooperating causes of all things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and the contexture of the web.

IV.43

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.43#

Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

IV.44

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.44#

It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things to subsist in consequence of change.

IV.45

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.45#

Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away too.

IV.46

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.46#

Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them.

IV.47

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.47#

In the series of things those which follow are always aptly fitted to those which have gone before; for this series is not like a mere enumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are arranged together harmoniously, so the things which come into existence exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship.

IV.48

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.48#

Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth is to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the death of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who forgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with which they are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs the universe; and the things which daily meet with seem to them strange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that we ought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and speak as we have been taught.

IV.49

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.49#

If any god told thee that thou shalt die tomorrow, or certainly on the day after tomorrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was on the third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest degree mean-spirited—for how small is the difference?—So think it no great thing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather than tomorrow.

IV.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.5#

If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will anyone say that the whole human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to nonexistence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source.

IV.50

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.50#

Think continually how many physicians are dead after often contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers after predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how many philosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality; how many heroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used their power over men’s lives with terrible insolence as if they were immortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after burying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him: and all this in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and worthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus tomorrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space of time conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the tree on which it grew.

IV.51

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.51#

Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break, but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.

IV.52

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.52#

Unhappy am I because this has happened to me.—Not so, but happy am I, though this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain, neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing as this might have happened to every man; but every man would not have continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune? And dost thou in all cases call that a man’s misfortune, which is not a deviation from man’s nature? And does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from man’s nature, when it is not contrary to the will of man’s nature? Well, thou knowest the will of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee from being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, and everything else, by the presence of which man’s nature obtains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle: not that this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

IV.53

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.53#

It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death, to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more then have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or anyone else like them, who have carried out many to be buried, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval is small between birth and death; and consider with how much trouble, and in company with what sort of people and in what a feeble body this interval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider life a thing of any value. For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the time which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity then what is the difference between him who lives three days and him who lives three generations?

IV.54

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.54#

Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural: accordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest reason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble, and warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious display.

IV.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.6#

Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; a composition out of the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary to the nature of a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason of our constitution.

IV.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.7#

It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it is a matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind, that within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon not even your names will be left behind.

IV.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.8#

Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, “I have been harmed.” Take away the complaint, “I have been harmed,” and the harm is taken away.

IV.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IV.9#

That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within.

IX. Concerning a Civil Principality

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX. Concerning a Civil Principality#

But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.

IX. What Is Noble?

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX. What Is Noble?#

IX.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.1#

He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things that are; and things that are have a relation to all things that come into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth, and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is equally affected—for it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards both—towards these they who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honour and dishonour, which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are produced in continuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence, according to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, having conceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and having determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of suchlike successions.

IX.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.10#

Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper seasons each produces it. But if usage has especially fixed these terms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces fruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other things of the same kind as reason itself.

IX.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.11#

If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some purposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind they are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee?

IX.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.12#

Labour not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied or admired: but direct thy will to one thing only, to put thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.

IX.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.13#

Today I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.

IX.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.14#

All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in the time of those whom we have buried.

IX.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.15#

Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgement. What is it, then, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.

IX.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.16#

Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity.

IX.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.17#

For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good to have been carried up.

IX.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.18#

Penetrate inwards into men’s leading principles, and thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of themselves.

IX.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.19#

All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too.

IX.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.2#

It would be a man’s happiest lot to depart from mankind without having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. However to breathe out one’s life when a man has had enough of these things is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence of animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of men so far as they are men.

IX.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.20#

It is thy duty to leave another man’s wrongful act there where it is.

IX.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.21#

Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the consideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is this anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under thy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner, then, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole life a thing to be afraid of.

IX.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.22#

Hasten to examine thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe and that of thy neighbour: thy own that thou mayest make it just: and that of the universe, that thou mayest remember of what thou art a part; and that of thy neighbour, that thou mayest know whether he has acted ignorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayest also consider that his ruling faculty is akin to thine.

IX.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.23#

As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let every act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of thine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.

IX.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.24#

Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits carrying about dead bodies, such is everything; and so what is exhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead strikes our eyes more clearly.

IX.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.25#

Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it altogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then determine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is naturally made to endure.

IX.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.26#

Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with thy ruling faculty, when it does the things which it is constituted by nature to do. But enough of this.

IX.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.27#

When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee anything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no reason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion about thee. However thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they set a value.

IX.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.28#

The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down from age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content with that which is the result of its activity; or it puts itself in motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence in a manner; or indivisible elements are the origin of all things.—In a word, if there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou also be governed by it.

IX.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.29#

Soon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and the things also which result from change will continue to change forever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable.

IX.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.3#

Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard and grey hairs, and to beget, and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with the character of a reflecting man, to be neither careless nor impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy wife’s womb, so be ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made best reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou art going to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently; and yet to remember that thy departure will be not from men who have the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be any, which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life, to be permitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the discordance of those who live together, so that thou mayest say, Come quick, O death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself.

IX.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.30#

The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are engaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the philosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about thee to see if anyone will observe it; nor yet expect Plato’s Republic: but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men’s opinions? And without a change of opinions what else is there than the slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell me of Alexander and Philip and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature required, and trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and modest is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to indolence and pride.

IX.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.31#

Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live together, and die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden time, and the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else.

IX.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.32#

Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature.

IX.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.33#

Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe in thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as the equally boundless time after dissolution.

IX.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.34#

All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who dies at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition with him who died prematurely.

IX.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.35#

What are these men’s leading principles, and about what kind of things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and honour? Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an idea!

IX.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.36#

Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and from eternity have been done in like form, and will be such to time without end. What, then, dost thou say? That all things have been and all things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned to be found in never ceasing evil?

IX.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.37#

The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything! Water, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits of hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the same kind. And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the same kind, changing from this to that.

IX.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.38#

Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why art thou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is it the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it. But besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods, then, now become at last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine these things for a hundred years or three.

IX.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.39#

If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong.

IX.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.4#

He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.

IX.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.40#

Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come together as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what is done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and nothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed? Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and feed with the rest?

IX.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.41#

Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they have no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray that any of these things should not happen or happen? for certainly if they can cooperate with men, they can cooperate for these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods have placed them in thy power. Well, then, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man than to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the things which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt see. One man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou pray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus: How shall I be released from this? Another prays: How shall I not desire to be released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little son? Thou thus: How shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see what comes.

IX.42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.42#

Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those who visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as before, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating in such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from perturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do, then, the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant man or with one unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools of philosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which thou doest it.

IX.43

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.43#

When thou art offended with any man’s shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be in the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible. For this man also is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be in the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt become more kindly disposed towards every one individually. It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote against the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of man some other power. And in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray; for every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. Besides wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has done anything by which thy mind could be made worse; but that which is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that a man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy very act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? Just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working according to their several constitutions obtain what is their own; so also as man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own.

IX.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.5#

He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he who does a certain thing.

IX.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.6#

Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with everything which happens—that is enough.

IX.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.7#

Wipe out imagination; check desire; extinguish appetite; keep the ruling faculty in its own power.

IX.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.8#

Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as there is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and we see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision and all that have life.

IX.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

IX.9#

All things which participate in anything which is common to them all move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the fire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then everything also which participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more. For so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are souls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has been observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there are political communities and friendships, and families and meetings of people; and in wars, treaties and armistices. But in the things which are still superior, even though they are separated from one another, unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which are separated. See, then, what now takes place. For only intelligent animals have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in them alone the property of flowing together is not seen. But still though men strive to avoid this union, they are caught and held by it, for their nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing than a man altogether separated from other men.

Jeremy Bentham

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Jeremy Bentham#

Summary#

Nietzsche presents Bentham as the originator whose footsteps the English utilitarians follow ponderously and respectably. The utilitarian philosophers stalk along in Bentham’s path just as he himself had stalked in the footsteps of Helvetius, producing a tedious moral philosophy devoid of new thought or finer expression, which Nietzsche dismisses as an “impossible literature” unless leavened with some mischief.

Mentioned In#

228 ↖ VII. Our Virtues

Liberation

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Liberation#

Summary#

Liberation is characterized as a voluptuous distance and remoteness, likened to a bird that flies ever higher to see more beneath it. However, Nietzsche warns against clinging to one’s own liberation, identifying it as a danger for the free spirit. True independence requires not becoming attached even to freedom itself, as such attachment can become another form of bondage.

Mentioned In#

41 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Life

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Life#

Summary#

Life is understood as the foundation of emotions underlying human existence. When anarchy threatens to break out among the instincts, this foundation is convulsed, manifesting as corruption in various forms depending on the organization in which it appears.

Mentioned In#

258 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Locke

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Locke#

Summary#

Nietzsche criticizes Locke’s empiricist theory of the origin of ideas as superficial. Against Locke’s view that ideas arise from sensory experience, Nietzsche argues that philosophical thinking is shaped by innate grammatical structures and physiological conditions, making it more of a “remembering” than a discovery. Different language families predispose thinkers to certain philosophical systems, undermining Locke’s notion of a blank slate.

Mentioned In#

20 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Logical fictions

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Logical fictions#

Summary#

Logical fictions are false but necessary constructs that humans use to make sense of reality. According to Nietzsche, these include synthetic judgments a priori, the concept of the absolute and immutable, and numerical representations of the world. Though untrue, these fictions are indispensable for life itself, and recognizing untruth as a condition of life places one beyond traditional moral valuations.

Mentioned In#

4 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Love for mankind

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Love for mankind#

Summary#

Nietzsche argues that love for mankind without a higher justification—such as loving humanity for God’s sake—is mere folly and brutishness. This sentiment requires refinement and proportion from a “higher inclination” to become noble. The philosopher who first recognized that unconditional love for humanity needs a redeeming purpose is praised as one who has “flown highest” in moral understanding.

Mentioned In#

60 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Luther

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Luther#

Summary#

Luther exemplifies a churlish, honest-hearted, and importunate passion for God. His religious fervor represents the whole of Protestantism, which Nietzsche characterizes as lacking the southern delicatezza (delicacy or refinement).

Mentioned In#

50 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Machiavelli

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Machiavelli#

Summary#

Nietzsche admires Machiavelli as a master of prose tempo, praising how his Principe breathes the dry, fine air of Florence while presenting the most serious and dangerous thoughts in a boisterous, galloping style. This contrast between weighty subject matter and wanton, swift expression exemplifies the kind of free-spirited writing that Nietzsche finds nearly impossible to translate into German.

Mentioned In#

28 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Madame de Guyon

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Madame de Guyon#

Summary#

Nietzsche cites Madame de Guyon as an example of a feminine, sensual form of religious passion that unconsciously longs for a mystical and physical union with the divine. Her spiritual devotion represents the tender, modest side of the passion for God, in contrast to the churlish fervor of Luther or the slavish exaltation of Augustine.

Mentioned In#

50 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Madame de Stael

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Madame de Stael#

Summary#

Nietzsche references Madame de Stael as an example of a woman who was silenced by Napoleon with the phrase “let woman be silent in politics.” Her eloquence in political matters is presented as something that required masculine restraint, illustrating the broader argument that women compromise themselves through intellectual self-exposure and would do better to remain within their traditional sphere of charm and appearance.

Mentioned In#

232 ↖ VII. Our Virtues

Man of prey

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Man of prey#

Summary#

Nietzsche presents the man of prey, exemplified by figures like Caesar Borgia, as fundamentally misunderstood by moralists who seek pathology or innate evil in such natures. These “tropical” human types represent the healthiest and most vital specimens of humanity, yet conventional morality condemns them in favor of temperate, mediocre men. This moralistic condemnation reveals timidity rather than genuine moral insight.

Mentioned In#

197 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Mentioned In#

293 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Mentioned In#

12 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Meditations

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Meditations#

Books#

Concepts#

Change ↖ Metaphysics

Death ↖ States Of Being

Diogenes ↖ Philosophers

Epictetus ↖ Philosophers

Epicurus ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers

Gods ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Religion

Impermanence ↖ Metaphysics

Justice ↖ Virtues

Nature ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Metaphysics

Opinion ↖ Epistemology

Plato ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Philosophers

Providence

Reason ↖ Epistemology

Mercenaries

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Mercenaries#

Summary#

Machiavelli condemns mercenaries as useless and dangerous forces that have brought ruin to Italy. He argues they are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, and unfaithful, valiant only among themselves but cowardly against real enemies. Throughout The Prince, he demonstrates through historical examples how mercenary captains either become tyrants over their employers or prove incompetent, and insists that a prince must rely on his own forces to maintain power securely.

Mentioned In#

Mentioned In#

208 ↖ VI. We Scholars

Mentioned In#

186 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Mentioned In#

198 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Mentioned In#

14 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Opinion

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Opinion#

Summary#

Opinion is the mental judgment we attach to events and circumstances, and it lies entirely within our power to control. Marcus Aurelius teaches that most disturbances come not from things themselves but from our opinions about them. By choosing to cast away harmful opinions, we can find inner calm and make any hardship endurable.

Mentioned In#

Overman

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Overman#

Summary#

The Overman represents a higher mode of existence characterized by the capacity for “golden laughter.” In Nietzsche’s view, even the gods philosophize and laugh in an Overman-like fashion, finding ridicule and joy even in holy matters. This suggests the Overman transcends conventional seriousness and achieves a divine lightness of spirit.

Mentioned In#

294 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Mentioned In#

10 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Perspective estimates and semblances

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Perspective estimates and semblances#

Summary#

Nietzsche argues that life itself could not exist except upon the basis of perspective estimates and semblances. The belief that truth is worth more than appearance is merely a moral prejudice, the worst-proved supposition in the world. If one could abolish the “seeming world,” nothing of “truth” would remain either; instead, we should recognize degrees of seemingness, lighter and darker shades of semblance.

Mentioned In#

34 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Mentioned In#

23 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Mentioned In#

7 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Pleasure and pain

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Pleasure and pain#

Summary#

Pleasure and pain are dismissed as mere “accompanying circumstances and secondary considerations” that naive philosophies like hedonism, utilitarianism, and eudaemonism mistakenly use to measure the worth of things. Nietzsche argues that those conscious of creative powers look down upon such modes of thinking, recognizing that the discipline of great suffering has produced all elevations of humanity. Systems of philosophy that deal only with pleasure and pain are deemed naivetes, as there are higher problems demanding attention.

Plebeianism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Plebeianism#

Summary#

Plebeianism refers to a cultural atmosphere that renders everything “opaque and leaden,” making it difficult to recognize true nobility. Nietzsche describes it as a “heavy overcast sky” under which the noble man must be identified not by actions or works, but by the fundamental certainty and self-reverence of the noble soul.

Mentioned In#

287 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Mentioned In#

10 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Mentioned In#

58 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Mentioned In#

40 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Protestantism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Protestantism#

Summary#

Protestantism is presented as a form of religious passion that lacks the southern delicatezza (refinement or delicacy). It is exemplified by Luther’s churlish and importunate devotion to God, representing a more forceful and less graceful expression of religious fervor compared to other traditions.

Mentioned In#

50 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Providence

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Providence#

Summary#

Marcus Aurelius presents providence as one of three possible cosmic orders alongside necessity and random confusion. He counsels that if providence governs the universe, one should make oneself worthy of divine help, while even if chaos rules, one’s ruling intelligence remains untouched by external tempests. In contemplating what befalls us, we should consider whether events happen by chance or according to providence, neither blaming the former nor accusing the latter.

Psychologist

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Psychologist#

Summary#

The psychologist is presented as a hunter whose domain is the human soul in all its heights, depths, and distances. This figure pursues the history of inner experience like a “big hunt,” yet finds it nearly impossible to obtain suitable assistants, for scholars lose their keen eye and nose precisely when the great danger and difficulty commences. The born psychologist must ultimately do everything oneself in order to know something, driven by what Nietzsche calls the most agreeable of vices: the love of truth.

Psychology

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Psychology#

Psychology ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Physio-psychology ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Consciousness ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Instinct and Reason ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Fear ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ States Of Being

Suffering ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ States Of Being

Sympathy ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ Gender Relationships

Shame ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Cruelty ↖ Beyond Good and Evil ↖ The Prince

Ego ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Herd-instinct ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Gregarious instinct ↖ Beyond Good and Evil

Psychology

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Psychology#

Recluse

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Recluse#

Summary#

The recluse is one who has spent years in solitary discourse with his own soul, becoming like a cave-bear or treasure-guardian in his labyrinth. His ideas acquire a twilight quality, something uncommunicative and chilly to others. The recluse understands that philosophers never reveal their true opinions in books—every philosophy conceals a deeper philosophy, every word is a mask, and behind every cave lies a still deeper abyss.

Mentioned In#

289 ↖ IX. What Is Noble?

Religion

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Religion#

Summary#

Religion serves vastly different purposes across these works. Marcus Aurelius presents the gods as benevolent powers with whom humans can cooperate through proper prayer, arguing for inner transformation rather than petitioning for external outcomes. Nietzsche views religion as a tool that philosophers may employ for disciplining different ranks of humanity: for rulers it strengthens authority, for noble spirits it provides contemplative refuge, and for the masses it offers consolation that makes their suffering bearable. Christianity and Buddhism are characterized as religions for sufferers that have systematically preserved the weak while working to shatter the strong, inverting ancient values and producing a diminished European humanity.

Religious cruelty

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Religious cruelty#

Summary#

Religious cruelty has ascended through three great rungs of sacrifice. First, humanity sacrificed human beings to their gods, including those most beloved. Then, during the moral epoch, they sacrificed their strongest natural instincts, as seen in the cruel joy of ascetics. Finally, the ultimate cruelty emerged: sacrificing God himself for nothingness, worshipping stone, stupidity, gravity, and fate in his place.

Mentioned In#

55 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Religious idleness

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Religious idleness#

Mentioned In#

61 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Saint

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Saint#

Mentioned In#

40 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Sin

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Sin#

Summary#

Sin is presented as one of the most solemn conceptions that has caused immense fighting and suffering throughout human history. Yet Nietzsche suggests that with the growth of intellectual vision and insight, such weighty concepts may one day appear as trivial as a child’s plaything seems to an old man.

Mentioned In#

57 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Mentioned In#

195 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Mentioned In#

190 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Solitude

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Solitude#

Summary#

Solitude is presented as essential for genuine philosophical freedom and spiritual independence. The “good solitude” is described as free, lightsome, and wanton, offering protection from the corrupting effects of prolonged conflict and enmity that turn thinkers into vengeance-seekers. True free spirits are characterized as “born, sworn, jealous friends of solitude,” in contrast to superficial levellers who lack personal solitude and merely advocate for herd comfort and equality.

Mentioned In#

Mentioned In#

189 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Stoicism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Stoicism#

Summary#

Stoicism is presented as an exemplary system of moral constraint that, like metrical rules in poetry, appears tyrannical but ultimately cultivates strength and freedom. Nietzsche argues that understanding Stoicism requires recognizing how such disciplinary systems, through long obedience and self-imposed limitations, become the means by which genuine elegance, boldness, and mastery develop.

Mentioned In#

188 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

Stoics

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Stoics#

Summary#

The Stoics are criticized for their fraudulent doctrine of living “according to Nature,” which Nietzsche exposes as a self-deception whereby they project their own morals onto Nature rather than deriving them from it. Their philosophy represents a form of self-tyranny and an attempt to tyrannize Nature itself. The Stoic prescription of indifference and coldness towards the emotions is dismissed as mere expediency mixed with stupidity, a recipe for managing one’s dangerous passions rather than genuine wisdom.

Suffering

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Suffering#

Summary#

Suffering is presented not as something to be eliminated but as a necessary discipline that has produced all human greatness and elevation. Profound suffering separates and ennobles, granting the sufferer access to knowledge that the comfortable can never possess. The modern impulse to abolish suffering through sympathy is criticized as a form of weakness and bad taste that would ultimately dwarf humanity.

Mentioned In#

II. Concerning Hereditary Principalities

III. Concerning Mixed Principalities

IV. Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against the Successors of Alexander at His Death

V. Concerning the Way to Govern Cities or Principalities Which Lived Under Their Own Laws Before They Were Annexed

VI. Concerning New Principalities Which Are Acquired by One’s Own Arms and Ability

The Romans

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

The Romans#

Mentioned In#

Mentioned In#

1 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Ultra-moral

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Ultra-moral#

Utilitarianism

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Utilitarianism#

Summary#

Nietzsche critiques utilitarianism as sharing its origins with Socratic morality, both stemming from a common mentality that equates “good” with “useful and pleasant” and views evil merely as stupidity with unpleasant consequences. This mode of reasoning is characterized as belonging to the populace, who judge wrongdoing only by its disagreeable results rather than by any deeper moral consideration.

Mentioned In#

190 ↖ V. The Natural History of Morals

V. Concerning the Way to Govern Cities or Principalities Which Lived Under Their Own Laws Before They Were Annexed

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V. Concerning the Way to Govern Cities or Principalities Which Lived Under Their Own Laws Before They Were Annexed#

Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.

V. The Natural History of Morals

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V. The Natural History of Morals#

V.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.1#

In the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be present—I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bedclothes and keep myself warm?—But this is more pleasant.—Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for action or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is according to thy nature?—But it is necessary to take rest also.—It is necessary: however nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those who love their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed and without food; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of money values his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And such men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care for. But are the acts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of thy labour?

V.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.10#

Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult to understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man who never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves, and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. Then turn to the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth being highly prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is a man’s duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me which is not conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for there is no man who will compel me to this.

V.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.11#

About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must ask myself this question, and inquire, what have I now in this part of me which they call the ruling principle? And whose soul have I now? That of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?

V.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.12#

What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good. But if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and would not be rejected in the first case, while we receive it when it is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think those things to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied—that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.

V.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.13#

I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them will perish into nonexistence, as neither of them came into existence out of nonexistence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another part of the universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the universe is administered according to definite periods of revolution.

V.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.14#

Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are sufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are named catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed by the right road.

V.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.15#

None of these things ought to be called a man’s, which do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man’s nature promise them, nor are they the means of man’s nature attaining its end. Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better man.

V.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.16#

Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace;—well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again, consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried; and its end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the end is, there also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now the good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made for society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exist for the sake of the superior? But the things which have life are superior to those which have not life, and of those which have life the superior are those which have reason.

V.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.17#

To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the bad should not do something of this kind.

V.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.18#

Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear. The same things happen to another, and either because he does not see that they have happened or because he would show a great spirit he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit should be stronger than wisdom.

V.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.19#

Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor have they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul: but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgements it may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which present themselves to it.

V.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.2#

How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquility.

V.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.20#

In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments to my affects and disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally and changing: for the mind converts and changes every hindrance to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the road helps us on this road.

V.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.21#

Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that which makes use of all things and directs all things. And in like manner also reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the same kind as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of everything else, is this, and thy life is directed by this.

V.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.22#

That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen. In the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him where his error is.

V.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.23#

Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and disappear, both the things which are and the things which are produced. For substance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of things are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite varieties; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And consider this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes himself miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time.

V.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.24#

Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small portion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible interval has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by destiny, and how small a part of it thou art.

V.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.25#

Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own disposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature wills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.

V.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.26#

Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those affects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the opinion that it is either good or bad.

V.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.27#

Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them, his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man’s understanding and reason.

V.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.28#

Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? Art thou angry with him whose mouth smells foul? What good will this danger do thee? He has such a mouth, he has such armpits: it is necessary that such an emanation must come from such things—but the man has reason, it will be said, and he is able, if he takes pain, to discover wherein he offends—I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast reason: by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger. Neither tragic actor nor whore …

V.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.29#

As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out, … so it is in thy power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so long as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what is according to the nature of the rational and social animal.

V.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.3#

Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit for thee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any people nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said, do not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their peculiar leading principle and follow their peculiar movement; which things do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature and the common nature; and the way of both is one.

V.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.30#

The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the superior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, coordinated and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has brought together into concord with one another the things which are the best.

V.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.31#

How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee:

V.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.32#

Never has wronged a man in deed or word.

V.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.33#

And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through, and how many things thou hast been able to endure: and that the history of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended: and how many beautiful things thou hast seen: and how many pleasures and pains thou hast despised; and how many things called honourable thou hast spurned; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition.

V.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.34#

Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and knowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance and through all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the universe.

V.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.35#

Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a name or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things which are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and like little dogs biting one another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and justice and truth are fled

V.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.36#

Up to Olympus from the widespread earth.

V.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.37#

What then is there which still detains thee here? If the objects of sense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of perception are dull and easily receive false impressions; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation from blood. But to have good repute amidst such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tranquility for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to another state? And until that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men, and to practise tolerance and self-restraint; but as to everything which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is neither thine nor in thy power.

V.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.38#

Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These two things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man, and to the soul of every rational being, not to be hindered by another; and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination.

V.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.39#

If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness, and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it? And what is the harm to the common weal?

V.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.4#

I go through the things which happen according to nature until I shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many purposes.

V.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.40#

Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of things, but give help to all according to thy ability and their fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage. For it is a bad habit. But as the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child’s top, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.

V.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.41#

When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what these things are?—Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these people—wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things?—I was once a fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.—But fortunate means that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.

V.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.5#

Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.—Be it so: but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labour, aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark? Or art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to be so restless in thy mind? No, by the gods: but thou mightest have been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy dullness.

V.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.6#

One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it down to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.—Must a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it?—Yes.—But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also should perceive it.—It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now said: and for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.

V.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.7#

A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.—In truth we ought not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion.

V.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.8#

Just as we must understand when it is said, That Æsculapius prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water or going without shoes; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted to procure health; and in the second case it means: That which happens to or suits every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in some kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness, harmony. And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought this to such a person.—This then was brought and this was prescribed to him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which Æsculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things, which the common nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which is directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with that which happens to thee; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other, because even that which comes severally to every man is to the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.

V.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

V.9#

Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing everything according to right principles; but when thou hast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part of what thou doest is consistent with man’s nature, and love this to which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only the things which thy nature requires; but thou wouldst have something else which is not according to nature.—It may be objected, Why what is more agreeable than this which I am doing?—But is not this the very reason why pleasure deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding and knowledge?

Valuations

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Valuations#

Summary#

Nietzsche argues that behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement lie valuations, or more plainly, physiological demands for the maintenance of a definite mode of life. These valuations, such as preferring certainty over uncertainty or truth over illusion, may be merely superficial and necessary only for creatures like ourselves, rather than reflecting any objective measure of things.

Mentioned In#

3 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Value of Truth

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Value of Truth#

Summary#

Nietzsche presents the value of truth as a fundamental philosophical problem that had never been properly raised before. He questions why we desire truth rather than untruth, uncertainty, or even ignorance, suggesting that the very pursuit of truth involves great risk. The problem confronts us like a riddle posed by a Sphinx, forcing us to become questioners ourselves.

Mentioned In#

1 ↖ I. Prejudices of Philosophers

Vedanta philosophy

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Vedanta philosophy#

Summary#

Nietzsche references Vedanta philosophy in connection with Kant’s epistemological project, noting that the thought of the apparent existence of the subject and the soul once held immense power on earth through Vedanta teachings. This appears in his broader critique of how modern philosophy, since Descartes, has attempted to undermine the traditional conception of the soul as a grammatical subject.

Mentioned In#

54 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

VI. Concerning New Principalities Which Are Acquired by One’s Own Arms and Ability

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI. Concerning New Principalities Which Are Acquired by One’s Own Arms and Ability#

Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

VI. We Scholars

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI. We Scholars#

VI.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.1#

The substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the reason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed by it. But all things are made and perfected according to this reason.

VI.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.10#

The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of things, and a dispersion; or it is unity and order and providence. If then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous combination of things and such a disorder? And why do I care about anything else than how I shall at last become earth? And why am I disturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do. But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust in him who governs.

VI.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.11#

When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in a manner, quickly return to thyself and do not continue out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over the harmony by continually recurring to it.

VI.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.12#

If thou hadst a stepmother and a mother at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy stepmother, but still thou wouldst constantly return to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to thee stepmother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court.

VI.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.13#

When we have meat before us and such eatables we receive the impression, that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe some sheep’s wool dyed with the blood of a shellfish: such then are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself.

VI.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.14#

Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to objects of the most general kind, those which are held together by cohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired by men who are a little more reasonable are referred to the things which are held together by a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are still more instructed are the things which are held together by a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who values rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards nothing else except this; and above all things he keeps his soul in a condition and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and he cooperates to this end with those who are of the same kind as himself.

VI.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.15#

Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out of it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already extinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite duration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a man would set a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man, like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst first draw it.

VI.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.16#

Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being nourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and parting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being valued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we value the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this worthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This in my opinion, to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper constitution, to which end both all employments and arts lead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made should be adapted to the work for which it has been made; and both the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching of youth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without passion. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those who can take away those things, and plot against those who have that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these things; and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence and honour thy own mind will make thee content with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they give and have ordered.

VI.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.17#

Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the motion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine, and advancing by a way hardly observed it goes happily on its road.

VI.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.18#

How strangely men act. They will not praise those who are living at the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised by posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever will see, this they set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou shouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not praise thee.

VI.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.19#

If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think that it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and conformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself too.

VI.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.2#

Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we die: it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in hand.

VI.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.20#

In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behaviour be in all the other parts of life; let us overlook many things in those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred.

VI.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.21#

If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance.

VI.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.22#

I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either things without life, or things without reason, or things that have rambled and know not the way.

VI.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.23#

As to the animals which have no reason and generally all things and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make use of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all occasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length of time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are sufficient.

VI.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.24#

Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the same state; for either they were received among the same seminal principles of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the atoms.

VI.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.25#

Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in each of us, things which concern the body and things which concern the soul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things which come into existence in that which is the one and all, which we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.

VI.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.26#

If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter each letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with composure and number every letter? just so then in this life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts. These it is thy duty to observe and without being disturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry with thee to go on thy way and finish that which is set before thee.

VI.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.27#

How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable to them.—But it is not so.—Teach them then, and show them without being angry.

VI.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.28#

Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh.

VI.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.29#

It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life, when thy body does not give way.

VI.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.3#

Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its value escape thee.

VI.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.30#

Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee. Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every act which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things, and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness, and his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things; and how he would never let anything pass without having first most carefully examined it and clearly understood it; and how he bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how he did nothing in a hurry; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how exact an examiner of manners and actions he was; and not given to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants; and how laborious and patient; and how he was able on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not even requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations except at the usual hour; and his firmness and uniformity in his friendships; and how he tolerated freedom of speech in those who opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he had when any man showed him anything better; and how religious he was without superstition. Imitate all this that thou mayest have as good a conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had.

VI.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.31#

Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou hast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the things about thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams].

VI.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.32#

I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But to the understanding those things only are indifferent, which are not the works of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its own activity, all these are in its power. And of these however only those which are done with reference to the present; for as to the future and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the present indifferent.

VI.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.33#

Neither the labour which the hand does nor that of the foot is contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot’s work and the hand the hand’s. So then neither to a man as a man is his labour contrary to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the labour is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.

VI.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.34#

How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants.

VI.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.35#

Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft—nevertheless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their art and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason [the principles] of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him and the gods?

VI.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.36#

Asia, Europe are corners of the universe: all the sea a drop in the universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable. All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either directly proceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion’s gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. Do not then imagine that they are of another kind from that which thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all.

VI.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.37#

He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.

VI.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.38#

Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the substance.

VI.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.39#

Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it truly, sincerely.

VI.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.4#

All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to vapour, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed.

VI.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.40#

Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things which are held together by nature there is within and there abides in them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit to reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to it are in conformity to intelligence.

VI.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.41#

Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference between these things [because we do not regard these things as indifferent]. But if we judge only those things which are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.

VI.42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.42#

We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are labourers and cooperators in the things which take place in the universe. But men cooperate after different fashions: and even those cooperate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what kind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some part of the cooperators and of those whose labours conduce to one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of.

VI.43

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.43#

Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Æsculapius the work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth]? And how is it with respect to each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together to the same end?

VI.44

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.44#

If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their providence? But if they have not determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing—which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us—but if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the universal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the middle kind, neither good nor bad.

VI.45

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.45#

As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the continual sight of the same things and the uniformity make the spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things above, below, are the same and from the same. How long then?

VI.46

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.46#

Think continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the other kinds of men. To that place then we must remove, where there are so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so many generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great minds, lovers of labour, versatile, confident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all these consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is this to them; and what to those whose names are altogether unknown? One thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars and unjust men.

VI.47

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.47#

When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those who live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the virtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us and present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must keep them before us.

VI.48

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.48#

Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest only so many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou must live only so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied with the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be content with the time.

VI.49

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.49#

Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will, when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and tranquility, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a reservation, that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities. What then didst thou desire?—Some such effort as this.—But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast moved are accomplished.

VI.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.5#

The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what it does, and on what material it works.

VI.50

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.50#

He who loves fame considers another man’s activity to be his own good; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has understanding, considers his own acts to be his own good.

VI.51

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.51#

It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be disturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to form our judgements.

VI.52

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.52#

Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and as much as it is possible, be in the speaker’s mind.

VI.53

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.53#

That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the bee.

VI.54

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.54#

If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, would they listen to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of those in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?

VI.55

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.55#

How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone out of it.

VI.56

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.56#

To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine thing. Why then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has less power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog?

VI.57

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.57#

No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy own nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the universal nature.

VI.58

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.58#

What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things, and how many it has covered already.

VI.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.6#

The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like the wrong doer.

VI.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.7#

Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one social act to another social act, thinking of God.

VI.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.8#

The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes everything which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills.

VI.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VI.9#

In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and independent of this.

VII. Concerning New Principalities Which Are Acquired Either by the Arms of Others or by Good Fortune

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII. Concerning New Principalities Which Are Acquired Either by the Arms of Others or by Good Fortune#

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

VII. Our Virtues

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII. Our Virtues#

VII.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.1#

What is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the occasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the same things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the middle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are filled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar and short-lived.

VII.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.10#

Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole; and everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the universal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed in time.

VII.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.11#

To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and according to reason.

VII.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.12#

Be thou erect, or be made erect.

VII.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.13#

Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in one, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have been constituted for one cooperation. And the perception of this will be more apparent to thee, if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member [μέλος] of the system of rational beings. But if [using the letter r] thou sayest that thou art a part [μέρος] thou dost not yet love men from thy heart; beneficence does not yet delight thee for its own sake; thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself.

VII.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.14#

Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if they choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so.

VII.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.15#

Whatever anyone does or says, I must be good, just as if the gold, or the emerald, or the purple were always saying this. Whatever anyone does or says, I must be emerald and keep my colour.

VII.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.16#

The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself pain. But if anyone else can frighten or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it can, that is suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has completely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing, for it will never deviate into such a judgement. The leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if it does not disturb and impede itself.

VII.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.17#

Eudæmonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then art thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come according to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away.

VII.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.18#

Is any man afraid of change? Why what can take place without change? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal nature? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change? And canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can anything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature?

VII.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.19#

Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all bodies are carried, being by their nature united with and cooperating with the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already swallowed up? And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to every man and thing.

VII.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.2#

How can our principles become dead, unless the impressions [thoughts] which correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion about anything, which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed? The things which are external to my mind have no relation at all to my mind.—Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as thou didst use to look at them; for in this consists the recovery of thy life.

VII.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.20#

One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the constitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, or what it does not allow now.

VII.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.21#

Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness of thee by all.

VII.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.22#

It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrongdoer has done thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was before.

VII.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.23#

The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the material for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each of these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being fastened together.

VII.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.24#

A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often assumed, the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there for living any longer?

VII.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.25#

Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which thou seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and again other things from the substance of them, in order that the world may be ever new.

VII.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.26#

When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is in error.

VII.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.27#

Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the same time however take care that thou dost not through being so pleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them.

VII.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.28#

Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so secures tranquility.

VII.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.29#

Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine thyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal] and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a man stay there where the wrong was done.

VII.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.3#

The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into fishponds, labourings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings—all alike. It is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humour and not a proud air; to understand however that every man is worth just so much as the things are worth about which he busies himself.

VII.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.30#

Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter into the things that are doing and the things which do them.

VII.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.31#

Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with indifference towards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. Follow God. The poet says that Law rules all. And it is enough to remember that Law rules all.

VII.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.32#

About death: Whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change.

VII.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.33#

About pain: The pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own tranquility by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not made worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give their opinion about it.

VII.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.34#

About fame: Look at the minds of those who seek fame, observe what they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one another hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before are soon covered by those which come after.

VII.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.35#

From Plato: The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of all time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to think that human life is anything great? it is not possible, he said.—Such a man then will think that death also is no evil.—Certainly not.

VII.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.36#

From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not to be regulated and composed by itself.

VII.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.37#

To the immortal gods and us give joy.

VII.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.38#

For the good is with me, and the just.

VII.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.39#

No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion.

VII.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.4#

In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement thou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see immediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully what is the thing signified.

VII.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.40#

From Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad man.

VII.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.41#

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a commander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything else, before the baseness of deserting his post.

VII.42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.42#

But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good is not something different from saving and being saved; for as to a man living such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider if this is not a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts: and there must be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must entrust them to the deity and believe what the women say, that no man can escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the time that he has to live.

VII.43

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.43#

Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one another; for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life.

VII.44

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.44#

This is a fine saying of Plato: That he who is discoursing about men should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some higher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies, agricultural labours, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination of contraries.

VII.45

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.45#

Consider the past; such great changes of political supremacies. Thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should deviate from the order of the things which take place now: accordingly to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?

VII.46

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.46#

This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements.

VII.47

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.47#

Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his neighbours.

VII.48

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.48#

Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear: for where we are able to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds according to our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected.

VII.49

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.49#

Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them without being well examined.

VII.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.5#

Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature. But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and give way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some reason why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the man who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is now fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society.

VII.50

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.50#

Do not look around thee to discover other men’s ruling principles, but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being ought to do that which is according to its constitution; and all other things have been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as among irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the rational for the sake of one another.

VII.51

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.51#

The prime principle then in man’s constitution is the social. And the second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, for it is the peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the intelligent motion claims superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its own.

VII.52

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.52#

Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to the present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is allowed thee.

VII.53

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.53#

Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of thy destiny. For what is more suitable?

VII.54

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.54#

In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as strange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they? Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? And why dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature, to those who cause them and those who are moved by them? And why art thou not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things which happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will be a material for thee to work on. Only attend to thyself, and resolve to be a good man in every act which thou doest: and remember …

VII.55

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.55#

Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig.

VII.56

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.56#

The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be required also in the whole body. But all of these things should be observed without affectation.

VII.57

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.57#

The art of life is more like the wrestler’s art than the dancer’s, in respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which are sudden and unexpected.

VII.58

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.58#

Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and appetites.

VII.59

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.59#

Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and temperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards all.

VII.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.6#

How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to oblivion; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long been dead.

VII.60

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.60#

In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonour in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does not damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence is rational or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that we do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented about any of these things, say to thyself, that thou art yielding to pain.

VII.61

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.61#

Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they feel towards men.

VII.62

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.62#

How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to Socrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death, and disputed more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the night in the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swaggering way in the streets—though as to this fact one may have great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire, what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on account of men’s villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to any man’s ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his share out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh.

VII.63

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.63#

Nature has not so mingled the intelligence with the composition of the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognised as such by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free and modest and social and obedient to God.

VII.64

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.64#

It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest tranquility of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquility and in a just judgement of all surrounding things and in a ready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the judgement may say to the thing which falls under its observation: This thou art in substance [reality], though in men’s opinion thou mayest appear to be of a different kind; and the use shall say to that which falls under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me that which presents itself is always a material for virtue both rational and political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man or God. For everything which happens has a relationship either to God or man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter to work on.

VII.65

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.65#

The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor playing the hypocrite.

VII.66

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.66#

The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of them bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the bad, and this too when thou art one of them?

VII.67

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.67#

It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men’s badness, which is impossible.

VII.68

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.68#

Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to itself.

VII.69

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.69#

When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost thou look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?

VII.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.7#

Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of another it is possible?

VII.70

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.70#

No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by doing it to others.

VII.71

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.71#

The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either everything that takes place comes by way of consequence or continuity; or even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this is remembered it will make thee more tranquil in many things.

VII.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.8#

Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou usest for present things.

VII.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VII.9#

All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been coordinated, and they combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and participate in the same reason.

VIII. Concerning Those Who Have Obtained a Principality by Wickedness

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII. Concerning Those Who Have Obtained a Principality by Wickedness#

Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples—one ancient, the other modern—and without entering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.

VIII. Peoples and Countries

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII. Peoples and Countries#

VIII.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.1#

This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem to others, and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found happiness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing what man’s nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has principles from which come his affects and his acts. What principles? Those which relate to good and bad: the belief that there is nothing good for man, which does not make him just, temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned.

VIII.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.10#

Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something useful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect good man should look after it. But no such man would ever repent of having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor useful.

VIII.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.11#

This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? What is its substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?

VIII.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.12#

When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is according to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform social acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But that which is according to each individual’s nature is also more peculiarly its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable.

VIII.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.13#

Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of Dialectic.

VIII.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.14#

Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What opinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing wonderful or strange to me, if he does such and such things; and I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.

VIII.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.15#

Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and such things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be surprised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavourable.

VIII.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.16#

Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects thy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to thy own movement and judgement, and indeed according to thy own understanding too.

VIII.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.17#

If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? But if it is in the power of another, whom dost thou blame? The atoms [chance] or the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct that which is the cause; but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this, of what use is it to thee to find fault? For nothing should be done without a purpose.

VIII.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.18#

That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too change, and they murmur not.

VIII.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.19#

Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why dost thou wonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou? to enjoy pleasure? See if common sense allows this.

VIII.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.2#

On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is work of an intelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the same law with God?

VIII.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.20#

Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the beginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball. What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have fallen? And what good is it to the bubble while it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be said of a light also.

VIII.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.21#

Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is; and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is diseased.

VIII.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.22#

Short-lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer and the remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world; and not even here do all agree, no, not anyone with himself: and the whole earth too is a point.

VIII.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.23#

Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion or an act or a word.

VIII.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.24#

Thou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest rather to become good tomorrow than to be good today.

VIII.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.25#

Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind. Does anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and the source of all things, from which all that happens is derived.

VIII.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.26#

Such as bathing appears to thee—oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting—so is every part of life and everything.

VIII.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.27#

Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrian die, and then Celer died. And those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where are they? For instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudæmon, and anyone else like them. All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short time, and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere.

VIII.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.28#

It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise the movements of the senses, to form a just judgement of plausible appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of the things which happen in it.

VIII.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.29#

There are three relations between thee and other things: the one to the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with thee.

VIII.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.3#

Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with things, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling principles of these men were the same. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for, and to how many things were they slaves?

VIII.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.30#

Pain is either an evil to the body—then let the body say what it thinks of it—or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to maintain its own serenity and tranquility, and not to think that pain is an evil. For every judgement and movement and desire and aversion is within, and no evil ascends so high.

VIII.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.31#

Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturbation at all; but looking at all things I see what is their nature, and I use each according to its value.—Remember this power which thou hast from nature.

VIII.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.32#

Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be, appropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse.

VIII.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.33#

Augustus’ court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, Mæcenas, physicians and sacrificing priests—the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest, not considering the death of a single man, but of a whole race, as of the Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs—The last of his race. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that they might leave a successor; and then, that of necessity someone must be the last. Again here consider the death of a whole race.

VIII.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.34#

It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be content; and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.—But something external will stand in the way.—Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.—But perhaps some other active power will be hindered.—Well, but by acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee in place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to this ordering of which we are speaking.

VIII.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.35#

Receive wealth or prosperity without arrogance; and be ready to let it go.

VIII.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.36#

If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached thyself from the natural unity—for thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off—yet here there is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be separated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a part.

VIII.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.37#

As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all the other powers that it has, so we have received from it this power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its predestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it, and makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such purposes as it may have designed.

VIII.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.38#

Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayest expect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What is there in this which is intolerable and past bearing? For thou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the future nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even this.

VIII.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.39#

Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus? Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrian? That would be ridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be conscious of it? And if the dead were conscious, would they be pleased? And if they were pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in the order of destiny that these persons too should first become old women and old men and then die? What then would those do after these were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.

VIII.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.4#

Consider that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though thou shouldst burst.

VIII.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.40#

If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, says the philosopher.

VIII.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.41#

In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and that is temperance.

VIII.42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.42#

If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.—Who is this self?—The reason.—But I am not reason.—Be it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its own opinion about itself.

VIII.43

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.43#

Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the animal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an evil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure affect thee? The senses will look to that.—Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object? if indeed thou wast making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest into consideration the usual course of things, thou hast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however which are proper to the understanding no other man is used to impede, for neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it continues a sphere.

VIII.44

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.44#

It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never intentionally given pain even to another.

VIII.45

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.45#

Different things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its value.

VIII.46

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.46#

See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who rather pursue posthumous fame do consider that the men of after time will be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both are mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after time utter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about thee?

VIII.47

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.47#

Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act conformably to its proper constitution. Is this change of place sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? And what wilt thou find which is sufficient reason for this?

VIII.48

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.48#

Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee.

VIII.49

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.49#

If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgement about it. And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgement now. But if anything in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And even if thou art pained because thou art not doing some particular thing which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than complain?—But some insuperable obstacle is in the way?—Do not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on thee.—But it is not worth while to live if this cannot be done.—Take thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in full activity, and well pleased too with the things which are obstacles.

VIII.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.5#

This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are according to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrian and Augustus. In the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and at the same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what man’s nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as it seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and with modesty and without hypocrisy.

VIII.50

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.50#

Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it be when it forms a judgement about anything aided by reason and deliberately? Therefore the mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for, refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is unhappy.

VIII.51

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.51#

Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report. Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured, that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something, like a man who knows everything that happens in the world.

VIII.52

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.52#

A cucumber is bitter.—Throw it away.—There are briars in the road.—Turn aside from them.—This is enough. Do not add, And why were such things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet they have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings, and the universal nature has no external space; but the wondrous part of her art is that though she has circumscribed herself, everything within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she changes into herself, and again makes other new things from these very same, so that she requires neither substance from without nor wants a place into which she may cast that which decays. She is content then with her own space, and her own matter and her own art.

VIII.53

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.53#

Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul inward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure.

VIII.54

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.54#

Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water; and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt thou possess a perpetual fountain and not a mere well? By forming thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, simplicity and modesty.

VIII.55

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.55#

He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is. And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself. What then dost thou think of him who avoids or seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who they are?

VIII.56

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.56#

Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice every hour? Wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please himself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything that he does?

VIII.57

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.57#

No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power is no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to respire it.

VIII.58

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.58#

Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness of one man does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it, as soon as he shall choose.

VIII.59

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.59#

To my own free will the free will of my neighbour is just as indifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made especially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each of us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbour’s wickedness would be my harm, which God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on another.

VIII.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.6#

The nature of the universal has this work to do, to remove to that place the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away hence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not fear anything new. All things are familiar to us; but the distribution of them still remains the same.

VIII.60

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.60#

The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension: Accordingly its rays are called Extensions because they are extended. But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun’s light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its way; nor yet fall down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it.

VIII.61

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.61#

He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live.

VIII.62

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.62#

Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with them.

VIII.63

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.63#

In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed, both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about inquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object.

VIII.64

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.64#

Enter into every man’s ruling faculty; and also let every other man enter into thine.

VIII.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.7#

Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well; and a rational nature goes on its way well, when in its thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions to the things which are in its power, and when it is satisfied with everything that is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this common nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of man is part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions and according to its worth, times, substance, cause [form], activity, and incident. But examine, not to discover that any one thing compared with any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all the parts together of one thing and comparing them with all the parts together of another.

VIII.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.8#

Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arrogance; thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure and pain; thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care for them.

VIII.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

VIII.9#

Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or with thy own.

Virtue

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Virtue#

Summary#

Virtue carries vastly different meanings across these works. For Marcus Aurelius, virtue is acting according to nature and reason, serving the common good as naturally as the eye sees, requiring no external reward. Machiavelli inverts this, arguing that a prince who acts entirely virtuously will be ruined among so much evil; what appears virtuous may destroy while apparent vice may preserve. Nietzsche warns against becoming enslaved to one’s own virtues, noting that every virtue inclines toward stupidity and that moral philosophy has made virtue tedious through its ponderous advocates.

Virtues

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Virtues#

Summary#

The conception of virtue diverges radically across these texts. For Marcus Aurelius, virtues like justice, honesty, and gratitude express the soul’s alignment with universal reason and nature, requiring no external reward since they fulfill their purpose in being exercised. Machiavelli inverts this understanding entirely, arguing that a prince adhering strictly to conventional virtues will be destroyed among the wicked, and that what appears vicious may prove most salutary for maintaining power. Nietzsche warns against becoming enslaved to one’s virtues and observes that the very attempt to codify virtue through moral philosophy has made it tedious, favoring instead the noble soul’s spontaneous self-reverence over prescribed moral duties.

Voltaire

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Voltaire#

Summary#

Voltaire represents the Enlightenment ideal of seeking truth for humanitarian purposes. Nietzsche critiques this approach, suggesting that those who search for truth “too humanely” will find nothing. Compared to the Abbe Galiani, Voltaire is described as less profound and consequently less silent, implying a certain superficiality in his thought.

Mentioned In#

Wagner

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Wagner#

Summary#

Nietzsche places Wagner alongside Hegel as a thinker who gave expression to the riddles of the conflicting German soul, with Wagner setting these riddles to music. In his analysis of German depth and the German character, Nietzsche sees Wagner as someone who systematically captured the contradictory, obscure, and evolving nature of the German spirit through his art.

Mentioned In#

244 ↖ VIII. Peoples and Countries

Mentioned In#

24 ↖ II. The Free Spirit

Mentioned In#

59 ↖ III. The Religious Mood

Woman

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Woman#

Summary#

Nietzsche presents woman as a being whose essential nature lies in charm, artfulness, and the mastery of appearance rather than truth. He argues that woman’s strength resides in her capacity to play, to alleviate sorrow, and to create beauty, while her pursuit of scientific self-enlightenment represents an unfortunate abandonment of these natural gifts. The text suggests that woman has historically been restrained by fear of man, and that her attempts at independence through masculine modes of knowledge threaten to undermine her authentic power.

X. Concerning the Way in Which the Strength of All Principalities Ought to Be Measured

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X. Concerning the Way in Which the Strength of All Principalities Ought to Be Measured#

It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against anyone who comes to attack them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his people.

X.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.1#

Wilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never be full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures? Nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom thou mayest live in harmony? But wilt thou be satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that thou hast everything and that it comes from the gods, that everything is well for thee, and will be well whatever shall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of the perfect living being, the good and just and beautiful, which generates and holds together all things, and contains and embraces all things which are dissolved for the production of other like things? Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods and men as neither to find fault with them at all, nor to be condemned by them?

X.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.10#

Mimi, war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out those holy principles of thine. How many things without studying nature dost thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do everything, that at the same time the power of dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative faculty is exercised, and the confidence which comes from the knowledge of each several thing is maintained without showing it, but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge of every several thing, both what it is in substance, and what place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who are able both to give it and take it away?

X.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.11#

A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these robbers, if thou examinest their opinions?

X.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.12#

Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into one another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about this part of philosophy. For nothing is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave everything here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the universal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him or do against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself contented with these two things, with acting justly in what he now does, and being satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to accomplish the straight course through the law, and by accomplishing the straight course to follow God.

X.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.13#

What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to inquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way content, without turning back: but if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on according to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which appears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also cheerful and collected.

X.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.14#

Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep, whether it will make any difference to thee, if another does what is just and right. It will make no difference.

X.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.15#

Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame on others, are such as they are at bed and at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and what they avoid and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon [happiness]?

X.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.16#

To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou wilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently and well pleased with her.

X.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.17#

Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in a state [political community]. Let men see, let them know a real man who lives according to nature. If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to live thus as men do.

X.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.18#

No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought to be, but be such.

X.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.19#

Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance, and consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain of a fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet.

X.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.2#

Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by nature only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living being, shall not be made worse by it.

X.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.20#

Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that everything is so constituted by nature as to die.

X.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.21#

Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating, easing themselves and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when they are imperious and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their elevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and for what things; and after a little time consider in what a condition they will be.

X.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.22#

That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings it.

X.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.23#

“The earth loves the shower”; and “the solemn æther loves”: and the universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that “this or that loves [is wont] to be produced”?

X.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.24#

Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying and hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is nothing. Be of good cheer, then.

X.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.25#

Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like any other; and that all things here are the same with things on top of a mountain, or on the seashore, or wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city as in a shepherd’s fold on a mountain.

X.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.26#

What is my ruling faculty now to me? And of what nature am I now making it? And for what purpose am I now using it? Is it void of understanding? Is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? Is it melted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together with it?

X.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.27#

He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master, and he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or angry or afraid, is dissatisfied because something has been or is or shall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules all things, and he is Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who fears or is grieved or is angry is a runaway.

X.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.28#

A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause takes it, and labours on it and makes a child. What a thing from such a material! Again, the child passes food down through the throat, and then another cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and in fine life and strength and other things; how many and how strange! Observe then the things which are produced in such a hidden way, and see the power just as we see the power which carries things downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly.

X.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.29#

Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time past also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And place before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form, whatever thou hast learned from thy experience or from older history; for example, the whole court of Hadrian, and the whole court of Antoninus, and the whole court of Philip, Alexander, Croesus; for all those were such dramas as we see now, only with different actors.

X.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.3#

And next thou must observe what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And all this thou mayest allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules, then, and trouble thyself about nothing else.

X.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.30#

Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.

X.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.31#

Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all.

X.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.32#

Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, pause and ask thyself, if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of this.

X.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.33#

When thou art offended at any man’s fault, forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for example, in thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is compelled: for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away from him the compulsion.

X.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.34#

When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic, think of either Eutyches or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropæophorus, and when thou hast seen Xenophon think of Crito or Severus, and when thou hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the case of every one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind, Where then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For thus continuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing at all; especially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has once changed will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But thou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why art thou not content to pass through this short time in an orderly way? What matter and opportunity for thy activity art thou avoiding? For what else are all these things, except exercises for the reason, when it has viewed carefully and by examination into their nature the things which happen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have made these things thy own, as the stomach which is strengthened makes all things its own, as the blazing fire makes flame and brightness out of everything that is thrown into it.

X.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.35#

Let it not be in any man’s power to say truly of thee that thou art not simple or that thou are not good; but let him be a liar whoever shall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in thy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good and simple? Do thou only determine to live no longer, unless thou shalt be such. For neither does reason allow thee to live, if thou art not such.

X.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.36#

What is that which as to this material [our life] can be done or said in the way most conformable to reason. For whatever this may be, it is in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a condition that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such shall be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented to thee, the doing of the things which are conformable to man’s constitution; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment everything which it is in his power to do according to his own nature. And it is in his power everywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to anything else which is governed by nature or an irrational soul, for the things which check them and stand in the way are many. But intelligence and reason are able to go through everything that opposes them, and in such manner as they are formed by nature and as they choose. Place before thy eyes this facility with which the reason will be carried through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone downwards, as a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing further. For all other obstacles either affect the body only which is a dead thing; or, except through opinion and the yielding of the reason itself, they do not crush nor do any harm of any kind; for if they did, he who felt it would immediately become bad. Now, in the case of all things which have a certain constitution, whatever harm may happen to any of them, that which is so affected becomes consequently worse; but in the like case, a man becomes both better, if one may say so, and more worthy of praise by making a right use of these accidents. And finally remember that nothing harms him who is really a citizen, which does not harm the state; nor yet does anything harm the state, which does not harm law [order]; and of these things which are called misfortunes not one harms law. What then does not harm law does not harm either state or citizen.

X.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.37#

To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest precept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he should be free from grief and fear. For example:

X.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.38#

Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry out as if they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on the contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like manner, are those who shall receive and transmit a man’s fame to aftertimes. For all such things as these “are produced in the season of spring,” as the poet says; then the wind casts them down; then the forest produces other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all things as if they would be eternal. A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes; and him who has attended thee to thy grave another soon will lament.

X.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.39#

The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I wish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that can be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with respect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things which it is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding ought to be prepared for everything which happens; but that which says, Let my dear children live, and let all men praise whatever I may do, is an eye which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for soft things.

X.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.4#

Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art formed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion to make it endurable and tolerable, by thinking that it is either thy interest or thy duty to do this.

X.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.40#

There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he is dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen. Suppose that he was a good and wise man, will there not be at last someone to say to himself, Let us at last breathe freely being relieved from this schoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I perceived that he tacitly condemns us.—This is what is said of a good man. But in our own case how many other things are there for which there are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou wilt consider this then when thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my associates in behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared, themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some little advantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a longer stay here? Do not however for this reason go away less kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own character, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away; but as when a man dies a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the body, such also ought thy departure from men to be, for nature united thee to them and associated thee. But does she now dissolve the union? Well, I am separated as from kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without compulsion; for this too is one of the things according to nature.

X.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.41#

Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything being done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is this man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first.

X.42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.42#

Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is hidden within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if one may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the vessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached about it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this that they grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts without the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver’s shuttle, and the writer’s pen and the driver’s whip.

X.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.5#

If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error. But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself.

X.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.6#

Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it.

X.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.7#

Whether the universe is a concourse of atoms, or nature is a system, let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn an my efforts to the common interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content with whatever the state may assign to him.

X.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.8#

The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally comprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be understood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is naturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to change and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For whether did nature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into evil, or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both these suppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the term Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time that the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and at the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were happening contrary to nature, particularly as the dissolution of things is into those things of which each thing is composed. For there is either a dispersion of the elements out of which everything has been compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal reason, whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received the accretion, changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. But suppose that this which thy mother brought forth implicates thee very much with that other part, which has the peculiar quality of change, this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.

X.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

X.9#

When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change these names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. And remember that the term Rational was intended to signify a discriminating attention to every several thing and freedom from negligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the things which are assigned to thee by the common nature; and that Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and above that poor thing called fame, and death, and all such things. If, then, thou maintainest thyself in the possession of these names, without desiring to be called by these names by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is the character of a very stupid man and one overfond of his life, and like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who though covered with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept to the following day, though they will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names: and if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain islands of the Happy. But if thou shalt perceive that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and freedom and modesty, after doing this one laudable thing at least in thy life, to have gone out of it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these names, it will greatly help thee, if thou rememberest the gods, and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be made like themselves; and if thou rememberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man is a man.

XI. Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI. Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities#

It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.

XI.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.1#

These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears itself enjoys—for the fruits of plants and that in animals which corresponds to fruits others enjoy—it obtains its own end, wherever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in suchlike things, where the whole action is incomplete, if anything cuts it short; but in every part and wherever it may be stopped, it makes what has been set before it full and complete, so that it can say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses the whole universe, and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the periodical renovation of all things, and it comprehends that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor have those before us seen anything more, but in a manner he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things which have been and all that will be. This too is a property of the rational soul, love of one’s neighbour, and truth and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself, which is also the property of Law. Thus then right reason differs not at all from the reason of justice.

XI.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.10#

Life’s harvest reap like the wheat’s fruitful ear.

XI.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.11#

And other things of the same kind.

XI.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.12#

After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in reminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes used to take from these writers.

XI.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.13#

But as to the middle comedy which came next, observe what it was, and again, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said even by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look!

XI.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.14#

How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life so well suited for philosophising as this in which thou now happenest to be.

XI.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.15#

A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut off from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from another man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a branch, another cuts it off, but a man by his own act separates himself from his neighbour when he hates him and turns away from him, and he does not know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the whole social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from Zeus who framed society, for it is in our power to grow again to that which is near to us, and be to come a part which helps to make up the whole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from the first grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one life with it, is not like that which after being cut off is then ingrafted, for this is something like what the gardeners mean when they say that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that it has not the same mind with it.

XI.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.16#

As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding according to right reason, will not be able to turn thee aside from thy proper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent feelings towards them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not only in the matter of steady judgement and action, but also in the matter of gentleness towards those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to be diverted from thy course of action and to give way through fear; for both are equally deserters from their post, the man who does it through fear, and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman and a friend.

XI.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.17#

There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate the nature of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed, hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and careless and changeable.

XI.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.18#

If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy judgement about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.

XI.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.19#

The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure, when it is neither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees the truth, the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself.

XI.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.2#

Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by this; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in the matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do the same; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to value them little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life.

XI.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.20#

Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior parts ought to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is for the common advantage may be done in some way?

XI.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.21#

Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to raise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.

XI.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.22#

How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal with thee in a fair way.—What art thou doing, man? There is no occasion to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man’s character is, he immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander as soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking.

XI.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.23#

As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all together, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain immovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgements about them, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgements have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time, and then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in them, and they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek his own good.

XI.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.24#

Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and into what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has changed, and that it will sustain no harm.

XI.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.25#

If any have offended against thee, consider first: What is my relation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another respect, I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from this: If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the superior, and these for the sake of one another.

XI.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.26#

Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so forth: and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what they do.

XI.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.27#

Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be displeased; but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word wrongdoers to their neighbours.

XI.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.28#

Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that thou art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost abstain from such faults.

XI.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.29#

Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable him to pass a correct judgement on another man’s acts.

XI.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.3#

What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a man’s own judgement, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, without tragic show.

XI.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.30#

Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man’s life is only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead.

XI.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.31#

Seventh, that it is not men’s acts which disturb us, for those acts have their foundation in men’s ruling principles, but it is our own opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgement about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else.

XI.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.32#

Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we are angry and vexed.

XI.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.33#

Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible, if it be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring thyself, my child.—And show him with gentle tact and by general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, but affectionately and without any rancour in thy soul; and not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present …

XI.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.34#

Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou must equally avoid flattering men and being veied at them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves and courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in which a man’s mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both submit.

XI.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.35#

But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the Muses [Apollo], and it is this—that to expect bad men not to do wrong is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.

XI.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.36#

There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each occasion thus: this thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy social union: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real thoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less honourable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross pleasures.

XI.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.37#

Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee, though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the compound mass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee and the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner then the elemental parts obey the universal, for when they have been fixed in any place perforce they remain there until again the universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and discontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those things which are conformable to its nature: still it does not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the movement towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens, then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety and reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment with the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior to acts of justice.

XI.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.38#

He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be one and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest; so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a common kind [social] and political. For he who directs all his own efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same.

XI.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.39#

Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation of the town mouse.

XI.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.4#

Have I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop doing such good.

XI.40

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.40#

Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of Lamiæ, bugbears to frighten children.

XI.41

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.41#

The Lacedæmonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.

XI.42

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.42#

Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying, It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends, that is, I would not receive a favour and then be unable to return it.

XI.43

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.43#

In the writings of the Ephesians there was this precept, constantly to think of some one of the men of former times who practised virtue.

XI.44

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.44#

The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.

XI.45

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.45#

Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates said to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when they saw him dressed thus.

XI.46

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.46#

Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself. Much more is this so in life.

XI.47

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.47#

And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.

XI.48

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.48#

To look for the fig in winter is a madman’s act: such is he who looks for his child when it is no longer allowed.

XI.49

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.49#

When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to himself, “Tomorrow perchance thou wilt die.”—But those are words of bad omen.—“No word is a word of bad omen,” said Epictetus, “which expresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped.”

XI.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.5#

What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well except by general principles, some about the nature of the universe, and others about the proper constitution of man?

XI.50

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.50#

The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape, all are changes, not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet.

XI.51

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.51#

No man can rob us of our free will. Epictetus also said, A man must discover an art [or rules] with respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.

XI.52

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.52#

The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about being mad or not.

XI.53

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.53#

Socrates used to say, What do you want? Souls of rational men or irrational?—Souls of rational men.—Of what rational men? Sound or unsound?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek for them?—Because we have them.—Why then do you fight and quarrel?

XI.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.6#

At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding men of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to nature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with what is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which takes place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be accomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out, “O Cithæron.” And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic writers, of which kind is the following especially:

XI.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.7#

And again—

XI.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.8#

We must not chafe and fret at that which happens.

XI.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XI.9#

And—

XII. How Many Kinds of Soldiery There Are, and Concerning Mercenaries

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII. How Many Kinds of Soldiery There Are, and Concerning Mercenaries#

Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence and defence which belong to each of them.

XII.1

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.1#

All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road, thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety and justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayest be content with the lot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee for it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayest always speak the truth freely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to law and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man’s wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will look to this. If then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have begun to live according to nature—then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen daily as if they were something unexpected, and to be dependent on this or that.

XII.10

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.10#

Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.

XII.11

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.11#

Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness; how no man is hindered by another; that everything is opinion.

XII.12

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.12#

In the application of thy principles thou must be like the pancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand, and needs to do nothing else than use it.

XII.13

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.13#

See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form and purpose.

XII.14

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.14#

What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and to accept all that God may give him.

XII.15

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.15#

With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we should blame nobody.

XII.16

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.16#

How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at anything which happens in life.

XII.17

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.17#

Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind Providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director (Book IV). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou resist? But if there is a Providence which allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if there is a confusion without governor, be content that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not carry away.

XII.18

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.18#

Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendour until it is extinguished; and shall the truth which is in thee and justice and temperance be extinguished before thy death?

XII.19

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.19#

When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong, say, How then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? and so this is like tearing his own face. Consider that he, who would not have the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree to bear juice in the figs and infants to cry and the horse to neigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such a character? If then thou art irritable, cure this man’s disposition.

XII.2

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.2#

God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble himself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and suchlike externals and show.

XII.20

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.20#

If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it. For let thy efforts be—

XII.21

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.21#

In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the material, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.

XII.22

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.22#

Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more divine than the things which cause the various affects, and as it were pull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind? Is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind?

XII.23

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.23#

First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second, make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.

XII.24

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.24#

Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are now living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned and to perish in order that other things in continuous succession may exist.

XII.25

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.25#

Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay.

XII.26

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.26#

Any one activity whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done this act, does he suffer any evil for this reason that the act has ceased. In like manner then the whole which consists of all the acts, which is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the whole universe continues ever young and perfect. And everything which is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable and profitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is moved by the deity who is moved in the same manner with the deity and moved towards the same things in his mind.

XII.27

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.27#

These three principles thou must have in readiness. In the things which thou doest do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee from without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to Providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse Providence. Second, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back of the same, and of what things every being is compounded and into what things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up above the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe the variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst see at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell around in the air and the æther, consider that as often as thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and shortness of duration. Are these things to be proud of?

XII.28

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.28#

Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from casting it away?

XII.29

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.29#

When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten this, that a man’s wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou hast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so and will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too, how close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that every man’s intelligence is a god, and is an efflux of the deity; and forgotten this, that nothing is a man’s own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from the deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses only this.

XII.3

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.3#

The things are three of which thou art composed, a little body, a little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body, is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere,

XII.30

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.30#

Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained greatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then think where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a tale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this sort, how Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiæ, and Tiberius at Capreæ and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager pursuit of anything conjoined with pride; and how worthless everything is after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it is for a man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself just, temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all simplicity: for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable of all.

XII.31

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.31#

To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods or how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshipest them? I answer, in the first place, they may be seen even with the eyes; in the second place, neither have I seen even my own soul and yet I honour it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate them.

XII.32

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.32#

The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what it is itself, what is its material, what the formal part; with all thy soul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains except to enjoy life by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the smallest intervals between?

XII.33

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.33#

There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls, mountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance, though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their several qualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things which have been mentioned all the other parts, such as those which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no fellowship: and yet even these parts the intelligent principle holds together, and the gravitation towards the same. But intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which is of the same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for communion is not interrupted.

XII.34

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.34#

What dost thou wish? to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to have sensation? movement? growth? and then again to cease to grow? to use thy speech? to think? What is there of all these things which seems to thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all these things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and god. But it is inconsistent with honouring reason and god to be troubled because by death a man will be deprived of the other things.

XII.35

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.35#

How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned to every man! for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal. And how small a part of the whole substance! and how small a part of the universal soul! and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except to act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common nature brings.

XII.36

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.36#

How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in this. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.

XII.37

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.37#

This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death, that even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have despised it.

XII.38

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.38#

The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to whom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts conformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether he contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time—for this man neither is death a terrible thing ( III.7 ↖ Book III ; VI.23 ↖ Book VI ; X.20 ↖ Book X ; XII.23 ↖ Book XII ).

XII.39

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.39#

Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world]; what difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]? for that which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, but nature who brought thee into it? the same as if a prætor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.—“But I have not finished the five acts, but only three of them.”—Thou sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be a complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its composition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of neither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is satisfied.

XII.4

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.4#

All round, and in its joyous rest reposing;

XII.5

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.5#

and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is, the present—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which remains for thee up to the time of thy death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee].

XII.6

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.6#

I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he could not endure it even for a single day. So much more respect have we to what our neighbours shall think of us than to what we shall think of ourselves.

XII.7

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.7#

How can it be that the gods after having arranged all things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should never exist again, but should be completely extinguished?

XII.8

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.8#

But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have been so:—for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the diety; and we should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and most just;—but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally.

XII.9

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XII.9#

Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all other things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than the right hand; for it has been practised in this.

XIII. Concerning Auxiliaries, Mixed Soldiery, and One’s Own

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XIII. Concerning Auxiliaries, Mixed Soldiery, and One’s Own#

Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.

XIV. That Which Concerns a Prince on the Subject of the Art of War

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XIV. That Which Concerns a Prince on the Subject of the Art of War#

A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

XIX. That One Should Avoid Being Despised and Hated

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XIX. That One Should Avoid Being Despised and Hated#

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.

XV. Concerning Things for Which Men, and Especially Princes, Are Praised or Blamed

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XV. Concerning Things for Which Men, and Especially Princes, Are Praised or Blamed#

It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil.

XVI. Concerning Liberality and Meanness

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XVI. Concerning Liberality and Meanness#

Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. Therefore, anyone wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by anyone; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.

XVII. Concerning Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved Than Feared

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XVII. Concerning Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved Than Feared#

Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only.

XVIII. Concerning the Way in Which Princes Should Keep Faith

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XVIII. Concerning the Way in Which Princes Should Keep Faith#

Everyone admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

XX. Are Fortresses, and Many Other Things to Which Princes Often Resort, Advantageous or Hurtful?

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XX. Are Fortresses, and Many Other Things to Which Princes Often Resort, Advantageous or Hurtful?#

Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.

XXI. How a Prince Should Conduct Himself So as to Gain Renown

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XXI. How a Prince Should Conduct Himself So as to Gain Renown#

Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against him.

XXII. Concerning the Secretaries of Princes

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XXII. Concerning the Secretaries of Princes#

The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.

XXIII. How Flatterers Should Be Avoided

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XXIII. How Flatterers Should Be Avoided#

I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when everyone may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.

XXIV. Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XXIV. Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States#

The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.

XXV. What Fortune Can Effect in Human Affairs and How to Withstand Her

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XXV. What Fortune Can Effect in Human Affairs and How to Withstand Her#

It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.

XXVI. An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

XXVI. An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians#

Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.